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INTRODUCTION

It has been observed that "[p]erhaps no management problem
looms larger to conservationists and fishermen than that of enforcement." 1 This comment is certainly true of the Fishery Conservation
and Management Act of 1976.2 The enforceability, or lack thereof, of
the aptly-numbered House Bill 200 was one of the chief issues raised
in the debates preceding passage of the Act. 3 Enforcement difficulties
also were noted in President Ford's statement upon signing the billa statement that many observers thought sounded more like a veto
message. Despite extensive discussion of these matters, which really
spoke to the question whether any 200-mile law was workable, rather
little detailed attention was given, on the public record, to the enforcement mechanisms established by the Act. 5 A number of important legal
.

Alverson & Paulik, Objectives and Problems of Managing Aquatic Living Re-

sources, 30 J. FISHERIES RESEARCH BOARD CANADA

1936, 1944 (1973).

reprinted in

Fisheries Jurisdiction: Hearings on Extending the Jurisdiction of the United States
Beyond the Present Twelve-Mile Fishery Zone Before the Subconm. on Fisheries and
Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House C'omm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 94-4, at 297, 307 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as 1975 House Merchant Marine Hearings].
2. Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (1976) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 18011882 (West Supp. 1977) [hereinafter cited as FCMA or "the Act"].
3. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. S21,088 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1974) (remarks of Sen.
Stevens); id. at S21,090 (remarks of Sen. Tunney); id. at S21,092 (remarks of Sen.
Packwood); id. at S21,093 (remarks of Sen. Thurmond); id. at S21,095 (remarks of
Sen. Cranston); id. at S21,100 (remarks of Sen. Stennis); id. at S21,105 (remarks of
Sen. Kennedy); id. at S21,128 (remarks of Sen. Stennis); 121 CONG. REC. H9914
(daily ed. Oct. 9, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Sullivan); id. at H9930 (remarks of Rep.
Emery); 121 CONG. REC. S19,947 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Gravel);
121 CONG. REC. S19,752 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Stevens); 122
CONG. REC. H2522 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Bob Wilson).
4. Statement by President Gerald R. Ford Upon Signing H.R. 200 into Law. 12
WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 644 (Apr. 13, 1976), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON
COMMERCE & NAT'L OCEAN POLICY STUDY, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976, at 34, 35
(Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. President Ford

noted that the provision for United States enforcement with respect to anadromous
species of United States origin beyond the 200-mile fishery conservation zone would,

in the absence of international agreement, "be contrary to the sound precepts of international jurisprudence." Id. at 35. He also suggested that provisions for seizure of
"unauthorized fishing vessels ...
lack adequate assurances of reciprocity in keeping
with the tenets of international law." Id.

5. For a rare exception see 1975 House Merchant Marine Hearings, supra note I.
at 648-49, 654-59 (testimony of William C. Brewer, Gen. Counsel. NOAA). In important respects the enforcement provisions were fashioned in working sessions of
the House and Senate Committee staffs, or by correspondence with concerned agencies
that has not been published as of this writing. The utility of such materials as legislative history sources is limited. Cf. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1278-83
(tentative ed. 1958).
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issues appear to have been overlooked or finessed during the legislative
process. These issues will presumably be confronted and, one hopes,
resolved as the federal government organizes and implements its program under the new law.
The purposes of this article are to analyze the enforcement provisions of the FCMA, to compare them with the terms of prior United
States fisheries legislation, and to consider the probable shape of the
enforcement program under the new law. Where appropriate, consideration will be given to parallel foreign developments as well as the
possible interaction with the Revised Single Negotiating Text distributed at the end of the New York session of the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea in May 1976.6 In several instances,
the need for corrective legislation, which is apparently being addressed within the Executive Branch,7 will be noted.
II.

BASIC PROHIBITIONS AND REACH

A.

ProhibitedConduct

The FCMA weaves a web of prohibitions potentially far more
complex than existed under the Bartlett Act. 8 The basic source for the
prohibitions is section 307, which makes it unlawful to violate any
provision of the Act, any regulation or permit thereunder, or any
Governing International Fishery Agreement (GIFA) or implementing
regulation. 9 The Act also outlaws the use of a fishing vessel whose
permit has been revoked or suspended, 1° and makes it unlawful to
refuse to permit an authorized boarding," to "forcibly assault, resist,
oppose, impede, intimidate, or interfere with" enforcement personnel, 12 to resist a proper arrest, 13 to traffic in illegal fish, 14 or "to inter6.

5 Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 125-201, U.N.

Docs. AICONF.62/WP.8/Rev. I & AICONF.62/WP.9Rev. 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Third U.N. Conf.].
7. See Statement by President Ford, supra note 4.

8. Act of May 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-308, 78 Stat. 194, as amended by Act of

Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-514, 84 Stat. 1296 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1081-1086
(1970) (repealed 1976), discussed in Fidell, Ten Years Under the Bartlett Act: A
Status Report on the Prohibition on Foreign Fishing, 54 B.U.L. REv. 703 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Bartlett Act Status Report].

9. FCMA § 307(1)(A), (C), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1857(1)(A), (C) (West Supp. 1977).
10. Id. § 307(1)(B), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1857(1)(B).
11. Id. § 307(1)(D), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1857(1)(D).
12. Id. § 307(I)(E), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1857(1)(E).
13. Id. § 307(I)(F), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1857(1)(F).
14. Id. § 307(1)(G), 16 U.S.C.A. §1857(1)(G).
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fere with, delay, or prevent, by any means, the apprehension or arrest
of another person, knowing that such other person has committed any
act prohibited by" section 307.15 These prohibitions apply to "any
person," a term defined in the Act to include "any individual (whether
or not a citizen or national of the United States), any corporation,
partnership, association, or other entity (whether or not organized or
existing under the laws of any State), and any Federal, State, local, or
foreign government or any entity of any such government.""'6 Accordingly, the prohibitions of section 307(1) apply not only to masters of
vessels, who were the only parties directly subject to the Bartlett Act,17
but to crewmembers as well.
Section 307(2) carries forward, with important changes, the prohibitions of the Bartlett Act by making it unlawful for vessels other than
vessels of the United States, t8 and for the owners or operators of such
vessels, to engage in fishing either "within the boundaries of any
State," 9 or, unless pursuant to a permit under section 204(b) or (c),
within the fishery conservation zone, or for United States anadromous
species, or for Continental Shelf fishery resources.2 0 Aside from the
novelty of the assertion of broadened jurisdiction over anadromous
fishes, section 307(2) departs from the Bartlett Act model by substituting "owner or operator" for the phrase "master or other person in
charge," thereby raising the spectre of criminal prosecution of owners
under section 309(a)(2). The difficulties of obtaining personal jurisdiction over a non-resident owner of a foreign vessel for purposes of
such a prosecution suggest that practice will continue to be as it was
15. Id. § 307(1)(H). 16 U.S.C.A. § 1857(l)(H).
16.
. § 319), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(19).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 1081 (1970) (repealed 1976). See generally Bartlett Act Status
Report, supra note 8, at 725 n. 116.
18. The Bartlett Act did not itself define this term, although regulations on foreign
harvesting of Continental Shelf fishery resources were issued to apply to "any foreign
flag vessel." 50 C.F.R. § 295.3(d) (1976). The FCMA defines the term "vessel of the
United States" as "any vessel documented under the laws of the United States or registered under the laws of any State." FCMA § 3(25), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(25) (West
Supp. 1977). This is consistent with the interpretation placed on the Bartlett Act by
the Treasury, T.D. 56382(6). 100 Treas. Dec. 145 (1965). and no difference in coverage appears to have been intended by the drafters. The Act defines "foreign fishing"
as "fishing by a vessel other than a vessel of the United States." FCMA § 3(12). 16
U.S.C.A. § 1802(12) (West Supp. 1977), a definition the Senate Commerce Committee explained by noting that "[t ] he determinant is the flag of the vessel. If the vessel
flies the flag of, i.e., is registered in, a foreign nation, it is included in the term." S.
REP. No. 94-416. 94th Cong.. 1st Sess. 20 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY.
supra note 4. at 653. 676. But see note 37 infra.
19. FCMA § 307(2)(A), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1857(2)(A) (West Supp. 1977).
20. Id. § 307(2)(B), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1857(2)(B).
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under the prior statutory scheme: namely, criminal prosecution of the
21
master, if anyone.
The FCMA goes considerably beyond the Bartlett Act in providing
definitions of prohibited conduct. For example, where the Bartlett Act
used the concept of "activities in support of a foreign fishery fleet"
separately from "engaging in the fisheries, '22 the FCMA treats support as a type of fishing. Thus, "operations at sea in support of, or in
preparation for" fishing are meshed with the more conventional notions
of fishing as actual or attempted catching, taking, or harvesting of fish,
or "any other activity which can reasonably be expected to result in the
catching, taking, or harvesting of fish."'23 This definition of support
activities is little more enlightening than the bald words of the Bartlett
Act prohibition, but considerable further light is shed on the matter by
a portion of the definition of "fishing vessel," which refers to vessels
"used for, equipped to be used for, or of a type which is normally used
for. . . aiding or assisting one or more vessels at sea in the performance of any activity relating to fishing, including, but not limited to,
preparation, supply, storage, refrigeration, transportation, or processing."24 In the author's view, the two provisions just quoted must
21.

In only one Bartlett Act case was a person other than a master prosecuted.

United States v. Artemov, Crim. No. A-21-72 (D. Alas., filed Feb. 4, 1972) (fleet
commander), discussed in Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8, at 723 n.109.

Section 307(2) includes any "operator" of an offending vessel. Whether one who was
not the master still had effective control over a vessel's activities so as to be deemed
an operator would be a question of fact. Where a person other than the master is
prosecuted on such a theory, the propriety of punishing the master as well may be
questioned. Cf. FIsHING NEws INT'L, Nov. 1976, at 19 (acquittal of sleeping master
of West German trawler by Norweigan court where mate on watch was convicted).
Canadian regulations exclude pilots from the category of persons having command or

charge of a vessel. Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations, § 2, 110 Can. Gaz. 3318
(1976).
22.
23.

16 U.S.C. § 1081 (1970) (repealed 1976).
FCMA § 3(10), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(10) (West Supp. 1977). Support acti-

vities are also assimilated with fishing in regulations under the Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975, 16 U.S.C. § 971-971h (Supp. V 1975). See 50 C.F.R. § 285.1
(1976). Note also that the FCMA does not require that the support activity be in aid

of a foreign fishery fleet-support of a single foreign fishing vessel suffices-thus resolving what was an open issue under the Bartlett Act. See Bartlett Act Status Report,

supra note 8, at 723.
Section 3(10)(C), prohibiting the "other activity" noted in the text, was suggested
by the Department of Justice in order to "clarify the authority of the Federal Govern-

ment to promulgate and enforce regulations prohibiting the unintentional taking of
continental shelf fisheries resources by foreign bottom trawlers." Letter from Michael

M. Uhlmann, Ass't Att'y Gen., to Rep. Leonor K. Sullivan, Chairperson, House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries (Feb. 24, 1976) at 6 (on file with the
Washington Law Review).
24. FCMA § 3(11), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(11) (West Supp. 1977).
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be read together in order to make sense of the entire statutory scheme.
Moreover, this listing surprisingly fails to cover all the forms of sup-

port activity that were previously identified in agency guidelines, for
example, transfer of personnel, or repairs. 25 Happily, the power of the

Secretary of Commerce to issue regulations 26 has been used to state
more precisely the types of conduct that are within the reach of this
27
portion of the prohibition.
Even the ban on fishing proper is not without problems of interpretation. For one thing, the FCMA fails to provide a completely satisfactory answer to the question whether recreational fishing is prohibited, although the balance tips in favor of inclusion of such fishing.

The unadorned words of the statute are broad enough to cover recreational angling,2 8 and regulations issued under other federal legislation

support the common sense notion that angling-the use of a handheld rod and reel to take fish for sport-involves "the taking or the
attempted taking of fish. '' 29 Plainly, however, such fishing was not the
chief evil the FCMA was intended to eradicate, and one may safely
25. Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8, at 722 & nn.100-01; Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic Center, Notice to Mariners No. 1, § 1(19) (Jan. I. 1977).
26. FCMA § 305(g), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(g) (West Supp. 1977).
27. 50 C.F.R. § 611.2(n)(2), 42 Fed. Reg. 8815 (1977); cf. Bartlett Act Status
Report, supra note 8, at 723 & n.109 (suggesting issuance of explanatory regulations
to define "support activity").
28. See FCMA § 3(10)(A)-(B), 16 U.S.C.A. §1802(10)(A)-(B) (West Supp.
1977). See also id. § 3(7)(A), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(7)(A) ("fishery" defined as stocks
of fish "identified on the basis of ... recreational . . . characteristics"); S. REP. No.

94-416. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. supra
note 4, at 653, 675. Canadian regulations, by expressly permitting United States sport
fishing (defined as "fishing for pleasure and not for sale or barter"), seem to suggest
that sport fishing by vessels of other nations must be by permit. Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations, 99 2, 16, 110 Can. Gaz. 3318, 3319, 3325 (1976). The regulations do not squarely answer the question, as the permits provision refers only to
commercial and research fishing. id. § 5(a)(i), 110 Can. Gaz. at 3319, although one
senior American official has noted that the Canadian law "applied to recreational fishing." 200-Mile Fisheries Zone and Joint Ventures: Hearings on Oversight on the Administration of Public Law 94-265, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act
of 1976 Before the Subcomntn. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 94-44, at 94
(1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 House Oversight Hearings] (testimony of Rozanne
L. Ridgway, Deputy Ass't Sec'y of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs). A recent
fisheries agreement negotiated with Canada lends support to the notion that recreational fishing is covered by the FCMA. See Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement. Feb. 24.
1977, United States-Canada. art. XII, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 95-90. 95th Cong..
1st Sess. 6 (1977).
29. See 50 C.F.R. § 285.1 (1976). The FCMA, it may be added, specifically includes attempted catching of fish as a subtype of fishing. FCMA § 3(10)(B). 16
U.S.C.A. § 1802(10)(B) (West Supp. 1977). A similar dichotomy found in British
legislation has been properly condemned as "otiose," with additional comment as
follows:
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assume that, at worst, isolated incidents of foreign angling in waters
covered by the Act would lead to issuance of a citation under section
30
311(c).
With regard to fishery research, the FCMA provides a clearer answer than did the Bartlett Act, although it was possible to infer from
the latter's provision for permits for international organizations' research activities3 1 that such activities were, in the absence of a permit,
illegal. The FCMA takes a different approach and affirmatively excludes from the definition of "fishing" "any scientific research activity
which is conducted by a scientific research vessel. '32 Thus, the limitation of this exemption to vessels owned or operated by an international organization of which the United States is a member, which the
Perhaps the offence of attempting to fish may be committed when the crew are
trying unsuccessfully to cast their nets outboard but that is not a very satisfactory
proposition. Once the nets are in the water, fishing has clearly commenced and
there can be no question of the defendant being guilty of an attempt. It is thought
that fishing continues until the net or line is returned inboard, since until that moment the fish have a chance to escape.
R. STURT, FISHERY PROTECTION AND FOREIGN SEA-FISHING BOATS 15-16 (1972). See

also Moiser, Fishery Protection, 141 JUST. P. 337 (1977). The observatfons seem
entirely applicable to the FCMA and its prohibitions.
30. See generally text accompanying notes 268-87 infra.
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1081 (1970) (repealed 1976). This provision was apparently
never used. See Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8, at 709 & n.29; H. R. REP.
No. 94-445, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 55 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 4, at 1051, 1107.
32. FCMA § 3(10), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(10) (West Supp. 1977). See also 42
Fed. Reg. 8813, 8815 (1977) (to be codified in 50 C.F.R. § 611.2). The Polish GIFA
subtly and, one expects, inadvertently distorts the structure of this section of the Act
by showing the research exception as a proviso only to the support activities clause
of the definition of "fishing." The GIFA also deviates from the Act by its exclusion of
"other legitimate uses of the high seas," only one of which is research activities. See
Agreement Concerning Fisheries Off the Coast of the United States, Aug. 2, 1976,
United States-Poland, art. II(5)(d), reprinted in H. R. Doc. No. 94-613, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1976), discussed in Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress,
Memorandum to House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Sept. 27, 1976,
reprinted in 1976 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 28, at 58 (1976). The apparent purpose of the latter change was to underscore the United States commitment to
unimpeded free transit through the fishery conservation zone. See id. at 62 (testimony
of Rozanne L. Ridgway, Deputy Ass't Sec'y of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs).
Other variances between the FCMA and the GIFA with Poland relating to support
activities seem not to reflect materially on the scope or meaning of the Act. See id.
at 58, 63 (discussing FCMA §§ 3(10)(D), 3(11)(B)). In contrast with FCMA §
3(9), Canadian regulations require that foreign vessels have a permit even when
"fishing for purposes of scientific research." Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations,
§ 5(a)(i), 110 Can. Gaz. 3318, 3319 (1976).
The policy of the FCMA was applied even before the Act took effect. In December
1976, the French research ship Cryos was found to have retained nearly 300 pounds
of lobster, but the only sanction imposed was a seizure of the lobster, which-alas-was later destroyed by the National Marine Fisheries Service. See Nat'l Fisherman,
Apr. 1977, § A at 28, cols. 4-5.
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House bill had sought to perpetuate, 33 did not survive. Instead, the
Conference Committee merely noted that it "does not consider the
conducting of tests of fishing gear to be scientific research within the
meaning of the bill." 34 Presumably, this congressional gloss on the
exemption for research is intended to permit such "pure" fishery research as is involved, for example, in the search for new species, or in
the assessment of impact of various conditions upon fish stocks. The
limitation to activities conducted by a research vessel, however,
should be elaborated in regulations to provide, at a minimum, for prior
notification to the United States of the name of the vessel, the duration
of its stay in controlled waters, and the nature of its research program.
Another issue to be faced is when is a vessel a vessel of the United
States? To what country does a given vessel belong for purposes of the
FCMA? The use of flags-of-convenience and charter parties may
make it more difficult than one might have imagined to resolve such
questions.3 5 The Senate Commerce Committee's report on Senate bill
961 appeared to make short shrift of the first of these questions by
noting, in explanation of the definition of "foreign fishing," that
"[t] he determinant is the flag of the vessel. If the vessel flies the flag
36
of, i.e., is registered in, a foreign nation, it is included in the term."
Passing over the potentially troublesome matter of permissible foreign
investment in domestic fishing ventures, 37 this language may be helpful
33.

H.R. REP. No. 94-445, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 50. 55 (1975). reprinted in LEG-

ISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1051, 1102, 1107.

34. S. REP. No. 94-711, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1976), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 4, at 37, 79. The Department of State has somewhat clarified the
meaning of the "'research" clause by announcing that "fishing carried out for the purpose of training fishermen" would not be deemed research exempt from the permit
requirements of the Act. "Fisheries research which assists in the conservation and
management of the stocks, and the identification of the fishery resources of the fisheries
conservation zone is encouraged .. . [and] when undertaken in full cooperation with
the United States, shall not be deemed to be fishing within the meaning of the Act."
U.S. Dep't of State, Policy Guidelines: Scientific Research in the Fishery Conservation
Zone, Feb. 22. 1977.
35. For a helpful summary of the phenomenon of "'pseudoforeign" vessels used to
evade Scottish fishery regulations at the turn of the century, see D. JOHNSTON. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 327 n. 18 (1965) (quoting T. FULTON. THE SOVEREIGNTY
OF THE SEA 729 n. 1 (1911)).

36. S. REP. No. 94-416, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1975). reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY. supra note 4. at 653, 676. This view has been accepted by the State Department. 1976 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 28, at 145, 158 (testimony of Rozanne L. Ridgway, Deputy Ass't Sec'y of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs).
37. See generally 1976 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 28, at 137-205:
Wall. St. J., Apr. 20, 1977, at 4, col. I, reprinted in 123 CONG. REC. E2350 (daily
ed. Apr. 21, 1977). As the Department of Transportation pointed out when H.R. 200
and S. 961 were in conference. " [t]
he Senate definition of'vessel of the United States'
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in showing when a vessel is a foreign vessel, but it does not really address the situation in which a vessel is owned or operated by citizens
of one foreign nation and flies the flag of another. Such arrangements
may cause no particular enforcement difficulties, 38 but if an enterprise
in a foreign country that has approval for its vessels to fish or conduct
other generally prohibited activities in coastal waters in turn charters
a vessel of another foreign nation either for "true" fishing 39 or for support activities, 4 0 complex issues of negotiation and interpretation would
arise, thereby further complicating the enforcement function.
In either of the described cases a section 204 permit would be required under the FCMA, but the Act refers to the submission of applications by a GIFA country "for a permit for each of its fishing

does not absolutely eliminate foreign fishing interests. Under present laws, a vessel can
be documented under the laws of the United States if owned by a domestic corporation, even if the majority shareholders are foreign citizens." Letter from John H. Ely,
Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Transportation, to Rep. Leonor K. Sullivan, Chairperson,
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries (Feb. 23, 1976) (on file with the
Washington Law Review). The matter was not resolved by the conferees, and accordingly, new legislation has been introduced to amend the FCMA to treat as foreign any
United States flag vessel that is 25% or more owned by foreign interests. H.R. 2564,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), discussed in 123 CONG. REC. H600-01,(daily ed. Jan. 27,
1977); id. E1263 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1977). See also 42 Fed. Reg. 30,875 (1977)
(notice of hearings to consider the desirability of rulemaking in this area). One form
of joint activity has already received official review. In response to an inquiry from
Alaskan officials, the Department of State has indicated that it would be permissible
under the FCMA for foreign vessels to purchase fishery products from American
fishermen inside the fishery conservation zone, and added that "fish caught by U.S.
fishermen within the U.S. fishery conservation zone, sold to foreign nationals, and delivered to these nationals within the zone would not be counted against any quotas
which may have been allocated by the United States to the government of the foreign
nationals involved in the transaction." Letter from Albert L. Zucca, Director, Office of
Fisheries Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, to Charles L. Meacham, Director, International
Fisheries and External Affairs, Office of the Governor of Alaska (March 2, 1977)
(on file with the Washington Law Review). Such legislation will plainly complicate
the enforcement function, for the enforcement agencies will no longer be able to rely
solely upon the vessel's flag to determine the regulatory limitations on the vessel's
activities.
In the past, where the government has found that registry of a fishing vessel to an
American citizen was fraudulent, the actual owner (and crew) being alien, it has proceeded against the vessel for unpaid duties. See U.S. Tariff Schedules, pt. 15, subpt. A,
Proc. No. 3548, 28 Fed. Reg. 8599 (1963); N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1937, at 1, col. 2;
id., Dec. 25, 1937, at 5, col. 1 (seizure of fishing vessel Nancy Hanks). See also 1
U.S.C. § 6 (1970).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Panamanian Long Liner Kwang Myong 21, Civil
No. A76-189 (D. Alas., filed Sept. 9, 1976) (Panamanian flag vessel operated by
South Korean corporation).
39. FCMA § 3(10)(A)-(C), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(10)(A)-(C) (West Supp.

1977).
40.

Id. § 3(10)(D), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(10)(D).
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vessels," 4 1 suggesting that only vessels registered in a country may be
sponsored by that country for United States fishing permits. Under the
Bartlett Act, the United States entered into some bilateral agreements
permitting otherwise prohibited support activities by vessels under
charter to the countries with which the agreements had been negotiated. 42 True to this approach, the Agreed Minutes to the Polish GIFA
allow Poland to apply for section 204 permits "for flag vessels of
other countries with which the United States has diplomatic relations,
chartered by or under contract to a Polish fishing company," 43 but it
is apparently the Administration's policy to issue permits only to ships
flying the flag of the GIFA nation seeking those permits, or to factory or other support vessels under charter to that nation, provided
those vessels in turn fly the flag of a GIFA country. Such an approach is a reasonable reconciliation of the terms of the Act and the
realities of international fishery business arrangements.
In general, no element of wilfulness is involved in the conduct proscribed by section 307 of the FCMA. 44 Section 307(2), the lineal descendant of the Bartlett Act's prohibitions on foreign fishing, 45 applies
to all fishing that falls within its terms; there is no requirement that the
perpetrator have intentionally violated these prohibitions. This was
the construction properly applied to the Bartlett Act 46 and it should be
applied to the FCMA as well. Neither statute imposes a moral stigma
upon a convicted defendant 47 and the absence of a "moral level" to
many fishing offenses has been cited as a reason for creation of the
41. Id. § 204(b)(1). 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b)(1) (emphasis added).
42. See Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8, at 724 & n.1 12, Agreement on
Certain Fisheries Problems on the High Seas in the Western Areas of the Middle Atlantic Ocean, Mar. I, 1976, United States-Soviet Union, art. VI(3), T.I.A.S. No. 8349.
43. Agreement Concerning Fisheries Off the Coasts of the United States. Aug. 2.
1976, United States-Poland, Agreed Minutes 1 5, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 94-613.
94th Cong.. 2d Sess. 21 (1976).
44. FCMA § 307, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1857 (West Supp. 1977).
45. S. REP. No. 94-711, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1976). reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 4, at 37, 92.
46. United States v. Ayo-Gonzalez, 536 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
97 S.Ct. 808 (1977). In an earlier case also involving Cuban fishing in the contiguous
fisheries zone off Texas, the master and owner had conceded that the Bartlett Act
.,requires no proof of specific intent to violate the contiguous fisheries zone in order to
impose both criminal and civil sanctions." Brief for Appellants at 16, United States v.
Sorina. 511 F.2d 1401 (5th Cir. 1975) (mem.).
47. See United States v. Ayo-Gonzalez, 536 F.2d 652, 661 (5th Cir. 1976). cert.
denied, 97 S.Ct. 808 (1977). Cf. Weng Chang Ngan v. H.M. Inspector of Fisheries.
No. M. 29176, slip op. at 7 (N.Z. Magis. Ct. App. Apr. 15. 1976) (foreign fishing "'is
a form of poaching which in these times does not or could not be said to attract particular odium").
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civil penalty sanction of section 307.48 Such a rule of strict liability is
also consistent with doctrine in other common law jurisdictions 49 and
reflects the exigencies of fisheries law enforcement. By the same token,
the statute and its legislative history provide no support for a contention that the prosecution must prove negligence in order to secure a
conviction or an order forfeiting the vessel. 50 Wilfulness of a violation,
however, would certainly be a pertinent consideration in the government's selection of a particular type of sanction, or in determining the
level of a civil penalty under section 308(a)51 or a forfeiture settle52
ment under section 310(a).
The prohibitions found in section 307(1) also are not qualified by a
requirement that the conduct be knowing or wilful, except in the case
of the bar on interference with the arrest of another person where the
offender must know "that such other person has committed any act
prohibited by" section 307. No showing is required that force was
used by an offender except with respect to section 307(1)(E), concerning forcible assault of, resistance to, or other interference with
enforcement personnel in the course of a search or inspection. As is
the case with the criminal code analogue to this provision, 53 the word

48.

1975 House Merchant Marine Hearings, supra note 1, at 658 (testimony of

William C. Brewer, Gen. Counsel, NOAA).
49. Weng Chang Ngan v. H.M. Inspector of Fisheries, No. M. 29176 (N.Z.
Magis. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 1976); Regina v. Itoh, No. 164175 (B.C. Ct. App. Apr. 23,
1975) (Carrothers, J. A.), citing Regina v. Pierce Fisheries Ltd., [1971] S.C.R. 5, 12

D.L.R.2d 591, 12 Can. Crim. Rep. (U.S.) 272 (1970); Minister for Agriculture and
Fisheries v. Shinkaruk, No. 19761383, slip op. at 4 (Cork, Ire., Dist. Ct., Oct. 13, 1976)

(app. pending), cert. refused sub nom. The State (Shinkaruk) v. District Justice Carroll, No. 19761502 (Ire. High Ct., Dec. 15, 1976). Oddly, there appears to be a divergence with respect to one type of offense--the sleeping master. United States law does
not excuse such a defendant from responsibility for his ship. Compare Bartlett Act
Status Report, supra note 8, at 735 n.178, and United States v. Fishing Vessel Retirement, Civil No. C76-614S (W.D. Wash. filed Sept. 8, 1976, dismissed Sept. 13, 1976),

with FISHING NEws INT'L, Nov. 1976, at 19 (acquittal of sleeping master of West German trawler Regulus by Norwegian court; mate on watch sentenced to NKrl5,000
fine for negligent navigation); see also R. STIRT, FISHERY PROTECTION AND FOREIGN
SEA-FSHING BOATS 14 (1972) (apparently indicating that it is an open question un-

der British law "whether if at the time of the offence the skipper is sleeping below
and one of the crew is in charge, both are guilty of an offence").
50. An amendment was offered to insert the phrase "knowingly and willingly" in
the House, but this did not pass. See 121 CONG. REC. H9953 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1975),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 930.
51. FCMA § 308(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1858(a) (West Supp. 1977). One of the §

308(a) criteria is "the degree of culpability." See generally text accompanying notes
179-89 infra.
52. FCMA § 310(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1860(a) (West Supp. 1977).
53.
18U.S.C.§ 111(1970).
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"forcibly" should be considered to modify not only the verb "assault,"
but in addition the other succeeding verbs.5 4 The amount of force that
must be displayed in order to violate this portion of the FCMA should
also be viewed as similar to that required by the general statute on interference with a federal official.5 5 From the structure and levels of
criminal punishment set forth in section 309(b),5 6 it may be inferred
that forcible resistance may occur without the use of a dangerous
weapon, conduct causing bodily injury, or even putting an enforcement officer "in fear of imminent bodily injury." The presence of
these circumstances merely serves to increase the penalties to higher
levels.
One episode in the legislative history dealt with the issue of refusals
to permit a boarding under section 307(1)(D). In the House debates,
Representative Eckhardt offered an amendment that would have excluded from that provision any refusal "pursuant to a right protected
by international law."'57 This amendment, justified by a desire to prevent hostile confrontations "to protect a bunch of haddock,"5 8 was,
surprisingly, accepted by the floor manager and agreed to by the
House. Fortunately, at the suggestion of the Departments of Transportation and Justice 59 the amendment was quietly deleted in the
Conference; if it had survived, it would have created an intolerable
degree of uncertainty in this important section, and would have compelled the district courts to address delicate law of the sea issues in
any case brought under the boarding provisions of section 307(1)(D).
This would, in all likelihood, have served to encourage rather than to
reduce obstructionism by, and conflict with, regulated foreign fishermen.
54. See Long v. United States, 199 F.2d 717 (4th Cir. 1952); United States v.
Bruce. 33 F.R.D. 133 (N.D. Miss. 1963).
55. The courts are divided on whether a threat coupled with apparent present
ability suffices under 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1970), or whether there must be an actual use
of force. Compare United States v. Cunningham, 509 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1975) and
United States v. Glover. 321 F. Supp. 591 (E.D. Ark. 1970) with United States v.
Bamberger, 452 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1043 (1972).
56. FCMA § 309(b). 16 U.S.C.A. § 1859(b) (West Supp. 1977).
57. 121 CONG. REC. H9980 (daily ed. Oct. 9. 1975) (remarks of Rep. Eckhardt),
reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1003.
58. Id.
59. Letter from John H. Ely. Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Transportation, to Rep.
Leonor K. Sullivan, Chairperson, House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
(Feb. 23. 1976) (on file with the Washington Law Review); Letter from Michael M.
Uhlmann, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Rep. Leonor K. Sullivan (Feb. 24, 1976) at 8 (on
file with the Washington Law Review).
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B.

GeographicalScope

A central question for enforcement purposes is the geographical
scope of the FCMA. This may be analyzed from two perspectives: (1)
What waters was the Act intended to cover (largely a question of definitions) and, more practically, (2) what are the metes and bounds of
the waters covered by the Act? These two issues will be addressed in
this section of the article.
1.

Waters subject to the Act

The Act has a different geographical reach for different purposes.
Thus, the FCMA asserts "exclusive fishery management authority"
over anadromous species throughout their migratory range, but not
"during the time [such species] are found within any foreign nation's
territorial sea or fishery conservation zone (or the equivalent), to the
'60
extent that such sea or zone is recognized by the United States.
Here, the jurisdiction follows the fish species of interest.
As to Continental Shelf fishery resources, the United States asserts
jurisdiction "beyond the fishery conservation zone, ' 61 as well as, by
implication, shoreward of the 200-mile limit. In a sense, the extent of
jurisdiction here is also defined by the species, because the Act, consonant with the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf62 and the
Bartlett Act, 63 defines the shelf to include "submarine areas adjacent
to the coast, but outside the area of the territorial sea, of the United
States, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the
depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of natural
resources of such areas."' 64 The list of shelf species developed under
66
the Bartlett Act 65 has been retained under the new law.

60.
61.
62.
311.
63.
64.
65.
66.

FCMA § 102(2), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1812(2) (West Supp. 1977).
Id. § 102(3), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1812(3).
Done Apr. 29, 1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S.
16 U.S.C. § 1085(d) (1970) (repealed 1976).
FCMA § 3(3), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(3) (West Supp. 1977).
50 C.F.R. § 295.4 (1976).
FCMA § 3(4), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(4) (West Supp. 1977). Three additional

species, the California spiny lobster, white abalone, and giant red sea urchin, have been
suggested by California authorities, Letter from Cal. Dep't of Fish & Game to Robert
W. Schoning, Director, Nat'l Marine Fisheries Service (May 25, 1976), but action on
the recommendation has been deferred. 41 Fed. Reg. 26,019 (1976).
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But principally, the FCMA asserts management jurisdiction over a
fishery conservation zone, defined as "a zone contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States [the inner boundary of which] is a line
coterminous with the seaward boundary of each of the coastal States,
and the outer boundary of such zone is a line drawn in such a manner
that each point on it is 200 nautical miles from the baseline from
which the territorial sea is measured." 6 7 Thus, with the present threemile limit of the territorial sea, 68 the fishery conservation zone is in
practical effect a 197-nautical-mile contiguous fisheries zone. 69 The
FCMA also includes protection against foreign fishing "within the
boundaries of any State,"'70 and grants the federal government limited
7
management powers within state waters (other than internal waters) '

67. FCMA § 101, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1811 (West Supp. 1977).
68. See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(8) (Supp. V
1975).
69. The contiguous fisheries zone under the Bartlett Act was measured from the
three-mile limit, whereas the fisheries conservation zone is measured from "the baseline
from which the territorial sea is measured." Hence if the territorial sea had been expanded under the Bartlett Act, the contiguous fisheries zone would have moved seaward; expansion of the territorial sea under the FCMA would merely serve to shrink
the fishery conservation zone. H.R. REP. No. 94-445, 94th Cong.. 1st Sess. 50 (1975).
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. ,upra note 4. at 105 1. 1101.

70. FCMA § 307(2)(A), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1857(2)(A)(WestSupp. 1977).
71. Id. § 306(b)(l)(B), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1856(b)(1)(B). The term "internal waters" is not defined in the FCMA, see 121 CONG. REC. H9920-21 (daily ed. Oct. 9.
1975) (remarks of Rep. Leggett), although an effort was made to define such waters
shoreward of the outer limits of the territorial sea of the United States. Id. at H9953
(remarks of Rep. Heckler). Such a definition would have deviated materially from the
meaning ascribed in article 5(1) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone, done Apr. 29, 1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639,
516 U.N.T.S. 205. That article defines internal waters as the "[w ] aters on the landward
side of the baseline of the territorial sea." To the extent that the seaward boundaries
of Texas and the Gulf Coast of Florida are nine nautical miles from shore rather
than three, United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960). the area subject to the
management authority of the Regional Council would be reduced commensurately.
This anomaly was defended by the Commerce Committee on the ground that "'it preserves the domestic breakdown of management authority between the States and the
Federal Government which has prevailed since the founding of the republic." S. REP.
No. 94-416, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY. supra
note 4, at 653, 678. Other events may upset this view because these two states have
been sued by the United States, in the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. for
a declaration that they are without jurisdiction over fishing beyond the three-mile
limit. United States v. Florida, No. 54 (orig.). On February 23. 1977, the Court. on
grounds of sovereign immunity, denied their motion for leave to file a counterclaim
for a declaration that they have jurisdiction over such fishing within that limit. 97 S.
Ct. 1166 (1977).
The Conference Committee apparently rejected an attempt by the Department of
Justice to create a uniform inner boundary for the fishery conservation zone. Compare
FCMA § 101, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1811 (West Supp. 1977) with Letter from Michael M.
Uhlmann, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Rep. Leonor K. Sullivan, Chairperson. House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries (Feb. 24, 1976) at 4 (on file with the
Washington Law Review).
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under extraordinary circumstances to protect a fishery that is predominantly engaged in within and beyond the fishery conservation zone.
The present issue is one of determining those land masses around
which the various jurisdictional areas created or recognized by the
FCMA are found.7 2 The Act is less than pellucid on this point, defining "State" to mean "each of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the
Virgin Islands, Guam, and any other Commonwealth, territory, or
possession of the United States, '73 but noting further that "[t] he term
'United States,' when used in a geographical context, means all the
74
States thereof.
Nevertheless, some of the uncertainty may be resolved fairly
readily. For example, section 307(2)(A) bars foreign fishing "within
the boundaries of any State." This would apply not only to the marginal sea but to internal waters as well, including the United States portion of the Great Lakes. The legislative history includes a sponsor's
statement that all states are covered by the FCMA,7 5 even though no
provision is made for a Great Lakes Regional Fishery Management
Council.7 6 Omission of the Great Lakes from the Regional Council
program may be explained by the fact that no fishery conservation
72. For a similar inquiry with respect to the reach of the former law see Bartlett
Act Status Report,supra note 8, at 713-15, 716-18.
73. FCMA § 3(21), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(21) (West Supp. 1977).
74. Id. § 3(24), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(24).
75. Passing over the FCMA's several special references to Alaska, FCMA §§

2(a)(7), 2(b)(6), 302(c)(2), 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801(a)(7), 1801(b)(6), 1852(c)(2)
(West Supp. 1977), Senator Magnuson, in the floor debates, stated: "This is not just
a bill for Alaska. This is a bill for all the other States." 122 CONG. REC. S121 (daily

ed. Jan. 19, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Magnuson), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 4, at 470. But cf. 120 CONG. REC. S21,080 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1974) (remarks of Sen. Magnuson) ("This applies to both coasts, the Pacific and the Atlantic,
and to the gulf"). The hearings that led to passage of the FCMA were focused virtually

exclusively on coastal problems, with very few references of any kind to the Great
Lakes. See 1975 House Merchant Marine Hearings, supra note 1, at 187 (testimony

of Howard W. Pollock, Deputy Adm'r, NOAA). Congressional leaders were, however,
aware of Great Lakes fishery problems at the time the FCMA was under consideration. See Letter from Rep. Leonor K. Sullivan, Chairperson, House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, to Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General (Nov. 19, 1975),
in I COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, No. B-177024, REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS: THE U.S. FISHING INDUSTRY-PRESENT CONDITION AND FUTURE OF

MARINE FISHERIES 124, 129 (Dec. 23, 1976). Specific evidence of fishing problems on
Lake Erie was brought to the attention of the 94th Congress after the FCMA had

been passed. See 122 CONG. REC. H3967 (daily ed. May 5, 1976) (remarks of Rep.
Pritchard).
76. Two of the Great Lakes states, New York and Pennsylvania, are included in
the Mid-Atlantic Council, but § 302(a)(2), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(a)(2) (West Supp.
1977), makes it plain that such membership pertains only to "the fisheries in the Atlantic Ocean seaward of such States."
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zone can exist on the Lakes in view of the legal status of the United
States portion of the Lakes as internal waters. 7 7 Under the Submerged
Lands Act the seaward boundary of Great Lakes states is the international boundary.78 It follows that under the new law, as under the old,
it will be a violation for Canadian vessels to fish on the United States
side of the Lakes' boundary, just as it would be for any foreign vessel
to fish within the territorial waters of a coastal state that borders on
the ocean waters.7 9 Any other interpretation would compel a conclusion that Congress had overruled the administrative gloss placed on
the Bartlett Act, a proposition for which no support has been found.80
Rather, the most that can be said is merely that the management authority vested by the Act in the federal government-as distinguished
from the bald prohibition on foreign fishing found in section
307(2)(A)--does not extend to the Great Lakes.
The provisions concerning composition of the Regional Councils
accurately reflect, albeit only by implication, the fact that no part of
the FCMA governs the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The
Senate had sought to include the Trust Territory, but the House did
77.
4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 190-92 (1965). But cf. 33
C.F.R. § 205.20(b) (1976). See generally D. PIPER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
GREAT LAKES (1962); Bedard, Le Regime Juridique des Grands Lacs, in CANADIAN
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 508, 509-10 (R. MacDonald,

G. Morris & D. Johnston, eds. 1974); Olds, The Law of the Lakes, 44 MICH. ST. B.J.
14(1965).
78. 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1970). The Conference Report states that " [t]he term 'seaward boundary' when used in reference to a coastal state has the same meaning as is
given to such term in the Submerged Lands Act of 1953." S. REP. No. 94-711. 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1976), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 37, 78.

Use of the term "coastal" here appears to have been surplusage. In any event, it is
worth noting that the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 defines "coastal state"
to include, inter alia, "a state ...

bordering on ... one or more of the Great Lakes."

16 U.S.C. § 1453(c) (Supp. V 1975). The exclusion of Great Lakes states from the
definition "coastal State" in the Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. § 1502(7)
(Supp. V 1975), does not argue against their inclusion under the FCMA, because
the principal purpose of the Deepwater Port Act was to provide a legal framework
for activities beyond territorial waters, a situation that cannot arise on the Great Lakes.
See text accompanying note 77 supra.
79. In fact, in the five years since the federal government decided that the Bartlett
Act applied to the Great Lakes, see Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8, at 71617, no Canadian fishing vessels have been seized by the Coast Guard, although that
agency has seized fishing gear believed to have been set by Canadian fishing tugs on the
United States side of the boundary in Lake Erie. Cleveland Plain Dealer, Oct. 23.
1975, § A, at 16, col. 3; Toledo, Ohio, Blade, Oct. 23. 1975, at 4, col. I.
80. Indeed, the Conference Report specifically indicates that the Bartlett Act prohibitions are preserved to the extent not modified by the FCMA. S. REP. No. 94-711.
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1976), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at

37, 92. The Bartlett Act is formally repealed by § 402 of the FCMA.
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not. The latter prevailed in conference. 8 1 In light of the reasoning set
forth above concerning the Great Lakes, it would have been tidier to
accomplish this result by appropriately adjusting the definitions rather
than the Regional Council composition section of the law. In any
event, exclusion of these islands from the FCMA's coverage is consistent with the construction applied administratively to the Bartlett
Act. 82 Presumably, once the new Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands83 comes into being, the Act will be held to apply to
them; at that time, those islands should be afforded full membership
84
on the Western Pacific Council.
The usual miscellaneous geographical questions still linger under
the new law. For one thing, apparently in the interests of not further
exacerbating relations with Panama, 85 the Canal Zone is not mentioned by name, either among the definitions or in the listing of Caribbean Council members. Also in the Caribbean, the status of Quita
81.

Compare S. REP. No. 94-416, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1975), reprinted in

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 655, 658, with H.R. REP. No. 94-445, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1051,

1101 and S. REP. No. 94-711, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1976), reprinted in LEGISLA-

TIVE HISTORY, supranote 4, at 37, 78.

82. Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8, at 717-18 & n.77. See also Agreement
on Certain Fisheries Off the United States Coast, Salmon Fisheries and King and
Tanner Crab, Dec. 24, 1974, United States-Japan, Agreed Minutes 1, 25 U.S.T. 3185,
T.I.A.S. No. 7986 (exclusion of Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands from bilateral
fisheries arrangements). Department of Transportationand Related Agencies Appropriationsfor 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Department of Transportation
and Related Agencies Appropriations of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 278 (testimony of Adm. 0. W. Siler, Commandant, U.S.
Coast Guard) (Coast Guard has no authority to patrol Trust Territory for fisheries
violations). On the other hand, it is anomalous-that Congress extended to 200 miles
the coverage of the Marine Mammal Protection Act, which does apply to the Trust
Territory. FCMA § 404(a) (amending 16 U.S.C. § 1362(15)(B) (Supp. V 1975));
16 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (Supp. V 1975) (term "United States" includes Trust'Teriitory).
Legislation has been introduced in the Congress of Micronesia jo create a Marine
Space Jurisdiction that would have the effect of regulating foreign fishing within 200
miles of the Trust Territory's islands. H.B. 7-92, 7th Cong. of Micronesia, Ist Reg.
Sess. (1977).
83. See Covenant to Establish A Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
in Political Union with the United States, Feb. 15, 1975, United States-Northern
Mariana Islands, 14 INT'L LEG. MAT. 344 (1975); Pub. L. No. 94-241, 90 Stat. 263
(1976).
84. Pending such action, the Northern Marianas have been afforded non-voting
observer status by the Western Pacific Council.
85. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-1784, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 94-K, at 244
(1977); Washington Post, May 30, 1976, at D3, col. I (arrest of United States flag
yacht Sea Wolf by Panamanian national guard while in Canal Zone waters); N.Y.
Times, May 7, 1976, § 1, at 11, col. 1 (U.S. tuna boats use of Canal Zone as refuge
from Panamanian authorities).
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Sueno, Roncador, and Serrana continues to be an open question. A
treaty settling matters, and renouncing all United States claims to sovereignty, was signed by the United States and Colombia on September
8, 1972, but still has not been ratified by the Senate.8 6 Article 2 of the
treaty states:
In recognition of the fact that nationals and vessels of Colombia and
the United States are at the present time engaged in fishing in the waters adjacent to Quita Sueno, both governments agree that in the future there shall be no interference by either government or by its na87
tionals or vessels with the fishing activities of the other in this area.
The succeeding article deals with fishing in the Roncador and Serrana
area, and an exchange of notes executed at the same time set forth a
scheme to protect American fishing from discriminatory regulation by
Colombia. In the absence of American ratification, the two nations
are cast back on the 1928 modus vivendi under which "the Government of the United States will refrain from objecting to the utilization,
by Colombian nationals, of the waters appurtenant to the Islands for
the purpose of fishing."'88 Because the principal matter of this modus
vivendi deals with conflicting claims to sovereignty, rather than fisheries, it is doubtful that a renegotiation would be required under section
202(b) of the FCMA. 89
Before turning to the question of delimitation of the fishery conser86. Treaty Concerning the Status of Quita Sueno, Roncador, and Serrana, done
Sept. 8, 1972, United States-Colombia, reprinted in S. EXEC. Doc. No. A, 93d Cong..
IstSess. (1973). Colombia ratified the treaty in March, 1974, but the United States has
not yet ratified. E. McDOWELL, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1975, at 768 (1976).
87. Treaty Concerning the Status of Quita Sueno, Roncador. and Serrana. done
Sept. 8, 1972, United States-Colombia, reprinted in S. EXEC. Doc. No. A, 93d Cong..
lst Sess. (1973).
88. Agreement Respecting the Status of Serrana and Quita Sueno Banks and Roncador Cay, Apr. 10, 1928, United States-Colombia, T.S. 760 , 6 C. BEVANS, TREATIES
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 17761949, at 904 (1971). See also 2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1322

(1963).
89. FCMA § 202(b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1822(b) (West Supp. 1977). Navassa Island,
which the United States occupies and Haiti claims, is another area of potential concern in the Caribbean. The United States asserts sovereignty over the island. Jones v.
United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890); Guano Islands Act, 48 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1419
(1970); Pres. Proclamation of Jan. 17, 1916, 39 Stat. 1763 (1916). See E. McDOWELL.
DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1975, at 93 (1976). At
this writing, however, the United States has not defined the limits of the FCZ around
the island. See U.S. Dep't of State Pub. Notice No. 526, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,937, 12,939
(1977). See also U.S. Dep't of State Pub. Notice No. 544, 42 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1977)
(correcting errors in Pub. Notice No. 526).
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vation zone, mention may be made of the status of Canton and Enderbury Islands in the South Pacific, which are administered jointly by
the United States and Great Britain under an agreement that expires
on April 6, 1989.90 The delicate balance by which each nation agreed
not to impair the claim of the other would suggest, at the very least,
that extreme circumspection be exercised in the application of the
FCMA to the waters of these obscure islands. 9 1
Similarly, the United States has asserted claims to certain atolls in
the Tokilau and Northern Cook Islands administered by New Zealand. Presumably, it was with all these islands in mind that the Department of State observed that" [e] stablishment of the fishery conservation
zone as set forth in this notice is without prejudice to claims regarding
92
the sovereignty of disputed islands."
Metes and bounds

2.

It hac been noted correctly that "[e] nforcement of the 200-mile
zone ... depends in large part on the knowledge of the boundaries
of that zone."193 For this reason, the drafters of the FCMA gave express
attention to the problems of boundary delineation. Such boundaries
are of four types under the Act: first, the international borders with
our neighbors on the North American continent; second, international
borders with each of the nations whose fisheries zones would conflict
with the fishery conservation zone (FCZ) created by the Act; third, the
precise outer limit where the FCZ meets waters not subject to any nation's jurisdiction; and fourth, the marine boundaries separating the
waters subject to the eight Regional Fishery Management Councils.
90. See Agreement on Joint Administration of Canton and Enderbury Islands,
Apr. 6, 1939, United States-United Kingdom, 53 Stat. 2219, E.A.S. No. 145, 196
L.N.T.S. 343, 12 C. BEVANS, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949, at 543 (1974). See also 2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1330 (1963).

91. It may be anticipated that still other territorial jurisdiction questions will arise
under the Act. For example, the Western Pacific Council has passed a resolution to
have that region include Wake, Howland, Baker, Jarvis, Johnston, Palymyra, and
Midway Islands, and Kingman Reef. 2 MARINE FISH MANAGEMENT, Nov. 1976, at 4.

It was also suggested in the press, apparently spuriously, that the United States and
Japan were each waiting to lay claim to a possible new volcanic island 200 miles
from Iwo Jima, in order to obtain the 200-mile economic or fishery zone that would
come with ownership. Washington Post, Sept. 20, 1976, at A17, col. 3.
92.

U.S. Dep't of State Pub. Notice No. 526, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,937, 12,940 n.4

(1977); see also Dep't of State Pub. Notice No. 544, 42 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1977),
for corrections.

93.

122 CONG. REC. H6244 (daily ed. June 18, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Forsythe).
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With respect to the first two of these four categories, section 202(d)
of the FCMA provides that " [t] he Secretary of State, in cooperation
with the Secretary [of Commerce], may initiate and conduct negotiations with any adjacent or opposite foreign nation to establish the
boundaries of the fishery conservation zone of the United States in
relation to any such nation."9 4 Although the definition of the fishery
conservation zone makes no reference to adjustments of the 200nautical-mile zonal boundary, 95 the clear implication is that a section
202(d) agreement would represent a pro tanto alteration of the FCZ.
As such, the scheme is similar to that of the Contiguous Fisheries
Zone Act of 1966,96 which provided: "Whenever the President determines that a portion of the fisheries zone conflicts with the territorial
waters or fisheries zone of another country, he may establish a seaward boundary for such portion of the zone in substitution for the
seaward boundary described in section 1092 of this title."'97 Indeed,
the House bill had included an almost identical provision. 98 The
FCMA as enacted, however, is subtly different, in that the "in relation
to any such nation" clause of section 202(d) is sufficiently vague to
permit the negotiation of agreements that do less than draw lines
between fishing zones; that is, the words of the statute would seemingly permit an agreement that resolved the boundary question only as
between the neighbor country and the United States, leaving each
country's zone intact as to vessels of a third country. Such a resolution
is highly desirable as an interim measure where, as in the Georges
Bank area off New England, the United States and Canada are unable
at present to conclude a permanent maritime border agreement. 99
Efforts to negotiate the extended maritime boundaries with Canada
and Mexico have been given priority, and in the case of Mexico have
already borne fruit. In an exchange of notes accompanying the
signing of a fisheries agreement at Mexico City on November 26,
1976, the United States and Mexico established provisional maritime
94. FCMA § 202(d). 16 U.S.C.A. § 1822(d) (West Supp. 1977).
95. Id. § 101, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1811.
96. Act of Oct. 14, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-658, 80 Stat. 908 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1091-1094 (1970)) (repealed 1976).
97. Id. § 3, 16 U.S.C. § 1093 (1970).
98. H.R. 200, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 103 (1975). reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HisTORY. sulpra note 4, at 753, 763.

99. For a comparison of the FCMA and the Revised Text of the Law of the Sea
Treaty on this point, see Jacobson & Cameron, Potential Conflicts Between a Future
Law of the Sea Treaty and the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976,
52 WASH. L. REV. 451 (1977).
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boundaries to be used until necessary technical work and the ratification processes of each nation can be completed. 100
Talks with Canada have been slower and more difficult with respect to boundary issues, even though discussions on fishery management issues have made considerable progress. 10 On November 1,
1976, the Canadian government issued a proposed Order in Council
that would define the extent of Canadian jurisdiction over a 200-mile
fishing zone. 10 2 Because the proposed Order, stated boundary claims
that were inconsistent with United States positions, the Department of
State promptly published a notice in the Federal Register stating the
coordination of the boundaries of the Gulf of Maine, the Strait of
Juan de Fuca, Dixon Entrance and the Beaufort Sea.103 In footnotes
to the notice, the Department commented:
In view of the fact that the claimed boundaries published by the
United States and Canada would leave an unclaimed area within the
Gulf of Maine, the United States will exercise its fisheries management
jurisdiction to the Canadian-claimed line where that line is situated
eastward of the United States-claimed line, until such time as a permanent maritime boundary with Canada is established in the Gulf of
104
Maine.
As to the Continental Shelf, the Department added: "Where the continental shelf extends beyond 200 miles the claimed continental shelf
boundary of the United States will extend to the seaward limit of the
continental shelf in accordance with international law and in a direc100. Agreement on Fisheries, done Nov. 24, 1976, United States-Mexico (Exchange of Notes); see U.S. Dep't of State Pub. Notice No. 526, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,937
(1977); see also U.S. Dep't of State Pub. Notice No. 544, 42 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1977),
for corrections.
101. See Reciproeal Fisheries Agreement, Feb. 24, 1977, United States-Canada,
reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 95-90, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977). The Canadian
Government has rejected United States suggestions to refer the boundary disputes
over Machias Seal Island and North Rock in the Gulf of Maine, and the AlaskaBritish Columbia border, to the International Court of Justice. A. ROVINE, DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1973, at 465-68 (1974); A. ROVINE,
DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE ININTERNATIONAL LAW 1974, at 672-78 (1975).

102. The Order became effective on Jan. 1, 1977. Fishing Zones of Canada (Zones
4 and 5) Order, 111 Can. Gaz. 115 (Jan. 1,1977).
103. U.S. Dep't of State Pub. Notice No. 506, 41 Fed. Reg. 48,619 (1976); U.S.
Dep't of State Press Rel. No. 539 (1976). See also U.S. Defense Mapping Agency
Hydrographic Center, Notice to Mariners No. 1, § 1(6), 7 (Jan. 1, 1977) (United
States nonrecognition of Canadian-asserted lateral limits of fishing zone, and other
Canadian maritime claims).
104. 41 Fed. Reg. 48,620 n.l (1976). See also U.S. Dep't of State Pub. Notice No.
526, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,937, 12,940 n.2 (1977); see also U.S. Dep't of State Pub. Notice
No. 544, 42 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1977), for corrections.
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tion determined by application of the principles by which the de' 10 5
scribed segment is determined."
Enforcement under such circumstances, of course, is rendered more
difficult, if not impossible. In recent decades, however, Canada and
the United States have adopted conciliatory policies regarding fishing
by vessels of the other.10 6 In keeping with this history, the two countries have arrived at an interim program of enforcement. Thus, in the
Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement signed on February 23, 1977, the
United States and Canada agreed as follows:
In the boundary regions, the following principles shall be applied as
interim measures of mutual restraint pending the resolution of questions pertaining to the delimitation of areas subject to the respective
fishery jurisdiction of each party:
1. As between the parties, enforcement shall be conducted by the
flag State.
2. Neither party shall authorize fishing by vessels of third parties in
the boundary regions.
3. Either party may enforce against third parties in the boundary
regions.107

As to enforcement against third-country vessels in areas claimed by
the United States, the district courts should defer to the position stated
by the Executive Branch.10 8 Existence of overlapping claims for any
appreciable period, to be sure, would be subversive of the national
resource management objectives to which each country adheres.
Boundary negotiations with "opposite" rather than "adjacent"
105. 41 Fed. Reg. 48,620 n.2 (1976).
106. See Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8, at 734 nn. 173-74, 742 n.226;
Fidell. The Case of the Incidental Lobster: United States Regulation of Foreign Harvesting of Continental Shelf Fishery Resources, 10 INT'L LAW. 135, 141 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Shelf Enforcement] (citing 1975 House Merchant Marine Hearings,
supra note 1, at 112-13 (testimony of Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., Deputy Ass't Sec'y of
State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs)); 1976 House Oversight Hearings, supra note
28, at 95 (testimony of Rozanne L. Ridgway, Deputy Ass't Sec'y of State for Oceans
and Fisheries Affairs). But see Address by Thomas 0. Enders, U.S. Ambassador to
Canada, Before the Canadian Club, Ottawa (Mar. 23, 1976) at 3 ("In the future we
will not negotiate together on the basis of exceptional dispensations and conversions,
but as we do with other countries").
107. Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement, Feb. 24, 1977, United States-Canada. art.
IX, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 95-90, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1977). See also H.R.
5638, 95th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. REP. No. 95-193. 95th Cong.. Ist Sess.
(1977).
108. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
(citing, inter alia, Jones v. United
STATES § 152, Reporter's Note (b) (1965)
States, 137 U.S. 202, 212-14 (1890)).
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neighbor countries are also required, with particular emphasis on
those with the Soviet Union, Cuba (with which United States fishery
relations have been poor since the beginning of the Castro regime), 10 9
and other Caribbean countries. 1 0 It appears that in the press of activity in preparation for the March 1, 1977, effective date of the
FCMA, these negotiations have been given somewhat lower priority
than other tasks facing the responsible agencies.
It is not likely that there will be many violations of the FCMA in
the immediate vicinity of the seaward limit of the fishery conservation
zone because the "known active fishing areas" are generally considerably inside the zone."' Nevertheless, it is imperative that the precise
limits of that zone be known to the regulated fishermen and domestic
enforcement agencies. To this end, the National Ocean Survey of
NOAA will be conducting a program to survey and fix the baseline
from which the 200-mile limit is drawn. This program entails the establishment of forty-four long-term tidal observation stations, computation of mean low water tidal data from those stations, determination
of precise geographical positions along the mean low water line, and
the computation and publication of geographical coordinates for plotting on nautical charts. 1 2 At the end of October 1976, the federal
government's Committee on the United States Baseline began work
with a view to identification of geographical coordinates for the zone

109. See generally Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8, at 747-49. The only
Bartlett Act case to reach the Supreme Court, United States v. Ayo-Gonzalez, 536

F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 808 (1977), involved a violation by a
Cuban fishing vessel in the contiguous fisheries zone off Texas. Evidence of a thaw in
United States-Cuban fisheries relations may be seen in the recent initialing of a maritime boundary agreement between the two countries. Note to Cuba Establishing a
inodus vivendi on a Preliminary Maritime Boundary, Apr. 27, 1977, reprinted in U.S.
Dep't of State Press Release No. 233, May 26, 1977, noted in N.Y. Times, Apr. 29,

1977, at 1, col. 8.
110.

See S. REP. No. 94-711, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1976), reprinted in LEGIS-

LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 37, 82; H.R. RaP. No. 94-445, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.

50 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1051, 1102. According
to a State Department release issued the day the FCMA took effect, the Act:
creates maritime boundaries with Canada, Mexico, the Soviet Union, the Ba-

hamas, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, the Netherlands Antilles, Venezuela,
the British Virgin Islands, Tonga, Western Samoa, the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, and various islands in the Pacific Ocean which are under the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom or New Zealand.

76 DEP'T STATE BULL. 273 (1977).
111. See text accompanying notes 324-25 infra.
112. 122 CONG. REc. H6239 (daily ed. June 18, 1976) (NOAA Extended Juris-

diction Implementation Requirements, Fiscal Year 1977).
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limits and the publication of charts showing those limits. 1 l 3 The State
Department has published a partial list of the geographical coordinates of the FCZ,114 and new navigation charts will be made available
to foreign interests as were the set of nautical charts prepared with
respect to the twelve-mile limit in effect from 1966 to 1977.115
Because the management plans of the various regions will impose
differing requirements, it becomes as important to define the boundaries between the regions as to define the international boundaries. The
Act recognizes this by providing that the Secretary of Commerce
"shall establish the boundaries between the geographical areas of authority of adjacent Councils."1 16 The existence of occasional marine
border disputes between neighboring states, 117 and the inclusion of
some states in more than one region,11 8 makes this provision potentially controversial.
The manner in which the Secretary of Commerce exercises power
under section 304(f)(2) should be consistent with the exercise of
power to establish lateral seaward boundaries between the states
under the Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976,119
which govern the distribution of grants as part of the Coastal Energy
Impact Program. 120 The criteria there stated require initial reliance
upon the principles of pre-existing interstate compacts, agreements, or
judicial decisions that clearly define or fix such boundaries,1 21 and
113. Letter from Robert D. Hodgson, Director, Office of the Geographer. U.S.
Dep't of State. to the author (Oct. 12, 1976).
114. U.S. Dep't of State Pub. Notice No. 526. 42 Fed. Reg. 12,937 (1977): see
also U.S. Dep't of State Pub. Notice No. 544, 42 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1977), for corrections.
115. Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8, at 714-15 & nn.59-61; Brief for
Appellee at 9, United States v. Ayo-Gonzalez, 536 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1976). cert.
denied, 97 S.Ct. 808 (1977).
116. FCMA § 304(f)(2), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(f)(2) (West Supp. 1977). This
clause was inspired by a Coast Guard suggestion that also called upon the Commerce
Department to consult with the Coast Guard in fixing regional boundaries. As enacted.
the section omits the consultation requirement. Interim intercouncil boundaries for
the East Coast were published on July 18, 1977. 42 Fed. Reg. 36,980 (1977) (to be
codified as 50 C.F.R. § 601.12).
117. See, e.g., New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363 (1976); Nat'l Fisherman,
Nov. 1976, § A, at 24, col. I (dispute between South Carolina and Georgia concerning shrimp fishery at mouth of the Savannah River); Washington Post, July 12.
1977, at 3, Col. 2.
118. FCMA § 302(a)(3). (5)-(7), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(a)(3). (5)-(7) (West Supp.
1977).
119. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-1464 (West Supp. 1977) (amending 16 U.S.C. §§ 14511464 (Supp. V 1975).
120. Id. § 1456a.
Id. § 1456a (b)(3)(B)(i).
121.
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then upon "the applicable principles of law, including the principles of
22
the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone."'
It is hoped that in wielding its power to fix interregional boundaries
under section 304(f)(2) of the FCMA, the Commerce Department
will follow the principle stated in its proposed Coastal Energy Impact
Program regulations allowing the concerned states a period of one
year in which to resolve their differences before having a boundary
imposed upon them. 123
III.

SANCTIONS

The FCMA incorporates a complex web of sanctions that may be
invoked in the event of violations by fishing vessels. Some, as will be
seen, apply only to foreign fishing vessels, but most apply to both
domestic and foreign craft. The sanctions may be divided into direct
and indirect measures. The direct sanctions are those prescribed in
sections 308, 309 and 310,124 calling respectively for civil penalties
assessed by the Commerce Department; criminal prosecutions leading
to fines, imprisonment, or both; and forfeitures of offenders' fishing
vessels and illegal catch. Arguably, the direct sanctions category includes the citation procedure of section 31 (c),125 which is an alternative to both the formal enforcement steps of arrest, boarding, search
and seizure of section 31 (b), and the forfeiture sanction set forth in

section

310.126

In addition to these direct sanctions, a variety of indirect sanctions
may be invoked in response to offenses under the Act, regulations,
GIFA's, or fishing permits. These indirect sanctions include criminal or
administrative punishment by the flag state of a foreign vessel, which
both the Act and GIFA's contemplate; 27 reduction of the catch quota
of the vessel's flag state; 28 and the revocation, suspension, or further
conditioning of a permit to fish.' 2 9 Although not specifically referred
122.

Id. § 1456a (b)(3)(B)(ii).

123.
124.
125.
126.

See 41 Fed. Reg. 46,724, 46,738 (1976).
16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1858-1860 (West Supp. 1977).
Id. § 1861(c).
See text accompanying notes 268-87 infra.

127.

See text accompanying notes 229-39 infra.

128.

FCMA § 201(e)(3), 16 U.S.C.A. 9 1821(e)(3), (West Supp. 1977). Cf. text

accompanying notes 210-28 infra (direct sanctions against a vessel's permit).
129.

FCMA § 204(b)(12), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b)(12) (West Supp. 1977). See

text accompanying notes 210-28 infra.
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to in the Act, violations of applicable requirements would be an appropriate ground upon which to refuse renewal of a permit for a particular foreign fishing vessel,1 30 or to deny port call privileges to a particular vessel or to vessels of a particular country.1 31 The latter is a
sanction of questionable utility where alternative provisioning or liberty arrangements may be made, or their need reduced through at-seafleet support and transfer activities. 132 For masters of United States
vessels who violate the Act, regulations, or a management plan, the
possibility also exists that the Coast Guard will take administrative action affecting their federal licenses, 13 3 as has occasionally been done
with respect to violations of the Tuna Conventions Act of 1950.13 4
This section will address the direct sanctions noted above, and the indirect sanctions of flag state punishment and administrative action
with respect to permits for foreign fishing.
A.

Foifeiture Proceedings
Vessel forfeiture was the chief sanction available to the government

130. For example. FCMA § 204(b)(6), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b)(6) (West Supp.
1977). allows the Secretary of Commerce to approve an application for a permit for
foreign fishing "if he determines that the fishing described in the application will meet
the requirements of [the] Act." This text is broad enough to include an assessment of
prior conduct by a vessel as an indication of likely future conduct.
13 1. See, e.g., Canada Dep't of Environment News Release, July 23. 1975 (closure
of Canadian Atlantic ports to Soviet vessels), pursuant to 109 Can. Gaz. 1841 (1975)
(amending Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations § 3); 8 PARL. DEB., H.C. 7853-54.
30th Parl., IstSess. (1975) (Can.). See also Kieninger & Reifsnyder. Fishing Gear
Conflict Settlement: Prospects Under Extended Jurisdiction, 8 J. MAR. L. & CoNt.
127. 141 n.29(1977).
132. Presumably it was this fact, as well as the cumbersome entry regulations.
Aee MAR. FISH. REX., June 1976, at 29, 30, that has led the Soviet Union not to avail
itself of the port call privileges extended to it under the mid-Atlantic bilateral fishing
agreement. See Agreement on Certain Fisheries Problems on the High Seas in the
Western Areas of the Middle Atlantic Ocean, Mar. 1, 1976, United States-Soviet
Union, art. VIII, T.I.A.S. No. 8349. It has also been suggested that concern over
possible attachment of fishing vessels in civil litigation over gear conflicts may explain Soviet reluctance to exercise port call privileges. See Kieninger & Reifsnyder.
supra note 131, at 138.
133. 46 U.S.C. § 239 (1970); 46 C.F.R. Pt. 5 (1976).
134. 16 U.S.C. §§ 95 1-961 (1970). See, e.g., United States v. License No. 87816
(Cox), No. 1l-0056-HJG-75 (11th Coast Guard Dist. Nov. 4, 1975) (charge of
misconduct based upon harassment of seal in violation of Marine Mammal Protection Act); United States v. License No. 438175 (Conners), No. I1-044-HJG-74
(Ilth Coast Guard Dist. Oct. 22, 1974). In a related development, the Chief Counsel
of the Coast Guard has recently opined that proceedings under Rev. Stat. § 4450.
46 U.S.C. § 239 (1970). will not lie simply because a vessel's master has been assessed a civil penalty under the Marine Mammal Protection Act; there must be evidence of incompetency, misconduct, or violation of Title 52 of the Revised Statutes.
415 COAST GUARD L. BULL. 7 (1976).
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under the Bartlett Act, but that penalty was rarely carried through to
its conclusion. 135 Faced with the possibility of a judicial forfeiture of
the vessel itself, as well as its illegal catch (helped along by a rebuttable presumption that fish on board were taken or retained illegally), 136 it was not surprising that foreign fishing vessel oWners almost
invariably were willing to settle Bartlett Act cases.' 37 With settlements
running as high as $700,000 for a single violation, 138 it was quite
accurate for the Senate Commerce Committee to suggest that the forfeiture sanction "proved to be a valuable deterrent to fishing viola39
tions."1
The FCMA provides for a similar forfeiture sanction, although the
existence of more flexible remedies, such as the civil penalty, suggests
that forfeiture may be reserved for unusual cases such as repeated offenses or offenses by vessels of non-GIFA countries. 40 Section 310(a)
of the FCMA provides:
Any fishing vessel (including its fishing gear, furniture, appurtenances, stores, and cargo) used, and any fish taken or retained, in any
manner in connection with or as a result of the commission of any act
prohibited by section 307 (other than any act for which the issuance of
a citation under section 311 (c) is sufficient sanction) shall be subject to
forfeiture to the United States. All or part of such vessel may, and all
such fish shall, be forfeited to the United States pursuant to a civil
141
proceeding under this section.
This section departs in some respects from its Bartlett Act counter135. United States v. Fishing Vessel E39SA, 511 F.2d 1401 (5th Cir. 1975)
(mem.); United States v. Ayo-Gonzalez, 536 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 808 (1977).
136. 16 U.S.C. § 1082(b) (1970) (repealed 1976).
137. In one case the value of the ship and catch were lower than the settlement
position of the Justice Department, leading to a simple abandonment of the ship and
catch to the United States. United States v. Japanese Fishing Vessel Eikyu Maru No.
33, Civil No. A75-55 (D. Alas., filed Apr. 9, 1975), noted in 121 CONG. REc. S7155
(daily ed. Apr. 30, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Stevens); Note, Recent Developments in
the Law of the Sea: A Synopsis, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 628, 641 & n.63 (1976).
138. United States v. Japanese Fishing Vessel Kohoku Maru No. 12, Civil No.
A76-79 (D. Alas., filed Apr. 20, 1976), settlement noted in Nat'l Fisherman,
Aug. 1976, § A, at 1, col. 3.
139. S. REP. No. 94-416, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 653, 698.
140. The first forfeiture cases were not initiated until a considerable number of
citations had been issued and civil penalty cases reported. See, e.g., United States v.
Russian F/V Taras Shevchenko, Civil No. 77-1086-M (D. Mass., filed Apr. 21, 1977);
United States v. 17.56 Metric Tons, More or Less, of Fish, Civil No. 77-1086-M
(D. Mass., filed Apr. 21, 1977).
141. FCMA § 310(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1860(a) (West Supp. 1977).
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part. The definition of what may be forfeited varies slightly but inconsequentially from the terms of the 1964 legislation.' 42 More impor-

1 43
tantly, the provision for administrative or summary forfeitures,

which were very rarely used under the Bartlett Act,144 is missing en-

tirely from section 3 10(a). Hence, all forfeitures, even those involving
minimal amounts of catch or unattended, illegal fishing gear,'

require judicial intervention.

45

will

146

In several important respects, the FCMA preserves the forfeiture
scheme of the Bartlett Act. First, the Act requires the forfeiture of all
illegally taken or retained fish, although this forfeiture is not enforced
if for any reason the Justice Department declines to invoke the jurisdiction of the district courts. The vessel itself continues to be merely
"subject to forfeiture."'' 47 The discretion thus created, however, is
expanded over that available to the district courts under the Bartlett
Act, in that the first clause of the second sentence of section 3 10(a)
permits forfeiture of "[a] 11 or part" of an offending vessel. Ways had
been found to evade the apparent all-or-nothing forfeiture provision
of the Bartlett Act even when a case was litigated, 48 but the new law
gives welcome express recognition to the possibility that forfeiture of
more than the illegal catch but less than the entire vessel might be

warranted.
142. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1082(b) (1970) (vessel "including its tackle, apparel.
furniture, appurtenances, cargo, and stores") with FCMA § 310(a), 16 U.S.C.A. §
1860(a) (West Supp. 1977) (vessel "including its fishing gear, furniture, appurtenances.
stores, and cargo").
143.
16 U.S.C. § 1082(c) (1970) (repealed 1976).
144. But ,ee note 428 infra.
145. Such gear was seized by the Coast Guard three times under the Bartlett Act;
twice off Alaska. see, e.g., United States v. 4,109 Crab Pots, Civil No. 146-73 (D.
Alas., filed Sept. 20, 1973), and once on Lake Erie in 1975, see note 79 supra.
146. For this reason the Commerce Department's broad statement that 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1604-1618 (1970) are applicable to FCMA forfeitures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12.026 (1977).
is in error to the extent that it includes the summary forfeiture provisions of 19 U.S.C.
§ 1609.
147. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1082(b) (1970) with FCMA § 310(a), 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 1860(a) (West Supp. 1977).
148. See. e.g., United States v. F/V Taiyo Mart No. 28, 395 F. Supp. 413 (D. Me.
1975) (vessel released upon posting of a $450,000 bond, even though the vessel was
worth more than that sum). Cf. Fidell, Hot Pursuit From a Fisheries Zone, 70 AM.
J. INT'L L. 95, 96 & n.10 (1970); Fidell, Letter to the Editor, 70 AtM. J. INT'L L. 554
n.4 (1976). See also Letter from G. Joseph Tauro, U.S. Att'y, D. Mass., to Sen. Ted
Stevens (Feb. 16. 1972), reprinted in 118 CONG. REC. 7011 (1972) (remarks of Sen.
Stevens), indicating that the $10,000 bond forfeiture in the case of the West German
trawler Conrad. United States v. Cargo of Fish Seized on Board F/V Conrad, Civil
No. 70-867 (D. Mass. Mar. 10, 1971), was "not intended to reflect the actual value
of the catch."
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The rebuttable presumption that fish were taken or retained illegally is carried forward in section 310(e). 14 9 Retention of the presumption in this form would appear to dispose of the suggestion that it
be made conclusive. 150 Difficulties in proof that might otherwise be
experienced' 5 1 make this presumption a potentially useful tool.
The presumption in the FCMA may, however, be overbroad in the
sense that it could apply to fish aboard a ship that was found to be
taking Continental Shelf fishery resources or anadromous species beyond the fisheries conservation zone in violation of the FCMA. As the
Justice Department noted in an unsuccessful effort to restrict the presumption, "[s] ince the vessel was seized outside the 200-mile fishery
zone, there is no basis in fact that these other fish [i.e., fish that were
not anadromous or creatures of the Continental Shelf] were caught
within that zone."' 52 Such fish found aboard a vessel should not be
deemed to be subject to the rebuttable presumption; they may, however, still be forfeited, as may be seen below.
The meaning of the statutory terms is generally uncontroversial,
but in one recent case a dispute arose over whether a quantity of fish
on board a seized South Korean ship was "cargo," which would
merely be subject to forfeiture, or "fish" as to which the statutory presumption of illegal catching or retention would apply and which
therefore would be mandatorily forfeited. The ship, the Dong Won
707, was seized for taking king crab, a Continental Shelf fishery resource, beyond the Contiguous Fisheries Zone.' 53 A search revealed
that the vessel had frozen black cod and other fish species aboard, forfeiture of which was sought by the government. In an ingenious argument, the shipowners asserted that the black cod was neither cargo
149. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1860(e) (West Supp. 1977).
150. See S. 1365, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (Sen. Stevens), noted in Note,
Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea: A Synopsis, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 691,

697 (1974). Curiously, the Commerce Department appears to have been willing at
one time to give up the presumption entirely, a deficiency that was noted in the House
hearings. See 1975 House Merchant Marine Hearings, supra note 1, at 656-57

(colloquy between William C. Brewer, General Counsel, NOAA, and Ned P. Everett,
Counsel, Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment).
151.

See, e.g., FISHING NEWS INT'L, Nov. 1976, at 24; id. at 29 (refusal of British

152.

Letter from Michael M. Uhlmann, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Rep. Leonor K.

court to order forfeiture of catch of seized Soviet trawler Dzukiya in absence of proof
catch was taken within fishery limits).
Sullivan, Chairperson, House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries (Mar. 16,
1976) at 2-3 (on file with Washington Law Review).

153.

United States v. South Korean Vessel Dong Won 707, Civil No. A76-163

(D. Alas., filed Aug. 2, 1976).
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nor fish illegally caught or retained, and hence was neither mandatorily forfeited nor subject to discretionary forfeiture with the rest of the
vessel. The owners argued that legal catch should not be forfeited "because it is neither an offending instrument nor an illegal fruit."1 54 As
has happened with some regularity, the Dong Won 707 case was settled before the legal issue could be decided. Thus, there is no definitive resolution of the question, although it is not unlikely to recur
under the new law.

Forfeiture of catch, however, is not always a critical sanction under
the Act. Sometimes the illegal catch will be so small that forfeiture is
not a substantial penalty. Alternatively, the catch may spoil, be contaminated, or be unmarketable due to domestic fish preferences. Par-

ticularly in the Aleutian Islands, obtaining an order forfeiting illegal
fish may only burden the government.15 5 For such reasons, one

United States attorney has explained that, rather than seeking forfeiture of catch, as seemingly mandated by the Bartlett Act, "the effort

has been to try to obtain the same impact of economic loss through
the government's monetary demand in settlement of its claims against
the vessel, cargo and ship's master."1 5 6 Plainly, then, the provision for
mandatory forfeiture of illegal catch may be more trouble than it is
worth, leading only to evasion of this rigid feature of the statute by
157
those responsible for its administration.

154. Petition for Release from Custody of United States Marshal of 300 Tons.
More or Less, of Frozen Black Cod and Various Other Bottom Fish at 7. United
States v. South Korean Vessel Dong Won 707, Civil No. A76-163 (D. Alas.. filed
Sept. 28, 1976). This argument fails to rebut the fact that the definition of cargo is
broad enough to include fish, it being stated that cargo is the "load or lading of a
vessel; the goods, merchandise, or whatever is conveyed in a ship or other merchant
vessel." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 268 (4th ed. 1951). This view is supported not only

by the Justice Department's observation in 1970, in commenting on Bartlett Act
amendments, that "the cargo of a fishing vessel is likely to consist entirely of fish." Letter from Deputy Att'y Gen. Richard G. Kleindienst to Rep. Edward A. Garmatz.
Chairman. House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries (Feb. 13, 1970). reprinted
in H.R. REP. No. 91-1430, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1970), but also by a construction
applied by the Customs Service (then known as the Bureau of Customs) to the Bartlett Act shortly after that law took effect. In its initial instructions to the field, the
Service referred to "the liability to forfeiture of the vessel, its tackle, apparel, furniture, appurtenances, cargo (except fish which it may have taken or retained in violation
of the statute), and stores," thus suggesting that fish other than illegal fish could
form a part of the "cargo." See U.S. Customs Bureau. Circular ENF-4-MS. 3(a)( 1).
Sept. 14. 1964.
155. See generally Letter from G. Kent Edwards, U.S. Att'y, D. Alas., to Sen.
Ted Stevens (Mar. 13. 1972), reprinted in 119 CONG. REC. 9394-95 (1973) (remarks
of Sen. Stevens).
156.

119 CONG. REC. 9394 (1973).

157. See, e.g., Letter from G. Joseph Tauro, U.S. Att'y, D. Mass., to Sen. Ted
Stevens (Feb. 16, 1972), reprinted in 118 CONG. REC. 7011 (1972).
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Procedures for judicial forfeitures will continue to be governed by
158
the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims
and applicable statutes. 159 No jury trial is available in such cases and
the forfeiture case may proceed independently of any criminal prosecution arising out of the same violation of the Act.160 Venue for proceedings under section 310 will be the district in which the vessel is
arrested, if it is arrested within the limits of a judicial district, or "any
district into which the [vessel] is brought" if the seizure occurs beyond the limit of the territorial sea.' 6 ' In the latter case, the law is
unclear whether the seized vessel must be taken to the nearest or most
accessible American port, although a degree of discretion has been
recognized. 62 Consistent with this discretion, seized craft in several
instances have been brought to ports that were not geographically
closest to the point of arrest. 163 Abuses of this discretion are not likely
to occur, as considerations of economy would strongly impel the government to seek trial in the nearest port in which proper berthing and
64
refrigeration or other fish handling facilities are available.'
158. FED. R. Civ. P. E. Notably, FCMA § 310(d)(1), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1860(d)(1)
(West Supp. 1977) allows the release, upon proper security, of property seized with a
view to forfeiture. The first clause of Rule E(5)(a) would on its face have excluded
from such release property to be forfeited, and the Bartlett Act permitted such release only for seized fish, 16 U.S.C. § 1083(g) (1970) (repealed 1976), although in
practice pretrial release was permitted for vessels as well as fish in a few isolated cases.
See cases cited in note 148 supra. Section 310(d)(1) expands the power to grant release to include vessels. This expansion is consonant with the Revised Single Negotiating Text, which requires the prompt release of arrested vessels "upon the posting
of reasonable bond or other security." Revised Single Negotiating Text art. 61 (2),
5 Third U.N. Conf., supra note 6, at 151, 163, U.N. Doc. AICONF. 62/WP.8/Rev.
lI/Pt. II, at 34 (1976). See Jacobson & Cameron, Potential Conflicts Between a
'Future Law of the Sea Treaty and the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of
1976, 52 WASH. L. REV. 451, 468 & n.95 (1977).
159. See 28 U.S.C. § 2461(b) (1970) (proceedings in admiralty for forfeitur6 of
property seized on the high seas or navigable waters).
160. 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
38.12[7], at 135, 38.35[7], at 290 & n.6
(2d ed. 1976), (citing United States v. Steamship Coamo, 267 U.S. 220 (1925) (The
Coamo)); P. Sanford Ross, Inc. v. United States, 250 U.S. 269 (1919) (The Scow
6-S; Malagask Fishing Co. v. United States, 63 F.2d 311 (1st Cir. 1933) (The Maskinonge).
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1395(c), (d) (1970). See generally 1 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.144 [3], at 1481-88 (2d ed. 1976).
162. 7A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
C.11, at 672 & n.14 (2d ed. 1976) (citing
Samuels v. United States, 63 F.2d 638, 639 (5th Cir. 1933) (The Halcon)).
163. E.g., United States v. Inau, Official Registry No. 10330, Civil No. H74-311
(D. Md., filed Mar. 26, 1974), master prosecuted sub nom. United States v. Ancuta,
Crim. No. 74-0183-H (D. Md., filed Mar. 26, 1974) (continguous fisheries zone violation off North Carolina-Virginia border); United States v. M/V Limoza, Civil No. 74455 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 28, 1974) (contiguous fisheries zone violation off New Jersey).
164. See Coast Guard Miscellaneous-Pt. 1: Hearings on Coast Guard Oversight
Before the Subcomn. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Mer-
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Criminal Sanctions

Among its criminal penalties, the FCMA includes severe prison
terms and fines for certain violations. For violations of section
307(1)(D), (E), (F), or (H)165 there may be six months' imprisonment, a fine of $50,000, or both. 166 If a dangerous weapon is used, or
if an enforcement officer suffers or is placed in fear of bodily injury,
the punishment may be a $100,000 fine, or ten years' imprisonment, or
both. For foreign fishing prohibited by section 307(2), the FCMA retains the Bartlett Act's penalties of a $100,000 fine, or up to one
year's imprisonment, or both. In such cases only the owner or operator may be prosecuted, whereas "any person" may violate section
307(1) and hence be subject to the corresponding criminal penalties
under section 309(b). Venue for all such prosecutions lies in the "district in which the offender.

.

.

is arrested or is first brought."'167

Criminal sanctions have played a secondary role in recent United
States fisheries law enforcement and it is expected that this will continue to be the case under the FCMA. Practice under the Bartlett Act
rarely involved the imposition of prison sentences; indeed, in only one
incident were unsuspended prison terms imposed, and even those were
abbreviated in an exchange of prisoners with Cuba in 1971.168 Fines
assessed against masters have never approached the $100,000 limit of
the Bartlett Act,' 69 the maximum being the $30,000 imposed in several cases. 170 More recently, it has become common for United States
attorneys to forego prosecution of masters of foreign vessels, either
through a nolle proseque,'7 1 a deferral of prosecution under local
rules,' 72 or a complete refusal to bring charges. 173
chant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 94-3, at 159-60 (1975)
(testimony of Rear Adm. Robert H. Scarborough, Chief, Office of Operations, U.S.
Coast Guard) [hereinafter cited as 1975 House Oversight Hearings].
165.
16 U.S.C.A. § 1857(1)(D),(E),(F),(H) (West Supp. 1977). These sections prohibit, respectively: (D) refusal to permit an authorized boarding; (E) forcible
assault of or resistance to an authorized officer; (F) resisting arrest; and (H) interference with apprehension or arrest of a third party.
166. FCMA § 309(b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1859(b) (West Supp. 1977).
167. 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1970). See generally 8A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
18.03 [2] (2d ed. 1976).
168. United States v. Del Sol Rodriguez, Crim. Nos. 71-298 to 71-301 (S.D. Fla.
June 9, 1971), sentences reduced (July 1, 1971), noted in Bartlett Act Status Report,
supra note 8. at 749 & n.266.
169. 16 U.S.C. § I082(a) (1970) (repealed 1976).
170. See Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8, at 754-56.
171. E.g., United States v. Marquina, Magis. No. B76-954-M (S.D. Tex., filed
July 21. 1976).
172. E.g., United States v. Sferlazzo. Magis. No. 75-240 (S.D.N.Y.. filed Feb. 12.
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This informal move in the direction of decriminalization of fisheries
offenses is consistent with the Revised Single Negotiating Text presented at the close of the New York session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which provided in article
61(3) of Part II: "Coastal State penalties for violations of fisheries
regulations in the exclusive economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the absence of agreement to the contrary by the States concerned, or any other form of corporal punishment."' 74 The same document called for prompt release of arrested fishermen "upon the
posting of reasonable bond or other security."' 17 5 The FCMA does
not, of course, rule out the possibility of criminal punishment of offenders, even where the offense is one of "pure fishing" rather than
obstruction of enforcement or some related violation under section
307(1). Nevertheless, the imprisonment and release-upon-bond provisions developed in the Law of the Sea Conference Informal Single
Negotiating Text, predecessor of the Revised Single Negotiating Text
quoted above, were brought to the attention of Congress, 76 and it
should be the enforcement policy not to invoke such sanctions in the
absence of aggravating circumstances. This policy has already received expression in several Governing International Fishery Agree177
ments.
1975), noted in Shelf Enforcement, supra note 106, at 146-47 & n.53; United States
v. Angeli, Maigis. No. 75-171 (S.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 3, 1975), noted in Shelf Enforcement, supra note 106, at 145 & nn. 45-46.
173. E.g., Brownsville, Tex., Herald, Aug. 12, 1976, at 1, col. 1 (seizure of Mexican shrimpers Galac S.A. and Cabo Torina).
174. 5 Third U.N. Conf., supra note 6, at 151, 163, U.N. Doe. A/CONF.621
WP.8/Rev. /Pt. II at 34 (1976).
175. Id. art. 61(2).
176. See ALAS. COMM'N ON THE CONFERtNCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, ALASKA
POSITION ON INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE
SINGLE NEGOTIATING TEXT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE

SEA 30 (1975), reprinted in Two-Hundred-Mile Fishing Zone: Hearing on S. 961
Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and Int'l Environment of the Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 361, 401 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Senate
Foreign Relations Hearing]; 121 CONG. REC. S19, 752 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1975)
(remarks of Sen. Stevens) (reproducing address by Alas. Gov. Jay Hammond to U.S.
Dep't of State Advisory Comm. on Fisheries, Oct. 20, 1975).
177. Several of the recently negotiated GIFA's have included terms requiring the
United States to recommend to the court that any penalty not include imprisonment
or other form of corporal punishment. Agreement Concerning Fisheries Off the
Coasts of the United States, Nov. 23, 1976, United States-Romania, art. XI(3),
reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 95-34, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1977); Agreement Concerning Fisheries Off the Coasts of the United States, Sept. 15, 1976, United StatesRepublic of China, Agreed Minutes f 2, reprinted in H.R. DOC. No. 95-37, 95th
Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1977).
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Unlike the civil penalty and civil forfeiture sanctions found in sections 308 and 310, the criminal sanctions established by section 309
do not apply to every violation of section 307, which lists the conduct
proscribed by the Act. In addition to drawing lines between violations
that involve dangerous weapons, bodily injury, or the fear of imminent bodily injury, section 309 distinguishes among the various prohibitions of section 307. Thus, the Bartlett Act-type offenses in section
307(2) have a separate, maximum penalty. Indeed, violators of subsections (A), (B), (C), and (G)--dealing, respectively, with violations of the Act or regulations or permits thereunder, fishing with a revoked or suspended permit, violation of a GIFA or a regulation thereunder, and trafficking in fish illegally taken or retained-are entirely excluded from the criminal sanctions of section 309.178 The effect of
this exclusion is essentially to insulate domestic fishing and commerce
in fish from the criminal sanctions of the FCMA, unless the other,
criminally-enforceable terms of the section have been violated. The
prohibition of section 307(2)(B) would trigger criminal sanctions for
similar foreign conduct violative of section 307(1)(B) and (C), or
section 307(1)(A) to the extent that a permit condition had been
breached while the vessel was actually fishing.
Considered in this light, the flexibility implicit in the multiplicity of
sanctions created by the Act, particularly if coupled with a policy of
invoking forfeiture sanctions under section 310(a) only against foreign
vessels and assessing civil penalties under section 308(a) only against
domestic fishing interests, could become a vehicle for discriminatory
enforcement. Such discrimination could subvert the process of obtaining foreign recognition of exclusive United States fishery management rights in the fisheries conservation zone and thereby undermine
the effectiveness of the entire statutory scheme.
C.

Civil Penalties

Section 308 of the FCMA 179 adds to the arsenal of sanctions the
possibility of civil penalties assessed by the Commerce Department,
178. FCMA § 309(a)(1), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1859(a)(1) (West Supp. 1977). The
House bill had limited the criminal sanctions to cases involving refusals to permit
boarding (see text accompanying note 165 supra), forcible assault, resistance, and
the like. H.R. 200, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 311(a) (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 4, at 811.

179.
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subject to limited judicial review. These penalties may be assessed in
amounts up to $25,000 per violation against "any person" who violates section 307,180 with each day of continuing violations being a
separate offense. 181 Significantly, the Act does not limit the civil penalty procedure to domestic vessels, despite a suggestion by the National Marine Fisheries Service that NOAA be given a civil penalty
power "for violations of Federal fishing regulations by domestic fishermen," with the federal courts and United States attorneys retaining
182
basic responsibility for prosecuting foreign offenders.
The Act goes on to set out the criteria by which the Commerce
Department is to fix penalty levels: "In determining the amount of
such penalty, the Secretary shall take into account the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the prohibited acts committed and, with
respect to the violator, the degree of culpability, any history of prior
offenses, ability to pay, and such other matters as justice may require.' 83 Significantly, the above provision does not govern the decision to commence a penalty action; the criteria speak instead to the
level of penalty to be assessed. It is unquestionably difficult to generate a simple formula to guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,184 but the criteria of section 308(a) are broad enough to cover
the customary considerations in fishing law enforcement. 185 For example, the "degree of culpability" criterion would include the matter
of intent, even though that is generally not an element of FCMA offenses.' 8 6 The criteria are also of interest in their requirement that the
180.

16 U.S.C.A. § 1857 (West Supp. 1977). Such persons include any person

with respect to § 307(1) offenses, and any owner or operator of a foreign fishing
vessel with respect to § 307(2) offenses.
181. FCMA § 308(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1858(a) (West Supp. 1977).
182. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A MARINE FISHERIES PROGRAM FOR THE NATION
31 (1976). In hearings before the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee,
NOAA witnesses remarked that the civil penalty could be suitable for both domestic
and foreign offenders. See 1975 House Merchant Marine Hearings, supra note 1, at
654, 659 (testimony of William C. Brewer, Gen. Counsel, NOAA).
183. FCMA § 308(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1858(a) (West Supp. 1977).
184. See Increased Assistance of Commercial Fisheries:Hearings on H.R. 14678
and H.R. 14824 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the
House Conmn. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 91-27, at
167 (1970) (testimony of Dr. Leslie L. Glasgow, Assistant Sec'y of the Interior for
Fish and Wildlife, Parks, and Marine Resources).
185. For a summary of the considerations that have been applied see id. at 16768; Letter from Adm. Chester R. Bender, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, to Rep.
Thomas M. Pelly (Jan. 19, 1972), quoted in Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8,
at 735 & n.177.
186. See FCMA § 307, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1857 (West Supp. 1977). See also text
accompanying notes 44-55 supra.
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last four items be considered "with respect to the violator." Here the
issue is one of defining "the violator." In some circumstances the respondent's liability may be entirely vicarious, as in the case of an
owner under section 307(2)187 who is liable for acts of the master.
Hence, if the respondent were a fleet owner, prior offenses by other
vessels in the fleet could be considered under section 308(a). 188 Offenses by another fleet's craft should not be considered, however, even
if that other fleet flies the same flag. National patterns of noncompliance with the Act or a GIFA may be responded to by other more
189
appropriate means under section 201 (e).
The respondent in a civil penalty case is entitled to a hearing before
the agency and may thereafter seek review "in the appropriate court
of the United States" on the sole ground that the penalty is unsupported by substantial evidence. 190 The undefined term "appropriate
court of the United States" could be read to mean a district court, in
light of the unqualified jurisdictional grant to those courts in section
311 (d)19 1 and the use of the term "appropriate court" in that section.
Section 308 could also be read as a grant of jurisdiction-however inartful-to the United States courts of appeals, because it uses the term
"notice of appeal," which is generally associated with the courts of appeals, 192 and refers to procedures for filing the record on review set

187.
16 U.S.C.A. § 1857(2) (West Supp. 1977).
188. id. § 1858(a).
189. Id. § 1821(e) (West Supp. 1977). See text accompanying note 128 supra
(allocation of allowable levels of catch). But see text accompanying notes 210-28
infra (sanctions against GIFA permits under FCMA § 204(b)(12)(C), 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 1824(b)(12)(C) (West Supp. 1977)).
It may be assumed that records of citations issued under § 311(c), 16 U.S.C.A. §
1861(c) (West Supp. 1977), would be used by the Commerce Department as a basis
for determining the respondent's "history of prior offenses."
190. FCMA § 308(b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1858(b) (West Supp. 1977); 5 U.S.C. §
706(2) (1970).
191.
16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(d) (West Supp. 1977).
192. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(a). The term "appropriate court" appears, without
the words "of the United States," in § 305(d) of the FCMA, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(d)
(West Supp. 1977), concerning judicial review of regulations. Use of the "petition
for . . . review" formula in that section is also reminiscent of appellate practice, see
FED. R. ApP. P. 15(a), but that section of the FCMA lacks other indications that
direct review in the courts of appeals was intended. Rule 15 is not itself a grant of
jurisdiction. Noland v. Civil Service Comm'n, 544 F.2d 334 (8th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam). In the absence of a statutory grant of jurisdiction, those courts would be
without power to review regulations or any other action under the FCMA other than
on appeal from the district courts. See, e.g., AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 404 (1940);
Turkel v. FDA, 334 F.2d 844, 846 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 990 (1965).
If the FCMA were read as calling for district court review of regulations and court
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forth in a section of the Judicial Code that by its own terms has no application to the district courts. 193 The legislative history on the point is
confficting,194 although the plain meaning of the "exclusive jurisdiction" clause would probably be given effect. The statute should be
clarified in this regard.
In the event an assessed civil penalty is not timely paid, or has not
been paid following an unsuccessful judicial review action, the Justice
Department may sue to recover the penalty, with interest, "in any
appropriate district court of the United States,"'1 5 venue being in the
district where the penalty accrues or the defendant is found. 19 6 In
such a case, the defendant may not collaterally attack the "validity
and appropriateness" of the penalty, 19 7 but might possibly be en-

titled to jury consideration of any remaining factual issues. 198 The
FCMA does not impose a statutory lien on offending vessels for unpaid civil penalties, 19 9 but such vessels could always be attached in an
in personam proceeding against the owners.2 00 Moreover, nonpayment of an assessed civil penalty that has become final compels the
of appeals review of individual penalty cases, the resulting allocation of functions
would rival that in E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 97 S. Ct. 965, 979 (1977)
for perversity. For a discussion of district court review of regulations promulgated
under the FCMA, see Comment, JudicialReview of Fishery Management Regulations,
52 WASH. L. REV. 599 (1977).
193. 28 U.S.C. § 2112(d) (1970).
194. The House bill, from which § 308(b) was drawn, see S. REP. No. 94-711,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1976), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at

37, 92, used the "appropriate court" language. H.R. 200, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §
311(b) (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 812. The House

Report called for review in a United States court of appeals, H.R. REP. No. 94-445,
94th Cong., Ist Sess. 74 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at

1051, 1127, although in floor debate Representative Leggett explained that "any
person against whom a penalty has been assessed would be able to have his case reviewed by an appropriate U.S. district court if he is dissatisfied with the final decision
of the Secretary [of Commerce]." 121 CONG. REC. H9921 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1975)
(remarks of Rep. Leggett), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 845.
It is also pertinent to note, although it is not dispositive, that none of the statutory
schemes relied on as precedents for § 308, see note 206 infra, provide for court of
appeals review.
195. FCMA § 308(c), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1858(c) (West Supp. 1977).
196. 28 U.S.C. § 1395(a) (1970).
197. FCMA § 308(c), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1858(c) (West Supp. 1977).
198. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; compare Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHA, 97 S.Ct.
1261 (1977), with 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
38.31[I], at 232-33 & n.10
(1977 & Supp. 1976-77) (citing United States v. J. B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414
(2d Cir. 1974); Connolly v. United States, 149 F.2d 666 (9th Cir. 1945); United
States v. Jepson, 90 F. Supp. 983 (D.NJ. 1950)).
199. E.g., 46 U.S.C. § 162 (1970). Cf. 16 U.S.C. § 783 (1970); 33 U.S.C. § 450
(1970) (criminal fines as liens on vessels).
200. See FED. R. CIV. P. B(1).
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Commerce Department to impose sanctions on the offending vessel's
2 01
section 204 permit, if it has one.
Was the civil penalty sanction necessary? The Bartlett Act had no
such procedure, even though the civil forfeiture sanction had an in
terrorem effect not dissimilar in operation to the civil penalty program. 20 2 The Justice Department, with infrequent exceptions, 20 3 had
initiated the necessary civil and criminal proceedings under that
law, 204 leading one perhaps to question the need for the section 309
sanction. In explanation, NOAA witnesses argued that an expansion
of the federal fisheries caseload, particularly as to relatively minor offenses, could lead prosecutors to give fishing cases less priority than
hitherto. 20 5 Civil penalty sanctions in several other fisheries and wild2 06
life laws were noted as precedents.
The civil penalty technique may be seen as an appropriate means of
ensuring uniform national penalty levels 20 7 and recognizing the absence of a moral dimension in most fishery offenses. 20 8 It is likely that
the civil penalty mechanism will come to provide an important new
element of flexibility in the primary FCMA armamentarium that also
includes forfeitures, criminal prosecutions, and section 31 l(c) citations.
D.

Sanctions Against a GIFA Permit

201. FCMA § 204(b)(12), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b)(12) (West Supp. 1977). See
text accompanying notes 210-28 infra.
202. See 1975 House Merchant Marine Hearings, supra note I, at 659 (remarks
of Ned P. Everett, Counsel, Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and
the Environment).
203. See, e.g., Shelf Enforcement, supra note 106, at 151 & nn.82-83 (arrest and
release of Cuban trawler Playa de Varadero).
204. See Hill, NOAA and the Coast Guard: The Two Million Square Mile Challenge, NOAA MAGAZINE, July 1976, at 8, 11 (quoting Dan Russ, Chief, Law Enforcement Div., NMFS Northeast Region).
205. 1975 House Merchant Marine Hearings, supra note 1, at 654 (testimony of
William C. Brewer, General Counsel, and David Wallace, Associate Adm'r for Marine Resources, NOAA).
206.
id. at 658. Other legislation noted included the following: Offshore Shrimp
Fisheries Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § I lOOb-7(a) (Supp. V 1975); Marine Mammal
Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1375(a) (Supp. V 1975). The Endangered Species
Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a) (Supp. V 1975), was also a model for FCMA § 308.
121 CONG. REC. H9921 (daily ed. Oct. 9. 1975) (remarks of Rep. Leggett), reprinted
in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 845.
207 See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A MARINE FISHERIES PROGRAM FOR THE
NATION 31 (1976).

208. 1975 House Merchant Marine Hearings, supra note I, at 658 (testimony of
William C. Brewer, General Counsel, NOAA).
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Section 204(b)(12) of the FCMA 20 9 creates a framework for administrative action against permits for foreign fishing issued to vessels
of nations with which the United States has a Governing International
Fishery Agreement under section 201(c). 2 10 This section authorizes
the Commerce Department to order the revocation, suspension, or further conditioning of such permits, and points out that a revocation
may be "with or without prejudice to the right of the foreign nation
involved to obtain a permit for such vessel in any subsequent year."'2 1 '
It further provides that such action shall be taken if a section 308 civil
penalty or a section 309 criminal fine "has not been paid and is overdue," and may be taken if a vessel holding a GIFA permit "has been

used in the commission of any act prohibited by section

'

307. 212

Where one of the sanctions has been imposed mandatorily for nonpayment of a civil penalty under section 308, the statute provides for
automatic reinstatement upon payment of the amount due, with interest. No analogous provision applies to late payment of section
309(b) fines.
Two fundamental issues lurk in this indirect sanction. First, the
provision under which the Commerce Department is to "impose additional conditions and restrictions on the approved application of the
foreign nation involved and on any permit issued under such application" may be questioned as a retaliatory measure that punishes one
person for the wrongs of another with whom he may or may not be in
privity-it being the clear legislative intent that such additional restrictions could govern "all of the permits issued to the nation under
whose flag that vessel operates. '21 3 Even acknowledging the power of

209.

16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b)(12)(West Supp. 1977).

210. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c) (West Supp. 1977). This portion of the statute refers
only to "a permit issued pursuant to this subsection," thus excluding "registration
permits" issued under § 204(c). A combined permit sanction program applicable not
only to GIFA permits, but to § 204(c) registration permits and § 303(b)(1) domestic
fishing licenses as well, has been established by regulation under the general rulemaking power conferred on the Secretary of Commerce by FCMA § 305(g), 16
U.S.C.A. § 1855(g) (West Supp. 1977). 42 Fed. Reg. -12,026, 12,030-31
(to be codified as 50 C.F.R. § 621.51).
211. FCMA § 204(b)(12)(A), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b)(12)(A) (West Supp.
212. Id. § 204(b)(12), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b)(12).
213. S. REP. No. 94-711, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1976), reprinted in
LATIVE HIsToRY, supra note 4, at 37, 85. See also W. BURKE, R. LEGATSKI

(1977)
1977).
LEGIS& W.

WOODHEAD, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE OCEAN 43 (1975)

(suggesting exclusion of an entire foreign fishing fleet in case of repeated violations
or a pattern of violations evidencing "flag state 'collision' ").
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Congress to discriminate among various categories of nonresident
aliens for purposes of the immigration laws, 21 4 or to reserve natural
resources for exploitation by nationals or those aliens eligible for citizenship, 21 5 it is not difficult to fashion an argument that the alteration
of issued permits in this sweeping manner would offend deep-seated
notions of due process and equal protection. 216 No reason is apparent
why such nonresident aliens should be exempted from the equal protection dimension of fifth amendment due process or the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)--if, indeed, they may be viewed as nonresidents at all in light of their obligation under the GIFA's to appoint
agents for service of process. 217 A foreign entity should be permitted
to raise this argument, because in the FCMA "the United States...
has in fact imposed the framework of its government process on the
non-resident alien," and "is the entity requiring an applicant to follow
'2 18
a prescribed statutory process.
The second issue, closely tied to the first, is the question of hearing
rights under section 204(b)(12). Because GIFA permits are licenses
within the meaning of the APA, 21 9 they may not be peremptorily revoked without complying with the APA's procedural requirements. 22 0
The FCMA does not expressly create a right to a hearing on the record
214. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); cf. Mathews v. Diaz.
426 U.S. 67, 82-83 (1976) (upholding discrimination within the class of resident
aliens for certain medical benefits).
215.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 167. Comment b, Illustration 1 (1965).
216. Cf. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). Equal protection of the laws, initially guaranteed only as against the states, U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, has been held to be a limitation on the powers of the federal government as
well through the due process clause of the fifth amendment, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). although "the two protections are not always coextensive." Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976).
217. FCMA § 201(c)(2)(F), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c)(2)(F) (West Supp. 1977).
218. Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 152-53 (D.D.C.
1976). Generally speaking, nonresident aliens have not been permitted to sue in
United States courts for deprivation of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 776 (1950). At the time the Bartlett Act was under consideration, however, Japanese interests argued quite properly that "Japanese king crab
fishermen fishing for king crab in the high seas north of the Alaskan Peninsula arrested
and charged with illegal taking of 'Continental Shelf fisheries resources' when brought
before a U.S. court could avail themselves [as friendly aliens] of the [void-forvagueness dimension of the] fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States."
Fishing in U.S. Territorial Waters: Hearings on S. 1988 Before the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 88-17, at 188 (1964)
(statement of H. William Tanaka, Japan Fishery Society).
219. 5 U.S.C. § 551(8) (1970).
220. Id. § 558(c).
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for purposes of the trial-type adjudicatory hearing rights afforded by
sections 7 and 8 of the APA, 2 21 unless the reference in section 308(b)
to "the record upon which such a violation was found or such penalty
imposed" is to be read as mandating such a hearing. Nevertheless, it
must be concluded that the Conference Committee was mistaken when
it observed that the Commerce Department "is not required to give
notice or hold any kind of hearing prior to such permit revocation,
suspension, or modification since a hearing will already have been held
to determine whether the vessel was in fact used in the commission of a
prohibited act (or in the assessment of a civil penalty under section

308(a) or the imposition of a criminal penalty under section

309)."222

The committee was in error for two reasons. First, the civil penalty or
fine may be assessed against a person other than the holder of the permit against whom a sanction is being imposed under section 204(b)
(12). In the case of a fine this person will usually 6~e the master, 223 and
in the case of a civil penalty may well be the master rather than the
vessel owner or charterer to whom the permit has been issued. Hence,
even if an administrative hearing has been held, the real party in interest for section 204(b)(12) purposes may not have been a participant
in that hearing. Moreover, the opening clause of section 204(b)(12)
on its face permits sanctions to be imposed even where there has been
no unpaid civil penalty or criminal fine. In this situation, no hearing of
any kind will have been held, and revocation without a hearing flies
in the face of the procedural protections of the APA. The interim regu224
lations on permit sanctions take account of this problem.
A further circumstance not addressed by the conferees involves the
possible interaction between section 204(b)(12) and section 311(d),
which permits the district courts, in any case or controversy arising
under the FCMA, to "(1) enter restraining orders or prohibitions...
and (4) take other actions as are in the interest of justice." Although
the legislative history is silent on the point, it could be argued that
these powers extend to orders revoking, suspending, or further conditioning GIFA permits. Even so, the due process clause would stand as
a bar to the imposition of permit-oriented sanctions against vessels
221. Id. §§ 556, 557. See generally United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410
U.S. 224 (1973); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
222. S. REP. No. 94-711, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1976), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 4, at 37, 85.
223. See note 21 supra.
224. 42 Fed. Reg. 12,026, 12,031 (1977) (to be codified as 50 C.F.R. § 621.55(a)).
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other than those found to have violated the law or, perhaps, other vessels under common ownership. In candor, however, the plain terms of
section 204(b)(12), which vests license revocation or suspension
power in the Secretary of Commerce rather than the courts, and the
absence of clearer authorization to the district courts to take such
action, 225 militate against judicial sanctions against GIFA permits
other than upon express application by the Secretary incident to proceedings to collect an unpaid assessment, 226 punish an FCMA
228
crime, 227 or condemn a vessel or its catch.

E. Flag State Prosecution
The success of a coastal state's fisheries regulation scheme depends,
at least in part, on cooperation from flag states-that is, the foreign
states whose vessels fish the coastal state's waters. A flag state's cooperation may involve dissemination of information about the coastal
state's regulatory measures,2 29 or may go further to include punitive
programs to ensure compliance with those measures. The flag state
may even impose a "buffer zone" of several miles' depth to prevent its
masters from inadvertently violating coastal state regulations. 230 In
some instances such programs include the derating of officers. Measures
such as this may be at least as effective as coastal state penalties. 23 1
225. In some circumstances this type of power has been explicitly conferred on
the courts, although the underlying regulatory scheme is essentially administrative in
character. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 442-443 (1970).
226. FCMA § 308, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1858 (West Supp. 1977).
227. Id. § 309, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1859.
228. Id. § 310, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1860.
229.

See W. BURKE, LEGATSKI & W. WOODHEAD, supra note 213, at 44.

230. See U.S. COAST GUARD, STUDY OF COAST GUARD ENFORCEMENT OF 200-MILE
FiSHERY CONSERVATION ZONE 11-9 (1976) [hereinafter cited as COAST GUARD STUDY];
Anchorage, Alas., Daily Times, Feb. 26, 1974, at 1, col. I (Soviet 10-mile buffer
zone beyond 12-mile U.S. exclusive fishing zone); Irish Press (Dublin), Oct. 9, 1976, at 7,
col. 3 (Soviet 2-mile buffer zone around Irish 12-mile exclusive fishing zone). Conversely, however, the Coast Guard does not consider that there is a "buffer zone"
shoreward of the limit of United States fisheries waters: "foreign vessels choosing to
fish near the limit of the [territorial waters or the contiguous fisheries zone] assume
the risk of being seized." U.S. Coast Guard, Commandant Instruction No. 5921.1D,
§ 4(0(3) (Mar. 19, 1975).
231.' For example, it has been suggested that Soviet masters are "more wary of
being apprehended and being brought into [a United States] court, because when
they go home, one of their punishments is that they lose rank." Extending Jurisdiction
of the United States over Certain Ocean Areas: Hearings on S. 1988 Before the Senate
Conn. on Arned Services, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1974) (remarks of Sen.
Stevens); W. BURKE, R. LEGATSKI & W. WOODHEAD, supra note 213, at 28 & n.192
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Moreover, even where derating is not imposed, other penalties may be
invoked by the flag state for violation of coastal state laws, including
measures such as revocation of the vessel's license to fish for extended
periods.2 32 The question has been raised, however, whether some dis-

tant water fishing nations will actually punish their own fishermen.2 33

The FCMA gives apparent recognition to flag state prosecution as a
tool for ensuring compliance by foreign fishing vessels. Under section
201(c)(4)(C), a nation with which the United States has negotiated a
Governing International Fishery Agreement agrees to "abide by, and
take appropriate steps under its own laws to assure that all . . .
owners and operators [licensed to fish under section 204] comply

with, section 204(a) and the applicable
conditions and restrictions es2 4
tablished under section 204(b)(7). 3
The cooperative enforcement program is reflected, but not elaborated, in the Polish GIFA, which provides:

(1975) (citing A. VOLKov, MARITiME LAW 46-47 (1971)). See also Bartlett Act
Status Report, supra note 8, at 705 n. 11.Bulgaria also appears to punish its masters
who violate foreign fishing laws. FISHING NEws INT'L, Nov. 1976, at 24, col. 2 (arrest
of Bulgarian trawler Aurelia by Irish Navy).
232. For example, it was reported that the master and owners of the seized Taiwanese fishing vessel Tong Hong 3, see United States v. Taiwanese Longliner Tong
Hong 3, Civil No. A75-199 (D. Alas., filed Sept. 11, 1975); United States v. ChiangPuHsu, Crim. No. A75-1 18 (D. Alas., filed Sept. 11, 1975), would be subject to flag
state penalties in accordance with the Chinese government's policy to discourage intentional intrusion by Taiwanese vessels into foreign waters. 38 MAR. FISH. REV.,
Mar. 1976, at 35-36. Similarly, the Japanese government suspended the license of
the Mitsu Maru No. 30 for 100 days following that vessel's seizure by the United
States for a contiguous fisheries zone violation in 1973. 36 MAR. FISH. REV., Jan. 1974,
at 38.
233. 121 CONG. REc. S23,074-75 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1975) (remarks of Sen.
Muskie) (reproducing editorial from Boothbay, Me., Register Dec. 4, 1975). See also
id. at H9965 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1975) (remarks of Mr. Dodd). Flag state prosecution
concepts appear to have played some role in the disposition of the first criminal
prosecution under the Act. It was reported that the master of the Soviet fishing vessel
Taras Shevchenko was not going to be prosecuted by the United States because the
Soviet Union would punish him. Boston Herald American, Apr. 20, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
Subsequently, however, Captain Gupalov was prosecuted and, after the district court
refused to accept a plea of nolo contendere, see N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1977, at 8,
col. 1,entered a plea of guilty. Id., May 3, 1977, at 20, col. 4. He was fined $10,000
and given a suspended sentence to nine months' imprisonment.
234. Under H.R. 200, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(k)(4) (1975), as it passed the
House on October 9, 1975, 121 CONG. REc. H9984 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1975), provision
was made for the suspension of United States enforcement as to fishing for anadromous
species seaward of the 200-mile zone only "if the foreign nation gives written assurance to the Secretary of State that it will regulate such vessels in accordance with"
United States conditions and restrictions. The exception for flag-state enforcement
also applied only if foreign penalties were "equivalent" to those under H.R. 200 and
were "stringently" assessed. See H.R. REP. No. 94-445, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 54-55
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The Government of Poland shall take all necessary measures to
ensure:
1. that Polish nationals and vessels refrain from fishing for living
resources over which the United States exercises fishery management
authority except as authorized pursuant to this Agreement [and]
2. that all such vessels so authorized comply with the provisions of
permits issued pursuant to this Agreement and applicable laws of the
235
United States ....

Elsewhere, the agreement requires Poland to "take such measure as
may be necessary to ensure" that licensed and unlicensed Polish fishing
vessels permit boarding, inspection, and other enforcement action by
American law enforcement personnel. 236 While these provisions do not
in terms so provide, they do tend to suggest that enforcement measures
by the Polish government against Polish vessels violating the FCMA
are a part of the agreement between the two countries. Similar provisions, though even more ambiguous, are found in Bartlett Act-vintage
bilateral fisheries agreements, which commonly referred to the duty of
the distant water fishing country to "take necessary measures to ensure"
23 7
that its nationals complied with the substantive terms of the accords.
The efficacy of such foreign enforcement measures is, at this writing, necessarily uncertain, and it would be unwise to assume that
domestic enforcement efforts should be curtailed in the slightest degree in reliance on the possibility of punishment by the flag state.
Lack of available witnesses for trial in the courts of the flag state, and
the inevitable predisposition of a nation to drag its heels when prose(1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1051, 1106-07. This provision did not survive in conference.
235. Agreement Concerning Fisheries Off the Coast of the United States, Aug. 2,
1976, United States-Poland, art. V(I)-(2), reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 94-613.
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1976). Messrs. Burke, Legatski, and Woodhead suggest
that the "all necessary steps" formula should be made more specific, for example,
by requiring that all vessels in an area have on board a copy of the pertinent regulations. W. BURKE, R. LEGATSKI, & W. WOODHEAD, supra note 213, at 16.
236. Agreement Concerning Fisheries Off the Coast of the United States, Aug. 2,
1976, United States-Poland, art. IX(l), reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 94-613, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1976).
237. See, e.g., Agreement on Certain Fisheries Off the Coast of the United States,
Dec. 24, 1974, United States-Japan, [1974] 25 U.S.T. 3185, T.I.A.S. No. 7986, at 13;
Agreement on Fisheries in the Northeastern Pacific Ocean Off the United States Coast,
May 30, 1975, United States-Poland, art. 3, [1975] 26 U.S.T. 1179, T.I.A.S. No.
8100; Agreement on Fisheries in the Northeastern Pacific Ocean Off the United States
Coast, July 18, 1975, United States-Soviet Union, art. 11, T.I.A.S. No. 8207; Agreement
on Certain Fisheries Problems on the High Seas in the Western Areas of the Middle
Atlantic Ocean, Mar. 1, 1976, United States-Soviet Union, art. II, T.I.A.S. No. 8349.
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cuting its own citizens in such circumstances militate against excessive
expectations in this regard. In such cases, as Robert M. Goldberg has
properly observed, where "trial is not held in the country responsible
for the limits and arrest . . . [it] becomes an important test of the
participating country's willingness to abide by the rules of the regulating authority. '238 This test would be applicable, in the nature of
things, chiefly to fishing offenses by permitless vessels of GIFA nations, where such vessels are not successfully apprehended and the
only available form of punishment would be at the hands of the flag
state. It may be expected that this will be a miniscule category of
cases.
For these and related reasons, the Coast Guard reached the following conclusion after an analysis of flag state enforcement under the
International Convention on the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries:
From this record in the Atlantic, and recognizing that, with the possible exception of the USSR and Japan, the flag states exert less control over their fleets in the Pacific, the ability and willingness of flag
states to enforce must be seriously and objectively questioned. It is
clear that, historically, they have not self-policed themselves; the only
meaningful enforcement has been by the United States.
It is the Coast Guard's conclusion that flag nation enforcement is
23 9
not reliable enough to meet U.S. objectives for fisheries management.
IV.

SCHEME OF ENFORCEMENT

From the standpoint of law enforcement, the FCMA represents an
important advance over prior United States fisheries programs. Earlier
statutes and international agreements had created by degrees a hodgepodge of programs for enforcement, particularly against foreign vessels. In addition to the prohibitions of the Bartlett Act, to be applied
ultimately by the federal courts, the enforcement agencies were called
upon to implement international detention schemes such as those of
the North Pacific fisheries 240 and Pacific halibut fisheries, 241 the man238.

Goldberg, Ends and Means: The Role of Enforcement Analysis in Inter-

national Fisheries Regulation, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGE-

MENT 183, 197 (G. Knight ed. 1975).
239. COAST GUARD STUDY, supra note 230, at 11-8 to 11-9.
240. Int'l Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean,
entered into force June 12, 1953, art. X(1), [1953] 4 U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S. No. 2786.
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datory scheme of joint enforcement under the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 242 and sundry voluntary
schemes of joint enforcement elaborated in bilateral fisheries agreements. 243
The FCMA presents a far simpler charter for enforcement personnel, because its premise-with the exception of highly migratory species-is to make fisheries enforcement essentially a matter of coastal
state competence. This simplification of the institutional framework
for enforcement does not mean that the task of enforcement itself
becomes any easier, for the measures to be taken to conserve and allocate stocks-and to detect fishermen who disregard such measuresare likely to be more complex than those being supplanted. Hence, the
enforcement task may be simplified in the sense that only one set of
basic sanctions and law enforcement powers will apply, but the content of the regulatory or management scheme will itself not be made
less complex or onerous. This part of the article will discuss the
powers conferred by the FCMA upon enforcement personnel and
summarize how these powers are likely to be applied.
A.

Powers of Enforcement

Section 31 (b) of the FCMA sets forth the powers conferred on
enforcement personnel. On the whole, these powers do not vary materially from those exercised under the former legislative scheme. There
are differences, however, that should be noted.
241. Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern
Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, entered into force Oct. 28, 1953, United States-Canada.
art. II(1). [1954] 5 U.S.T. 5, T.I.A.S. No. 2900.
242. Feb. 8, 1949, [1950] 1 U.S.T. 477, T.I.A.S. No. 2089. See generally Jacobs.
United States Participation in International Fisheries Agreements, 6 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 471, 482 (1975). The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Act of 1950, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 981-991 (1970), was repealed by the Fishery Conservation Zone Transition Act.
Pub. L. No. 95-6, § 4, 91 Stat. 14, 16(1977).
243. E.g., Agreement on Certain Fishery Problems on the High Seas, Mar. 1.
1976, United States-Soviet Union, art. XI, T.I.A.S. No. 8349; Agreement Regarding
Fisheries in the Northeastern Pacific Ocean Off the United States Coast, Dec. 16. 1975,
United States-Poland, Annex II, T.I.A.S. No. 8354; Agreement Regarding Fisheries in
the Western Region of the Middle Atlantic Ocean, Dec. 4, 1973, United States-Romania, art. IX, [1973] 24 U.S.T. 2366, T.I.A.S. No. 7761; Agreement on Certain
Fishery Problems on the High Seas in the Western Areas of the Middle Atlantic
Ocean, June 21, 1973, United States-Soviet Union,
11, [1973] 24 U.S.T. 1603,
T.I.A.S. No. 7664; Agreement Regarding Fisheries in the Western Region of the
Middle Atlantic Ocean. June 2, 1973, United States-Poland, Annex II, [1973] 24
U.S.T. 1519, T.I.A.S. No. 7659.
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The Act continues to authorize boarding and search or inspection
of vessels, although it changes the Bartlett Act's undefined "any vessel" 244 to "any fishing vessel [as defined in section 3(11)] which is
subject to the provisions" of the FCMA.2 45 Vessels may be seized, as
before, if it "reasonably appears" the law has been broken, 246 and arrest of a person is authorized if there exists "reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed an act prohibited by section
307.1"247 Fish that have been taken or retained illegally may be seized
"wherever found"2 48 (i.e., presumably on land as well as at sea); the
Bartlett Act's apparently superfluous "whenever" 249 having been
deleted. Consonant with the Supreme Court's rejection of the "mere
evidence" rule in Warden v. Hayden,2 50 the FCMA expressly permits
seizure of "any other evidence related to any violation. '2 51 This provision did not appear in the repealed legislation although navigational
charts and logbooks were commonly seized for use at trial under the
Bartlett Act. All of these powers may be exercised with or without a
warrant. 252 Enforcement officers are also authorized to execute any
process that the district courts, which have exclusive jurisdiction over
254
cases arising under the Act, 25 3 may issue.
Perhaps the most obscure provision in the Act is the clause permitting enforcement agents to "exercise any other lawful authority." 255
Whatever the intent of the drafters, the language is broad enough to
include exercise of the right of hot pursuit.256 Beyond this, the clause
244.
245.
246.

16 U.S.C. § 1083(d)(2) (1970) (repealed 1976).
FCMA § 311(b)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1977).
Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1083(e) (1970) (repealed 1976), with FCMA §

31 l(b)(1)(C), 16 U.S.C.A. § 186 1(b)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1977).
247. FCMA § 311(b)(1)(A), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1977).
248. Id. § 311(b)(1)(D), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(b)(1)(D).
249. 16 U.S.C. § 1083(0 (1970) (repealed 1976).
250. 387 U.S. 294 (1967), noted in The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HAxv. L.
REv. 69, 112-14 (1967).
251. FCMA § 311(b)(1)(E), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(b)(1)(E) (West Supp. 1977).
252. Id. § 311(b)(1), 16U.S.C.A. § 1861(b)(1).
253. Id. § 311(d), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(d); but see id. § 308(b), 16 U.S.C.A. §
1858(b), discussed in text accompanying notes 190-95 supra. As a consequence of
the terms of § 311(d), even cases initiated by state enforcement agents designated
under § 311(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(a), must be brought before the federal district
courts. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1970) (district courts' original jurisdiction, exclusive of state courts, of offenses against laws of United States); 28 U.S.C. § 1355
(1970) (district courts' original jurisdiction, exclusive of state courts, of actions for
fines, penalties and forfeitures incurred under federal laws).
254. FCMA § 31 l(b)(2), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(b)(2) (West Supp. 1977).
255. Id. § 311(b)(3), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(b)(3). Runner-up for this distinction
is the mystifying definition in § 311(e), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(e).
256. See text accompanying notes 299-306 infra.
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could be relied on as a basis for such related enforcement powers as
2 57
the use of force in making arrests.
Lurking behind this catalog of enforcement powers is the question
of probable cause, which is usually required for a constitutional
search or arrest. 258 The legislative history does not explain the relationship of the term "reasonable cause" to the constitutional standard,
but at least as to United States vessels, broad powers of Coast Guard
inspection have been recognized by some courts,2 59 and an analogy to
border searches2 60 may provide some basis for random inspection of
foreign vessels entering territorial waters. Certainly it is no more
"practical to set up checkpoints at the outer perimeter" of the 200mile fishery conservation zone 2 61 than it is at the limit of territorial
waters. Beyond the three-mile limit, however, and a fortiori in enforcement against foreign vessels fishing for anadromous species beyond the fishery conservation zone, this rationale would be unavailing.
The Government will then have to rely, presumably, on an analogy to
the warrantless administrative inspections upheld in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States262 and United States v. Biswell.26 3 Be2 64
cause it will never be feasible to obtain a warrant on the high seas,
257. Questions might be raised as to the use of deadly force, see 14 U.S.C. §
637(a) (1970), to stop fleeing vessels. Recent domestic developments restricting the
use of such force in cases where no violence has been used by a felon, see Mattis v.
Schnarr, 547 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (4-3), vacated sub nor. Ashcroft
v. Mattis. 97 S. Ct. 1739 (1977), could, if applied to fishing cases, compel a wholesale rethinking of enforcement methodologies, which have historically relied on the
availability of deadly force as an important and, globally, surprisingly frequentlyinvoked power. The unavailability of extradition, however, serves to distinguish foreign
fishing offenses from the usual fleeing offender situation. See, e.g., Treaty on Extradition, Dec. 3, 1971, United States-Canada, T.I.A.S. No. 8237 (amending Treaty on
Extradition, Oct. 26, 1951, United States-Canada, [19521 3 U.S.T. 2826, T.I.AS.
No. 2454).
258. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
259. See, e.g., United States v. One 43 Foot Sailing Vessel "Winds Will." 538
F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (upholding constitutionality of 14 U.S.C.
§ 89(a) (1970)); but see United States v. Warren, 550 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1977),
wherein the court stated that "this Court is also casting doubt on the authority of the
Coast Guard under [14 U.S.C. § 89(a)] to stop a vessel for any reason other than
safety or documentary purposes absent a showing of probable cause that a crime has
been or is being committed." Id. at 225.
260. See, e.g., United States v. Stanley, 545 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1976).
261. See United States v. Tilton, 534 F.2d 1363, 1365 (9th Cir. 1976) (error for
trial court to sustain legality of search of ocean-going vessel without probable cause
in absence of finding that customs officers had "articulable facts to support a reasonably
certain conclusion" that vessel had crossed border).
262. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
263. 406 U.S. 311 (1972). See Rothstein & Rothstein, Administrative Searches
and Seizures: What Happened to Camara and See?, 50 WASH. L. REV. 341 (1975).
264. Moreover, even if a warrant were issued, service beyond the three-mile limit
would exceed the territorial constraints imposed by the Federal Rules, see FED. R.
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the exigencies of enforcement could be viewed as compelling a departure from shoreside practices.
Furthermore, with respect to foreign vessels the Act requires that
GIFA's include265an agreement to permit boarding, search, or inspection
"at any time,"
apparently without regard to the presence of probable or reasonable cause. The Polish GIFA does not include an explicit agreement to this effect; instead, a more general undertaking to
"allow and assist the boarding and inspection" is stated. 266 Assuming
this portion of the GIFA meets the standards of section 201(c)(2) of
the FCMA, and assuming further that the constitutional tests are applicable to FCMA searches, one may wonder whether a foreign government may, in this fashion, waive the rights of its citizens. This article
does not debate the rights of nonresident aliens under the Constitution, 267 but it is safe to say that issues of probable cause are quite likely
to be litigated under the FCMA.
Discussion thus far has centered on the basic powers conferred by
section 311(b) on enforcement personnel. It will now turn to (1) the
innovative "citation" alternative provided in section 311 (c) and (2) the
matter of hot pursuit, which has been a key tool in Bartlett Act enforcement.
B.

CitationProcedure

A novel provision in the FCMA is found in section 31 (c), which
reads:
[Enforcement personnel] may, in accordance with regulations issued
jointly by the Secretary [of Commerce] and the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating, issue a citation to the
owner or operator of [an offending] vessel in lieu of [making an arrest or seizure or taking other action] under subsection (b). 268
CRIM. P. 4(c), 41(a), FED. R. Civ. P. E(3)(a), unless FCMA § 311(b) is to be
viewed as a pro tanto modification of those rules. Such a reading could be difficult to

reconcile with the United States position that creation of the FCZ is not an expansion
of the area over which plenary sovereign rights are claimed.
265.

FCMA

§ 201(c)(2)(A)(i),

16 U.S.C.A.

§

1821(c)(2)(A)(i)

(West Supp.

1977) (emphasis added).
266. Agreement Concerning Fisheries Off the Coast of the United States, Aug. 2,
1976, United States-Poland, art. IX, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 94-613, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 8-9 (1976).
267. For another constitutional issue under the FCMA regarding treatment of
foreign fishermen, see text accompanying notes 213-16 supra.
268. FCMA § 31 1(c), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(c) (West Supp. 1977).
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The Act goes on to recite that any such citation must be noted on the
vessel's permit, together with the reason for the citation. The Commerce Department is to keep records of all citations .269
This procedure, which was put to use on the first day of FCMA
enforcement,2 7 0 was seemingly inspired by traffic offense models 27 1
and perhaps the minor violations section of the Sockeye Salmon or
Pink Salmon Fishing Act of 1947.272 It adds an important and needed
element of flexibility for "technical or minor violations" 27 3 to what
otherwise might be a rather cumbersome system of enforcement measures and sanctions. In the past, minor or technical violations were either never presented to the Department of Justice for prosecution, 274
nolle prossed,27 5 or made the subject of informal warnings and diplo276
matic protest.
Joint Department of Commerce-Coast Guard interim regulations
have been issued, but they are so terse as to provide little real guidance
269. Id.
270. See Boston Herald American, Mar. 2, 1977, at 1,col. 6 & 5, col. 3 (issuance
of citations to Soviet trawlers by Coast Guard cutters Sherman and Dallas). See also
N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1977, at D14, col. 2. For the first 72 hours of FCIA enforcement it appears to have been the policy to issue violations, in view of the possibility
of confusion among foreign fishermen. Boston Herald American, Mar. 2, 1977, at 5,
col. 3.
271.
H.R. REP. No. 94-445, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1051, 1105; see also Boston Herald American, Mar. 2.
1977, at 5, col. 5 (citation described by Coast Guard spokesman as "just like a
waterborne traffic ticket").
272. 16 U.S.C. § 776c(d) (1970). Unlike the FCMA, however, the salmon
legislation uses the citation as a summons to further formal proceedings, rather than
as a warning.
273. See S. REP. No. 94-711, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1976), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 37, 94.

274. See, e.g., Letter from Stan Pitkin, U.S. Att'y, W.D. Wash., to Sen. Ted
Stevens (Feb. 16, 1972), reprinted in 118 CONG. REC. 7011 (1972) (remarks of Sen.
Stevens) (offense by Canadian fishing vessel Dark Thunder not presented to U.S.
Attorney where vessel had only six undersized salmon aboard).
275. See, e.g., Shelf Enforcement, supra note 106, at 151 & nn. 82-83 (seizure
and release of Cuban trawler Playa de Varadero).
276. See, e.g., Honolulu Advertiser, July 12, 1976, at A3, col. I and July 13, 1976,
at A3. col. I (detention and release of Japanese vessels MEI 520 and MEl 579 at
Laysan Is.); cf. E. McDOWELL, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1975, at 387 (1976) (U.S. protest over unauthorized research by Soviet research
vessel Priboy in Trust Terr. of Pacific Islands); U.S. Oceans Policy: Hearing on S.
Res. 82 Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and Int'l Environment of the Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1973) (Dep't of State protest to Japan
concerning lobster fishing in violation of bilateral fisheries agreement). Even under the
FCMA it appears that diplomatic protests may form a part of the Government's
program for achieving compliance by foreign fishing interests. See Washington Post.
Apr. 8, 1977, at A12, cols. 5-6; id. Apr. 8, 1977, at A14, col. 2 (United States protest
to Soviet Union concerning early FCMA violations).
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as to how section 311 will be administered. 277 A number of observations may nevertheless be offered based upon the language of the Act
and the legislative history. First, it is to be noted that this provision,
read in isolation, purports merely to present an alternative to enforcement powers enumerated in section 311(b) (arrest, boarding, search,
seizure, etc.), but in actuality the procedure for citations stands as an
alternative to at least one of the three principal sanctions in the Act,
i.e., forfeiture of the vessel, its gear, cargo, and illegal catch of fish. Section 31 (c) cases are expressly exempted frbm the forfeiture provisions
of section 310.278 Presumably the intent of this exception was that
civil forfeiture would not lie where a citation had actually been issued,
27 9
and this is the interpretation that should be adopted.
Nevertheless, the bare words of section 31 (c) suggest that the legislative goal was to exclude only those cases where a citation was properl issued. Thus, shoreside authorities might have an opportunity to
second-guess citation judgments of at-sea enforcement personnel. Setting to one side the question of estoppel to prosecute based on the field
agent's issuance of a citation, 28 0 the uncertainties inherent in this construction are apparent and it has little to recommend it. For a similar
reason the converse reading-that it is a defense to a forfeiture action
277. Under § 310(a) forfeiture is authorized (but not required, see text accompanying note 147 supra) for "[a] ny fishing vessel (including its fishing gear, furniture,
appurtenances, stores, and cargo) used, and any fish taken or retained, in any manner,
in connection with or as a result of the commission of any act prohibited by section
307 (other than any act for which the issuance of a citation under section 311(c) is
sufficient sanction)."
278. FCMA § 310(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1860(a) (West Supp. 1977).
279. The Conference Report states that "[f]orfeiture does not lie . . . if the
relevant prohibited act was one for which the issuance of a citation under section
311(c) is sufficient sanction." S. REP. No. 94-711, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1976),
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 37, 93. This language does not
dispose of the question whether the citation must actually have been issued, or
whether, if issued, such issuance was proper. The Conference Report statement that a
citation is issued "for a violation of § 308(a)," id. at 58, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra

note 4, at 94, seems to have been in error, as § 308(a) does not define prohibited
conduct but merely creates the mechanism and criteria for imposition of civil penalties. The Conference Report also refers to citations being given to vessel masters, id.,
whereas the statute permits issuance of citations to "the owner or operator." FCMA
§ 311(c), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (West Supp. 1977). Issuance to the owner rather than
the master would be appropriate only where practical considerations such as the
weather or diversions of the patrol prevented boarding and issuance and notation of
the warning at the time of the offense.
280. The general rule has been that estoppel could not be based on representations by a subordinate government official. See generally 2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW TREATISE § 17.01 (1958). Recent decisions in the courts of appeals, however,
cast doubt upon the continuing validity of this rule. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 17.01 (1976).
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that a citation should have been issued under the joint regulationsmust be rejected, lest the federal courts be deprived of their condemnation jurisdiction based on an after-the-fact review of the alleged
propriety of a citation that was not issued. The legislative history of
the section holds no support for such a reading; similarly, the provision
should not be construed to grant district courts review power with respect to the correctness of administrative decisions to issue or not to
2 81
issue a citation.
The statute does not incorporate an analogous express exception
for the imposition of civil penalties under section 308 or criminal
penalties under section 309. Hence, issuance of a citation under section 311(c) would not be a bar to either of these types of proceedings,
although the legislative history views the citation as a "warning," i.e.,
an alternative to the actual imposition of a penalty. 282 Issuance of a
citation is, after all, a rather clear indication that an offense is minor,
if not trivial, and it is highly unlikely that a criminal prosecution
would be initiated respecting a violation for which a citation had
been issued. The same is not necessarily true of section 308 civil penalties, however, for it is quite possible to imagine a violation of the
Act that merits imposition of a civil penalty but does not dictate the
bodily arrest and seizure remedies available under section 31 (b).
Where this is the case, one might have thought a citation could be issued and thereafter-for example, upon review of the offender's
record-a civil penalty might also be assessed. The legislative history
does not support this view.
It should be mentioned that the citation procedure is not limited to
vessels that hold permits; obviously, however, only if a vessel holds a

281. Consider, however, the cases cited in note 140, supra. In each of the cases.
the complaint affirmatively pleaded that a citation was not sufficient sanction for the
violation in question. Amended Complaint at 4, United States v. Russian FIV Taras
Shevchenko, Civil No. 77-1086-M (D. Mass., filed Apr. 21, 1977); Complaint at 2.
United States v. 17.56 Metric Tons, More or Less, of Fish, Civil No. 77-1086-M
(D. Mass., filed Apr. 21, 1977). Corrective legislation to cure this difficulty has already been suggested. Letter from the author to Senator Warren G. Magnuson.
Chairman, Sen. Comm. on Commerce (Jan. 18, 1977), reprinted in inplementation of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act: Hearings on Oversight into
Implementation of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act Before the Sen-

ate Comm. on Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.. ser. 95-6, at 95, 96 (1977).
282. H.R. REP. No. 94-445, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1975), reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1051, 1105; H.R. REP. No. 94-711, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 58 (1976), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 37, 94.
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permit may the citation be noted on

it.283

This excludes (a) foreign

vessels that either (1) pertain to countries with which no GIFA or
other international fishery agreement exists, or (2) fly the colors of a
country that does have such an agreement, but do not themselves hold
a permit, and (b) domestic vessels lacking a license required under
section 303(b)(1). In the former category of foreign vessels, the absence of enforcement tools not involving personal arrest or vessel seizure compels the conclusion that citations would be inappropriate, and
the harsher powers conferred by section 31 (b) would have to be exer284
cised. The interim joint regulations are rather thin in this regard
and it is hoped that there will be further articulation of not only the
standards for citation issuance, but also the categories of vessels to
which the procedure will apply and the interaction with the exercise
of administrative discretion under section 308.285
How far the government should go in committing itself to a particular sanction may be debated at length. Bearing in mind the hazards
of predicting future enforcement approaches,2 8 6 at least some rough
rules of thumb may be suggested. For example, it can safely be said
that no intentional violation should lead to issuance of a citation. Similarly, impeding an enforcement officer-including necessitating hot
pursuit, transmitting fraudulent check-in or check-out reports, tampering with transponders or other enforcement-related equipment, or
attempting to transfer a foreign fishing permit to another vesselshould be treated as a serious offense beyond the ambit of section
311(c). Conversely, unintentional first offenses, such as recreational
2 87
fishing by crew members (assuming this is a violation of the Act),
failure to accord proper accommodations to observers, good faith reliance on erroneous navigational charts, or failure to display a fishing
permit in the required manner, could properly be treated as citable
under section 311(c). This list, of course, leaves a complex gray area
283.

Such a permit may be issued either under § 204(b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b)

(West Supp. 1'977) for vessels of countries with which a GIFA exists under § 201(c).
16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c); under § 204(c), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(c), for vessels of coun-

tries with which there is an existing international fishery agreement under § 201(b),
16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(b); or under § 303(b)(1), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853, for fishing vessels of the United States.
284. 42 Fed. Reg. 11,839 (1977) (to be codified as 50 C.F.R. Pt. 620); see also
42 Fed. Reg. 12,026-27 (1977) (to be codified as 50 C.F.R. § 621.2).

285. See generally text accompanying notes 184-87 supra.
286. Compare Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8, at 729 & n.145 with Shelf
Enforcement, supra note 106, at 145-51.

287.

See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
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impossible to clarify without further experience under the FCMA.
Certainly, however, the enforcement agencies should put more flesh
on the statutory bones if section 3 11 (c) is to be more than a cover for
unfettered enforcement discretion.
Hot Pursuit
A key element in maritime law enforcement is the right of hot pursuit, which allows a coastal state to give chase to and arrest beyond
waters subject to its jurisdiction a foreign vessel violating the coastal
state's laws or regulations. 288 Fishing zones were not one of the types
of contiguous zones for which hot pursuit was authorized under the
C.

Convention on the High Seas 289 or the Convention on the Territorial

Sea and the Contiguous Zone. 2 90 In a case involving a violation of the
Contiguous Fisheries Zone by a Japanese trawler, however, it was held
that the failure of the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference in
1958 to include fishing within the express purposes for which a contiguous zone may be established (customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary regulation) does not compel a conclusion that no such zone may
be created or that the right of hot pursuit may not be exercised with
2 91
respect to violations of such a zone.
Under the Bartlett Act, extensive use was made of the right of hot
pursuit,2 9 2 although never with respect to a prosecuted violation of the
prohibition on foreign harvesting of Continental Shelf fishery re288. See generally N. POULANTZAS, THE RIGHT OF HOT PURSUIT IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 39-268 (1969); 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 677-87 (1965).
289. Done Apr. 29, 1958, art. 23(1), [19621 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200,
450 U.N.T.S. 82.
290. Done Apr. 29, 1958, art. 24, [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639. 516
U.N.T.S. 205.
291. United States v. Fishing Vessel Taiyo Marit No. 28. 395 F. Supp. 413
(D. Me. 1975) (Gignoux, J.), discussed in Fidell, Hot Pursuitfrom a Fisheries Zone,
70 AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hot Pursuit], and Note, The
Right of Hot Pursuit fron Exclusive Fishery Zones, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 336
(1976). See also Ciobanu, Hot Pursuit from a Fisheries Zone: A Further Comment
on United States v. Fishing Vessel Taiyo Maru No. 28; United States v. Kawaguchi,
70 AM. J. INT'L L. 549 (1976); Fidell, Letter to the Editor, id. at 554.
292. See, e.g., Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8, at 739-41; Hot Pursuit,
supra note 291, at 97 & n.15 (1976); FISHING NEWS INT'L, Feb. 1976, at 16, col. 2
(U.S. hot pursuit of Polish trawler Humbak commenced by aircraft, concluded by

Coast Guard cutter Bibb); McCloskey, Board and Seize, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7. 1976.
§ 6 (Magazine) at 13, 85-86 (U.S. pursuit of South Korean trawler Kum Kang San).
For illustrative uses of hot pursuit by other countries see Regina v. Itoh. No. 164/75
(B.C. Ct. App.. Apr. 23, 1975) (arrest of Japanese fishing vessel Koyo Mart No. 2);

Washington Post, Nov. 9, 1976, at A8, col. 6; Halifax, N.S., Chronicle-Herald, Nov. 9,
1976, at 1, cols. 2. 5; id., Nov. 10, 1976, at 2, col. 2 (interception of Cuban fishing
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sources. 293 This exercise of the right of hot pursuit was based principally on the provision of that Act that made the laws relating to customs seizures applicable to fisheries violations.2 94 Pursuit is also contemplated by the law permitting the use of gunfire in the event a vessel
subject to seizure or examination disobeys a "heave to" order received
2 95
from a Coast Guard cutter or aircraft.
The FCMA probably removes one rationale for the exercise of hot
pursuit. In place of the Bartlett Act's sweeping incorporation of the
customs enforcement laws, 2 96 section 310(c) incorporates only those
portions of the customs laws relating to disposition and proceeds from
the sale of forfeited property, remission or mitigation of forfeitures,
and compromise of claims.2 97 Hence, reliance can no longer be placed
upon the authorization to pursue found in the Tariff Act of 1930.298
This deficiency is by no means critical, however, in view of the other
vessel Playa Colorado by Canadian destroyer); Weng Chang Ngan v. H.M. Inspector
of Fisheries, No. M.29/76 (N.Z. June 4, 1976) (Wild, C.J.) (arrest of Taiwanese
fishing vessel Kin Nan); Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries v. Shinkaruk, No.
1976/383 (Cork, Ire., Dist. Ct., Oct. 13, 1976) (app. pending), cert. refused sub nom.
The State (Shinkaruk) v. District Justice Carroll, No. 1976/502 (Ire. High Ct., Dec.
15, 1976), noted in Irish Press, Oct. 6, 1976, at 3, cols. 1-2 (arrest of Soviet trawler
Belomorye by Irish minesweeper); FISHING NEWS INT'L, Feb. 1975, at 13 (arrest of

British fishing vessel C. S. Forresterby Icelandic patrol vessel).
293. Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8, at 740 & n. 212; Shelf Enforceinent, supra note 106, at 152 n. 84. The probable reason for this is that many of the
Continental Shelf cases began with the United States enforcement agents' discovery of
illegal catches during inspections. With fishing operations not in progress and a boarding party already aboard, attempts to escape become more difficult and grave, although this has happened in several fisheries cases. See, e.g., Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8, at 740 n. 211; Fidell, The Law and Fishery Enforcement on the
High Seas, 101 U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROC., July 1975, at 95, 96 (abduction of Ohio

fish and wildlife agent by Canadian fishing vessel Cliffside); cf. Nat'l Fisherman,
Nov. 1976, at 19-A (escape of U.S. fishing vessel from Canadian custody with
Canadian agent aboard). Enforcement guidelines issued in 1974 for protection of
Continental Shelf fishery resources appear to contemplate that hot pursuit will be
exercised in shelf cases. See Enforcement of United States Law Prohibiting Foreign
Taking of Continental Shelf Fishery Resources (CSFR) of the United States 1 5, in
1975 House Merchant Marine Hearings, supra note 1, at 155, 157. The United
States has also cosponsored draft treaty articles at the Third U.N. Law of the Sea
Conference (Caracas session) authorizing hot pursuit in shelf cases. See note 301
infra.
294. 16 U.S.C. § 1082(c) (1970) (repealed 1976) provided:
All provisions of law relating to the seizure, summary and judicial forfeiture,
and condemnation of a vessel ... for violation of the customs laws, the disposition of such vessel, . . . or the proceeds from the sale thereof, and the remission
or mitigation of such forfeitures shall apply to seizures and forfeitures incurred,
or alleged to have been incurred, under the provision of this chapter ....
See generally Hot Pursuit,supra note 256, at 98.
295. 14 U.S.C. § 637(a) (1970).
296. See note 294 supra.
297. FCMA § 3 10(c)(1)-(4), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1860(c)(1)-(4) (West Supp. 1977).
298. 19 U.S.C. § 158 1(b),(d) (1970).
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available authority. Moreover, it seems entirely appropriate to read
the authorization of enforcement officers to "exercise any other lawful
authority"2 9 9 as broad enough to include the right of hot pursuit. In
view of the evidence placed before the Congress with respect to the
exercise of this right, 300 including the fact that the United States had
co-sponsored draft articles providing for hot pursuit from the economic zone as well as the Continental Shelf at the Caracas session of
the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, 30 1 it would be
absurd to consider that the express repeal of the Bartlett Act 3 02 was
also intended to be an implied repeal of an important enforcement
device, the use of which had been expressly upheld only the year be30 3
fore in the Taiyo Maru No. 28 case.
If, however, reliance is to be placed upon the "other lawful authority" clause of section 31 (b), it must be borne in mind that in international law the power to conduct hot pursuit inheres in the patrol vessel
or aircraft 304 and not in the individual law enforcement officer. Except for warships and military aircraft, which are automatically au299. FCMA § 31 1(b)(3), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(b)(3) (West Supp. 1977).
300. See, e.g., 133 CONG. REC. 7900 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Gruening) (pursuit
of Soviet trawler SRTM 457); 118 CONG. REc. 15061 (1972) (remarks of Sen.
Stevens) (listing seizures); 110 CONG. REC. 23863 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Stevens)
(pursuit of Korean fishing vessel Dong Bang 71), 121 CONG. REC. S7155 (daily ed.
Apr. 30, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Stevens) (pursuit of Japanese fishing vessel Eiky
Marti No. 33); id. at S20,838 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Stevens)
(pursuit of Japanese fishing vessel Eikyu Marit No. 35); Emergency Marine Fisheries
Protection Act of 1975: Hearing on S. 961 Before the Sen. Comm. on Commerce,
pt. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. ser. 94-27, at 47 (1975) (testimony of Adm. O.W. Siler.
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard) (arrest of Japanese fishing vessel Jikyu Marti No.
17); 121 CONG. REC. S19,147, S19,150 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1975) (remarks of Sen.
Gravel), reproducing Goldberg, Ends and Means: The Role of Enforcement Analysis
in International Fisheries Regulation, inTHE FUTUREOF INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 188, 204 (H. Knight ed. 1975) (pursuit and a'--ehension of Soviet trawlers):

Dep't of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1977: Hearings
Before a Subcoini. of the House Conine. on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 1. at 116 (1976) (testimony of Adm. O.W. Siler. Commandant, U.S. Coast
Guard) (discussion of use of helicopters in hot pursuit); 1975 House Oversight
Hearings, supra note 164, at 154, 159 (testimony of Rear Adm. Robert H. Scarborough. Chief. Office of Operations, U.S. Coast Guard).
301.
See SENATORS C. PELL, E. MUSKIE, C. CASE & T. STEVENS COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT TO THE SENATE: THE THIRD U.N. LAW OF THE SEA CON-

FERENCE 63 (Comm. Print 1975); Status of the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference:
Hearing Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong.. 2d Sess. 29 (1974).
302. FCMA, Pub. L. No. 94-265, § 402, 90 Stat. 331 (1976).
303. See note 291 and accompanying text supra.
304. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 289, art. 23(4). Indeed it
has been suggested that no specific statutory basis is necessary for the exercise of hot
pursuit. See 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 683 (1965), citing The

Ship "North" v. The King, 37 Can. S. Ct. 385 (1906).
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thorized to conduct hot pursuit, only "ships or aircraft on government
service specially authorized to that effect"3 05 may be used for this
purpose. Hence, it is important from the standpoint of international
law that the status of all enforcement vessels and aircraft be clear. To
resolve any doubts in this connection, enforcement regulations should
be promulgated under section 305(g) to indicate precisely which agencies' or states' vessels and aircraft will be authorized to conduct hot
3 06

pursuit.

One further point should be noted with regard to the new law. Evasive action requiring the exercise of hot pursuit can constitute an offense separate from the fishing violation, as well as being admissible as
evidence of guilt.30 7 Thus, the criminal sanctions of section 309(b)
apply to refusals by "any person" to permit an authorized officer to
conduct a boarding.3 08 In addition, third persons may be criminally
305. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 289, art. 23(4).
306. In the drug enforcement area, a Coast Guard instruction provides for hot
pursuit by vessels and aircraft of the Coast Guard, the Department of Defense, the
Customs Service, and the Drug Enforcement Administration. U.S. Coast Guard,
Commandant Instruction No. 5920.6 13(b) (Apr. 15, 1976) (cancelled Apr. 13,
1977). The analogous fishery instruction should provide for involvement of other
agencies in hot pursuit. Such arrangements should also be given due publicity through
publication in the Federal Register, and, to reach foreign interests that might not
otherwise receive notice, see Shelf Enforcement, supra note 106, at 148 n. 62, through
diplomatic correspondence. It may be added that NOAA has chartered aircraft to
supplement Coast Guard patrol efforts. Dept's of State, Justice and Commerce, the
Judiciaryand Related Agencies Appropriationsfor 1977: Hearings Before a Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 726 (1976).
If such aircraft are to be used for more than mere surveillance, the Revised Single
Negotiating Text indicates that they should not be authorized to conduct hot pursuit
unless they have distinctive markings. Revised Single Negotiating Text art. 34, 5
Third U.N. Conf., supra note 6, at 173, 179, U.N. Doc. AICONF. 62/WP.8/Rev. I/Pt.
III at 19 (1976). The Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, [1962]
2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, does not include this requirement.
307. See 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 276, at 111 n.2 (3 d ed. 1940).
308. FCMA § 309(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1859(a) (West :Supp. 1977). Other provisions of § 307(1), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1857(1) prohibit forcible assaults, resistance,
opposition, impeding, intimidation or interference with an enforcement officer. Mere
flight may not constitute a violation of these provisions. Compare Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries v. Shinkaruk, No. 19761383, slip op. at 2 (Cork, Ire., Dist. Ct.,
Oct. 13, 1976) (app. pending), cert. refused sub nom. The State (Shinkaruk) v. District Justice Carroll, No. 19761502 (Ire. High Ct., Dec. 15, 1976), noted in Washington Post, Oct. 14, 1976, at A24, col. I, and Irish Press, Oct. 15, 1976, at 3, Cols. 1-4
(master of Soviet trawler Belomorye acquitted on charges of obstructing and impeding Irish Navy boarding party, convicted of illegal fishing) with 14 FISHING NEws
INT'L, Feb. 1975, at 14-15 (master of British trawler C.S. Forrestersentenced to jail
term following conviction for illegal fishing and resisting arrest; hot pursuit by Icelandic patrol vessel). A question not squarely resolved is whether a mere refusal of a
master to follow a patrol vessel into port constitutes an offense. The FCMA is narrower than certain foreign laws requiring compliance with directives of law enforcement personnel. See, e.g., Fisheries Act of 1908, § 58(1), 5 REPR. STAT. N.Z. 263, 298
(1957), appplied in Weng Chang Ngan v. H.M. Inspector of Fisheries, No. M.29/76
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prosecuted for interfering with, delaying, or preventing "by any means,
the apprehension or arrest of another person, knowing that such other
person has committed any act prohibited by" section 307.309 Each of
these provisions could form the basis for prosecution of crew members
who help prevent a boarding or inspection, or who aid an escaping
vessel, provided that in the latter case the necessary element of knowledge is present. 310 Civil penalties can also be assessed and vessels are
subject to forfeiture for refusal to permit boarding or interference with
an apprehension. 3 11 Hence, penalties for flight are substantial and it
may be assumed that under the new law's civil penalty criteria, 3 12 the
need to conduct hot pursuit will continue to be a key element in shaping the government's response to a violation by a foreign fishing vessel. 313 The need to chase a domestic offender, although not involving
the doctrine of hot pursuit, would presumably also be pertinent to the
penalty level imposed.
As a practical matter, the right of hot pursuit may well be less important under the FCMA than before, since it is likely that most illegal fishing will occur at fishing grounds close to shore rather than in
the immediate vicinity of the 200-mile limit. 3 14 This circumstance,
slip op. at 11-12, (N.Z. Magis. Ct. Apr. 15, 1976), appeal dismissed (June 4. 1976
(N.Z.). In the event of a failure to cooperate, a fishing vessel can be towed to an
appropriate port. See, e.g., Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8, at 740 n. 211;
1975 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 164, at 154 (testimony of Rear Adm.
Robert H. Scarborough, Chief, Office of Operations, U.S. Coast Guard) (refusal of
Soviet fishing vessel Armaturschchik to proceed under own power); Corpus Christi.
Tex., Caller, Aug. 3, 1975, at 1, col. I (arrest of Cuban fishing vessel E-82HB). However, a small enforcement unit might find it difficult to tow a much larger vessel such
as a factory ship over any distance. See Fidell, Fisheries Legislation: Naval Enforcement, 7 J. MAR. L. & COM. 351, 354 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Naval Enforcement].
309. FCMA § 307(l)(H), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1857(1)(H) (West Supp. 1977).
310. Section 307(1)(H), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1875(1)(H) is the only prohibition in
the Act to require "knowing" conduct on the part of the perpetrator. See generally
text accompanying notes 45-53 supra. Cf. United States v. Ayo-Gonzalez, 536 F.2d
652 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 808 (1977) (no mens rea required in
civil forfeiture action for violation of § I of the Bartlett Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1081
(1970). repealed 1976).
311. FCMA § 310(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1860 (West Supp. 1977). See generally
text accompanying notes 11-15 supra.
312. FCMA § 308, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1858 (West Supp. 1977); see text accompanying
notes 174-208 supra.
313. See Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8, at 738-40 & nn. 20 1-11.
314. As Senator Packwood stated in the floor debates, " ' [i] t is easier, with Coast
Guard cutters or a plane, to catch someone penetrating 20 miles inside a 200-mile
zone than I mile inside the 12-mile zone.''" 120 CONG. REc. S21,092 (daily ed. Dec.
11, 1974). See also 1975 Senate Foreign Relations Hearings, supra note 176, at 438
(markup session) (remarks of Sen. Biden), and 1975 House Merchant Marine Hearings, supra note 1, at 391 (testimony of Allan J. Ristori, Chairman, Emergency Comm.
to Save America's Marine Resources).
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together with the availability of the civil penalty procedure for which
no seizure is necessary, 3 15 makes it somewhat less critical to have the
pursuit power, although the epic chases that have occasionally occurred off Alaska and elsewhere 3 16 tend to suggest that even a deep
incursion into the fisheries conservation zone does not guarantee that
a poacher will be stopped before he reaches the limit of the zone.
The extension of fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles by the United
States, Canada, and Mexico also adds a new dimension to the
problem of escape and hot pursuit across international boundaries.
Under the Convention on the High Seas, the right to conduct hot pursuit ends when a vessel enters the territorial sea of its flag state or a
third state.3 17 In accordance with this concept, there have been occa3 18
sional border escapes by Canadian and Mexican fishing vessels.
This safe haven was historically available and likely to be used only if
a vessel was operating quite near the United States shore. Now, with
the expansion of the fishing zones, it is likely that some fishing vessels
operating illegally in the 200-mile zone may seek refuge in Canadian
or Mexican fishing waters (or those of other nations whose fishing
zones abut the fisheries conservation zone). In these circumstances,
hot pursuit by United States enforcement craft would be lawful, but
likely to give rise to international friction, especially if the adjacent
315. FCMA § 308(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1858(a) (West Supp. 1977); see also id. §
201(c)(2)(F), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c)(2)(F) (appointment of agents in the United

States for receipt of process). The service-of-process arrangement does not remove
all need for hot pursuit, because it would have no bearing on fishing offenses by vessels of countries with which the United States has no § 202 agreement, or to foreign
vessels of GIFA countries where the particular vessel has no license (i.e., a fishing
vessel that is not fishing "pursuant to" a GIFA). Id. § 201(c)(2),

16 U.S.C.A. §

182 1(c)(2).
316. For example, the Eikyu Maru No. 35 pursuit lasted 14 hours, that of the
Eikyu Marui No. 33 over six hours, Note, Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea:
A Synopsis, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 628, 641 & n.63 (1976) (citing 121 CONG. REC.

S7155 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Stevens)), and the pursuit of the
Taiyo Maru No. 28 covered over 50 miles, United States v. Fishing Vessel Taiyo Maru
No. 28, 395 F. Supp. 413 (D.Me. 1975). See also Bartlett Act Status Report, supra

note 8, at 740 n.21 1.
317.

Done Apr. 29, 1958, art. 23(2), [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200,

450 U.N.T.S. 82. This concept is carried forward verbatim in the Revised Single Negotiating Text at Article 99(3). 5 Third U.N. Conf., supra note 6, at 151, 168, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.62/WP.8/Rev.l/Pt. II, at 47 (1976). See generally N. POULANTZAS, THE
RIGHT OF HOT PURSUIT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 227-29 (1969).

318.

See, e.g., Brownsville, Tex., Herald, Aug. 12, 1976, at 1, col. 1 (escape of

Mexican fishing vessels); see also Nat'l Fisherman, Nov. 1976, at A-16, col. 1. For an
illustration of a Canadian vessel's unsuccessful attempt to flee to Canadian waters
see 118 CONG. REC. 27239 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Stevens) (arrest of Canadian
fishing vessel Karen West three-fourths of a mile inside Alaskan waters by state agents).
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state does not consent to the pursuit (for example, if the pursued vessel flies the adjacent state's own flag). Arrangements should therefore be made and understandings reached in advance concerning the
exercise of the right in foreign fisheries zones. Conversely, the United
States and domestic fishing interests would have to recognize the possibility that Mexican, Canadian, or other foreign law enforcement vessels and aircraft might properly have occasion to pursue a malefactoreven one flying United States colors-into the fisheries conservation
zone.
With respect to foreign vessels fishing for United States anadromous species, hot pursuit may also play an important role. Pursuit
in these circumstances, however, is unusual in that "there is not a geographical 'area' within which hot pursuit is unnecessary to preserve
jurisdiction. 3 19 Because there is no jurisdictional area corresponding
to the FCZ for such species, the Coast Guard has taken the position
that hot pursuit in anadromous fishing cases must be "established and
maintained immediately upon discovery of an on-going violation in
'3 20
order to preserve jurisdiction over the fleeing vessel.
D.

Enforcement Philosophies

One of the hardest tasks facing the agencies responsible for enforcement of the FCMA is that of deciding upon an enforcement philosophy. How much enforcement is enough? At what point do the expenditures for enforcement overtake the advantages? These are issues
that have received considerable attention, and it is inevitable that present approaches will be adjusted as experience grows under the new
law. As the Commandant of the Coast Guard has pointed out, the true
nature of the enforcement program cannot be known until manage32 1
ment regulations have been issued.

319. U.S. Coast Guard. Enclosure to Commandant Instruction No. 16214.1A. at
VII-2 (Feb. 25, 1977).
320.

Id.

321. Emergency Marine Fisheries Protection Act of 1975: Hearing on S. 961
Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1975) (testimony of
Adm. O.W. Siler, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard); Letter from Adm. O.W. Siler.
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, to Sen. Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman, Sen.
Comm. on Commerce (Aug. 10, 1974), reprinted in Extending Jurisdiction of the
United States over Certain Ocean Areas: Hearings on S. 1988 Before the Senate Comm.
on Armed Services, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 267 (1974).
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It has been estimated that perhaps one offender in ten was apprehended under the Bartlett Act. 322 Such figures are of doubtful utility,
however, because, as the Department of Commerce has observed in
an analysis of fishing cases in the period from 1968 to 1975: "There
appears to be no direct correlation between the level of surveillance
323
efforts and the number of vessels seized."
The Coast Guard's response to the new law has been to opt for a
program combining concentrated surveillance of known fishing grounds
with occasional patrols and overflights of the entire fisheries conservation zone.3 24 The primary thrust will be to patrol known active commercial fishing areas within 200 miles of the coast, together with "less
frequent and less intensive random patrols to the limit of domestic
jurisdiction . . . for the purpose of detecting changes in fishing fleet
operations, illicit fisheries support activity, etc. Together these two concepts comprise the 200-mile 'Planned Approach.' ",325 It is not known
what enforcement efforts will be directed at foreign anadromous fishing
beyond the 200-mile zone. Operating instructions call for Coast Guard
boarding and inspection of foreign fishing vessels operating within the
migratory range of anadromous species that spawn in the United States
if such ships are found fishing "in a manner which may result in removal of such anadromous species from the sea."'3 26 To the extent that the
Continental Shelf exceeds the zone, some patrols will presumably be
322.

116 CONG. REc. 32764-65 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Dingell); id. at 32769

(remarks of Rep. Clark); H. R. REP. No. 91-1430, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970).
323. Dep'ts of State, Justice, and Commerce, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriationsfor 1977: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on

Appropriations,94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 726 (1976).
324. Letter from Adm. O.W. Suer, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, to Sen.
John Sparkman (Oct. 31, 1975), reprinted in 1975 Senate Foreign Relations Hearing,
supra note 176, at 308, 309; Dep't of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Dep't of Transportation
and Related Agencies Appropriations of the House Comm. on Appropriations,94th

Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1,at 96, 101 (1976) (testimony of Adm. O.W. Siler, Commandant,
U.S. Coast Guard).
325. Coast Guard Authorization-F.Y. 1977: Hearings on H.R. 11670 Before the
Subcomm. On Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 94-23, at 120 (1976). Other purposes of

the monitoring of activity throughout the zone would be "to make our presence

known throughout the area, to detect entry into the fishery zone, and to facilitate apprehension as necessary." Emergency Marine Fisheries Protection Act of 1975: Hear-

ing on S.961 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 94-27,
at 44 (1975) (testimony ofAdm. 0. W. Siler, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard).
326. U.S. Coast Guard, Commandant Instruction No. 16214.1A, III-1 (Feb. 25,
1977). Conversely, foreign vessels conducting a directed fishery for highly migratory
species are not subject to boarding and inspection in the FCZ. Id.
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undertaken there as well. This general approach is prudent, because
an effort to provide saturation coverage of the entire fisheries conservation zone-a zone that has been estimated to cover 2,222,000 square
nautical miles (an adition of 1,676,600 square nautical miles over
the combined area of the territorial sea and former contiguous fisheries
zone)32 7-would be exorbitantly expensive and might needlessly involve elements of the Defense Department.3 28 The decision not to apply a picket-line enforcement philosophy-one of the approaches the
Coast Guard had studied and rejected on grounds of expense 329-- has
33 0
received apparent Congressional approval.
Even with this refined patrol concept, the United States, like other
nations moving to expand their jurisdiction over fisheries, is faced with
a need for additional vessels, aircraft, and personnel. 331 In the past
year the Coast Guard and NOAA have been seeking to fill the perceived gaps.
Simply adding ships and planes, however, is not the answer to the
enforcement problem. The FCMA contemplates that more sophisticated methods be used than merely increasing the number of policemen on "the beat." Thus, section 201(c)(2)(C) requires that any
GIFA include a provision that the foreign nation and its fishing vessels
"abide by the requirement that

.

.

.

transponders, or such other ap-

propriate position-fixing and identification equipment as the Secretary
of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating determines
327. Coast Guard Authorization-F. Y. 1977: Hearings on H.R. 11670 Before the
Subconln. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 94-23, at 120 (1976).
328. This author has previously suggested that such reliance on the Defense Department could be viewed abroad as a hostile action and would divert such forces
from their primary mission. See Naval Enforcement, supra note 308, at 354 &
n. 12, 366.
329. Letter from Adm. O.W. Sler, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, to Sen. Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on Commerce (Aug. 10, 1974). reprinted
in Extending Jurisdiction of the United States Over Certain Ocean Areas: Hearings
on S. 1988 Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 267. 268
(1974); Coast Guard Authorization-F. Y. 1977: Hearings on H.R. 11670 Before the
Subconm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 94-23, at 118 (1976) (testimony of
Adm. 0. W. Siler, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard).
330. See H. R. REP. No. 94-1221, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1976); 121 CONG.
REc. H9914 (daily ed., Oct. 9, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Sullivan).
331. Problems posed by the need for language skills may be reduced in view of
the requirement that by January 1978 all foreign vessels fishing with a permit "have
available ... at all times a person who can converse in English and who can serve as
an interpreter." 42 Fed. Reg. 8813, 8817 (1977) (to be codified as 50 C.F.R. §
611.6(d)).
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to be appropriate, be installed and maintained in working order.13 32
The Act also calls for foreign consent to the stationing of United States
observers or "ship riders" aboard licensed foreign fishing vessels.3 33
33 5
Already in limited use in Alaskan waters 334 and in the tuna fleet,
ship riders could ensure compliance with gear and closed area restrictions, as well as record catch data and conduct biological sampling. 33 6
Presumably such ship riders could be clothed with official status as enforcement agents under section 3 11, in order to guarantee their personal safety33 7 and to provide them, if desired, with specific law enforcement powers. Absent a special designation, however, such observers
would not be duly authorized enforcement officers under section
3 38
3 11 (b).
The wisdom of vesting full enforcement authority in a single individual aboard a foreign vessel may be questioned. It is not likely that

an isolated law enforcement agent could single-handedly alter an illegal course of conduct or make an arrest or vessel seizure.33 9 The

332. FCMA § 201(c)(2)(C), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1977).
333. Id. § 201(c)(2)(D), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c)(2)(D).
334. See Miller, Nelson, French & Hoag, U.S. Observers Board Japanese Trawl
Vessels in Bering Sea, 39 MAR. FISH. REV., Apr. 1976, at 1.
335. 1975 House Merchant Marine Hearings, supra note 1, at 184 (testimony of
Howard W. Pollock, Deputy Adm'r, NOAA); see also Fish and Wildlife Briefings: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., Ist Sess.,
ser. 94-2, at 151-54 (1975) (testimony of Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., Deputy Ass't Sec'y
of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs); see also Save the Dolphins v. United States
Dep't of Commerce, 404 F. Supp. 407, 412 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
336. COAST GUARD STUDY, supra note 230, at IV-5.
337. See FCMA § 307(1)(E), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1857(1)(E) (West Supp. 1977).
Regulations published in February 1977 fail to include observers within the protected
category of authorized officers, although nonrated Coast Guard personnel are within
that category and hence protected by § 307(l)(E) if they. are "accompanying and
acting under the direction of' any listed authorized officer. 42 Fed. Reg. 8813, 8815
(1977) (to be codified as 50 C.F.R. § 611.2(c)(4)). (Ordinarily only Coast Guard
commissioned, warrant, and petty officers possess law enforcement powers. 14 U.S.C.
§ 89(a) (1970)). Because of the omission of observers from the class of authorized
officers it is not a crime under the F.C.M.A. to assault or impede them, although it
would be a regulatory offense, punishable by civil penalty or forfeiture. 42 Fed. Reg.
8817 (1977) (to be codified as 50 C.F.R. § 611.7(a)(4)(ii)).
338. 1976 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 23, at 68 (testimony of Rozanne
L. Ridgway, Deputy Ass't Sec'y of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs). But see
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY

ASSESSMENT,

U.S. CONGRESS,

ESTABLISHING A 200-MILE

FISHERIES ZONE 111-29 to 111-31 (suggesting that observers could be empowered to
collect fines).
339. The Coast Guard recognized as much in noting as a drawback of shiprider
programs "the fact that observers cannot perform the apprehension element without
specific support from ships." COAST GUARD STUDY, supranote 230, at IV-19.
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340
frequency of instances in which a show of force has been necessary,
or in which individual enforcement agents have been stymied, 34 ' rules
out such an expectation. Instead, the shiprider should be viewed as a
source of information, or at most, a permanent witness on whose reports civil penalties could be based or other action taken if need be.
The Foreign Fishing Regulations published on February 11, 1977, do
not resolve these questions. Those regulations note that observers are
assigned "[f] or the purposes of collecting scientific data and carrying
Direcout such other management and enforcement activities as [the
342
tor of the National Marine Fisheries Service] may authorize."
Beyond this, a detailed evaluation has been performed by the Coast
Guard in consultation with other concerned federal agencies 343 on a
variety of novel enforcement possibilities. 344 Some of the possibilities
are well known, such as the use of licensing schemes, which is required for foreign vessels by the FCMA. Others involve new concepts
and new technology, such as the use of satellites and underwater sen-

sors. 345 In addition, attention was given to programs for vessel posi-

340. See, e.g., Washington Post, Oct. 1. 1976, at A16, col. I (Irish 30-man
boarding party needed to require seized Soviet trawler to sail to port).
341. See note 293 supra.
342. 42 Fed. Reg. 8813, 8817 (1977) (to be codified as 50 C.F.R. § 611.8); 42
Fed. Reg. 22,589 (1977) (corrections to original regulations). The Commerce Department has summarized the functions of observers, in part, as follows:
Observers will record any violations of regulations and the terms of vessel permits
and will determine the accuracy of foreign vessel reporting. The observers will
not have direct enforcement responsibilities. However, their presence may serve
as a deterrent to violations of U.S. regulations. The observers' records may be
used in subsequent enforcement actions and in planning for deployment of observers and agents in future years.
42 Fed. Reg. 17,895 (1977). Unless observers are to be authorized to issue citations,
it is unclear how their records can be "used in subsequent enforcement actions."
Certainly any adverse information gathered by such observers should be brought to
the attention of the affected fishing company or master before it forms the basis for
imposition of a sanction.
343. The other agencies involved were the Departments of State, Defense. Commerce, Treasury and Justice, see Etergency Marine Fisheries Protection Act of 1975:
Hearing on S. 961 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., IstSess..
ser. 94-27, at 44 (1975) (testimony of Adm. 0. W. Siler, Commandant. U.S. Coast
Guard); the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, see Coast Guard Authorizations: Hearing on S.2924, Before the Subcommn. on Merchant Marine of the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 94-54, at 11 (1976) (testimony of
Adm. Siler); and the intelligence community, see 1975 House Merchant Marine
Hearings,supra note 1,at 210 (testimony of Adm. Siler).
344. See Act of Oct. 1, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-430, § 7, 88 Stat. 1180 (1974)
(requiring interagency study of "all feasible methods of enforcing fishery management
jurisdiction, including any possible extension of such jurisdiction").
345. See generally COAST GUARD STUDY, supra note 230, at IV-5; Emergency
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tion and activity reporting, currently provided for under the Tuna
Conventions Act of 1950.346
The results of the evaluation of enforcement techniques indicate
that for the near term, none of the more sophisticated enforcement
concepts "can provide the credibility of the on-scene vehicle for direct
enforcement. '347 Because enforcement credibility is a sine qua non for
deterrence, such concepts cannot properly be relied on for the present,
although they are continuing to receive attention for subsequent

phases of extended jurisdiction enforcement.
E.

348

Rewards

One feature of the Bartlett Act program that did not find its way
into the new law was the provision for rewards for information
leading to "any penalty or forfeiture incurred for violation" of the old
law. 349 This provision, added to the law in 1970, had not been
used,3 50 and it is likely that the drafters felt that its retention would
only have encouraged vigilantism-a phenomenon that could lead to
hostility and perhaps dangerous confrontations between American and

Marine Fisheries Protection Act of 1975. Hearing on S. 961 Before the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. ser. 94-27, at 44-45 (1976) (testimony of Adm.
O.W. Siler, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard); Department of Transportationand Related Agencies Appropriationsfor 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Department of Transportationand Related Agencies Appropriationsof the House Comm.
on Appropriations, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1 at 269-76 (1977) (testimony of Adm.
O.W. Sler). Joint tests have also been performed by the Coast Guard, NMFS, and
NASA on the use of synthetic aperture radar as an enforcement device. 1976 House
Oversight Hearings, supra note 28, at 49 (testimony of Capt. Richard J. Knapp, Chief,
Ocean Operations Div., U.S. Coast Guard).
346. 16 U.S.C. §§ 951-961 (1970); 50 C.F.R. § 280.7(c)-(d)(1)(1976); see
also Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, § 111(d), 16 U.S.C. § 1381(d) (Supp.
V. 1975); 41 Fed. Reg. 45,015, 45,019 (1976) (to be codified as 50 C.F.R. § 216).
FCMA regulations call for 24-hour prior notice of commencement and termination
of permit-authorized activity of foreign fishing vessels. 42 Fed. Reg. 8816 (1977) (to
be codified as 50 C.F.R. § 611.4).
347. COAST GUARD STUDY, supra note 230, at VI-I.
348. Examples of new enforcement equipment concepts being evaluated include
"high performance watercraft, lighter than aircraft [sic] and possibly remotely controlled aircraft." Emergency Marine Fisheries Protection Act of 1975: Hearing on
S. 961 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 94-27, at 45
(1976) (testimony of Adm. O.W. Siler, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard). See also
S. REP. No. 865, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976) (hydrofoils); Nat'l Fisherman,
Dec. 1976, at 1-A, col. 1 (testing of Coast Guard hydrofoil Flagstaff).
349. 16 U.S.C. § 1086 (1970), as amended by Act of Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-514, § 6, 84 Stat 1297 (repealed 1976).
350. See Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8, at 733 & n.170.
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foreign fishermen. 35 1 In any event it is clear from the legislative history that the omission of rewards was a conscious decision. 352 Even if
other omnibus fisheries and wildlife enforcement legislation calling
for rewards should be enacted, 353 the dangers and shortcomings of
excessive private involvement in the law enforcement process-for
example, inconvenience to fishing vessels, potential harassment, untimely reports, and the possibility of "false alarms" 354-counsel
against an increased reliance on such involvement.
V.

ENFORCEMENT ORGANIZATION

A.

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)

No agency's task is affected more by the FCMA than that of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. NOAA, as the
351. For evidence of self-help by American fishermen, see 1975 House Merchant
Marine Hearings, supra note 1, at 59 (remarks of Rep. Emery); Fishery Jurisdiction:
Hearings on Extending the Jurisdiction of the United States Beyond the Present
Twelve-Mile Fishery Zone Before the Subconmn. on Fisheries and Vildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant M/arine and Fisheries,
93d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 93-37, at 36, 39 (1974) (testimony of Robert Foster, New
Bedford Harbor Fishermen's Co-op). See also 1975 House Merchant Marine Hearings,
supra note I, at 62 (testimony of Rep. Heckler), discussing H.R.J. Res. 290, 94th Cong..
Ist Sess. (1975) (authorizing Letters of Marque for seven named lobster boats).
352. See 1975 Hotse Merchant Marine Hearings, supra note I, at 657 (remarks
of Ned P. Everett. Counsel, Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and
the Environment). The House bill had included provisions for the compensation of
informants. H.R. 200, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. § 313(b) (1975), 121 CONG. REc. H9976
(daily ed. Oct. 9, 1975). reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 814.
353. Such legislation was passed by the House of Representatives in 1976. H.R.
5523, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(a)(5) (1975), passed by House, 122 CONG. REC.
H3828 (daily ed. May 3, 1976). Under this bill, which was originally intended to
cover only the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Interior Department, but was later
expanded to include the Department of Commerce (of which the National Marine
Fisheries Service is a part), see H.R. REP. No. 94-1053, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976).
rewards may be offered and paid "for services or information which may lead to the
apprehension of violators of' federal fish and wildlife laws. To the extent that these
rewards need not be for information actually leading to a conviction, forfeiture or
civil penalty, the reward scheme is broader than the one under the 1970 Bartlett Act
amendments. The bill does not set a ceiling on the rewards, but the legislative history
indicates that the program would be generally administered by a senior official, such
as a regional director, subject to established policies. Field agents' discretion concerning the amount of rewards would be narrowly confined. See Fish and Wildlife
M ;,' I',.'flts-Part 3: Hearing on Administration of Fish and Wildlife Programs,
H.R. -. 23, Before the Subconmn. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the
Environment of the House Comnli. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong..
Ist Sess., ser. 94-20, at 173 (1976) (testimony of Lynn A. Greenwalt, Director.
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service). The bill has been reintroduced this session as H.R.
2329. 95th Cong.. 1st Sess. (1977).
354. See W. BURKE. R. LEGATSKI & W. WOODHEAD, supra note 213, at 46.
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designee of the Secretary of Commerce, 355 is entrusted with broad
management responsibilities. Not the least important part of NOAA's
expanding role is in the area of enforcement.
There are several consultative provisions in the Act that call for the
Commerce Department to be involved in enforcement-related decisions. Under section 201(e)(3), enforcement experience is one of the
factors to be considered by the Departments of State and Commerce
in allocating total catch levels among foreign nations, and under section 204(b)(6), the Commerce Department must consult with the
Coast Guard "with respect to enforcement" in deciding on applications for foreign fishing permits. Moreover, enforcement costs are
made a pertinent consideration in imposing license fees on foreign
fishing vessels. 3 56 In addition, exercise of the Commerce Department's
cooperative role in international boundary negotiations 357 and of its
sole power to "establish the boundaries between the geographical
areas of authority of adjacent Councils" 358 is very likely to have important enforcement implications.
These, however, are relatively peripheral to the enforcement function, for the new Act makes it plain that the Commerce Department is
to share enforcement responsibility with the department in which the
Coast Guard is operating. Both agencies are named in section 31 l(a),
and both (as well as "the head of any Federal or State agency which
has entered into an [enforcement] agreement") 35 9 may authorize their
personnel to exercise the arrest, boarding, search, seizure, and service
355.

Under the Act, "[t] he term 'Secretary' means the Secretary of Commerce or

his designee." FCMA

§

3(20), 16 U.S.C.A.

§

1802(20) (West Supp. 1977). The

enforcement-related functions have been delegated to the Administrator of NOAA.
41 Fed. Reg. 50,317 (1976). Within the National Marine Fisheries Service, responsibil-

ity for "promulgation and enforcement of domestic and international regulations for
the protection of marine fisheries and marine mammal resources of the United States"
is vested in the Office of Resource Management. 41 Fed. Reg. 795, 798 (1976).
356.
357.

FCMA § 204(b)(10), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b)(10) (West Supp. 1977).
Id. § 202(d), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1822(d). The National Ocean Survey of NOAA

will also be involved in enforcement-related activities through its program for surveying and fixing the limits of the fishery conservation zone. 122 CONG. REC. H6240
(daily ed. June 18, 1976) (NOAA Extended Jurisdiction Implementation Requirements, Fiscal Year 1977). See generally text accompanying notes 112-13 supra.
358. FCMA § 304(f)(2), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(f)(2) (West Supp. 1977); see also
42 Fed. Reg. 36,981 (1977) (to be codified as 50 C.F.R. § 601.12). The Commerce

Department has an analogous power to define lateral seaward boundaries between
states for purposes of allocating Coastal Energy Impact Program grants under the

Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1976. Pub. L. No. 99-370, §§ 7(a)
(2), 7(b)(3), 90 Stat. 1013, 1020-21 (1976). See also 41 Fed. Reg. 46,724, 46,738
(1976) (proposed 15 C.F.R. § P31.82).

359.

FCMA

§ 31 l(b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(b) (West Supp. 1977).
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of process powers noted in section 3 11 (b). Also, both share the task of
3 60
developing criteria for issuance of "citations" under section 3 11 (c).
The precise shape of the enforcement arrangements has yet to be
determined, but it is safe to predict that National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) personnel-who are expected to accompany eightyfive per cent of the Coast Guard enforcement patrols and flights36 1will be available to:
[a] dvise the unit commander, accompany boarding parties inspecting
domestic and foreign fishing vessels for compliance with Federal laws
and international agreements relating to living marine resources, and
assist in training Coast Guard personnel in technical matters related
362
to fisheries enforcement and observation.
In this fashion, the expertise of the NMFS agents can help provide continuity to overcome the effects of Coast Guard policies on regular rotation of military personnel. 363 NMFS personnel are also likely to be
36 4
relied on as ship riders or observers.
Beyond this, the Commerce Department has responsibility for the
disposition of forfeited property, succeeding generally, with respect to
the Act, to the role of the Commissioner of Customs under the cus3 66
toms laws. 3 65 Perhaps most important of all, the power to impose,
compromise, modify, or remit civil penalties3 67- - a novelty under the
FCMA 368-is vested in the Commerce Department. Judicious use of
this sanction, and of the related duty to revoke, suspend, or condition
360. See generally text accompanying notes 268-87 supra.
361.
122 CONG. REC. H6242 (daily ed. June 18, 1976) (NOAA Extended Jurisdiction Implementation Requirements, Fiscal Year 1977).
362. Interagency Agreement Between the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, National Marine Fisheries Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard. art.
IV.C.1, Mar. 13, 1974, in Coast Guard Authorizations: Hearing on S. 2924 Before
the Subcomm. on Merchant Marine of the Senate Conn. on Commerce, 94th Cong..
2d Sess.. ser. 94-54, at 17 (1976). See generally Bartlett Act Status Report, supra
note 8, at 730 & n.152.
363. See 122 CONG. REC. H6244 (daily ed. June 18, 1976) (remarks of Rep.
Forsythe).
364. See 1975 House Merchant Marine Hearings, supra note 1, at 183-84 (testimony of Howard W. Pollock, Deputy Adm'r, NOAA); id. at 210 (testimony of Adm.
O.W. Siler, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard).
365. FCMA § 310(c), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1860(c) (West Supp. 1977).
366. Id. § 308(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1858(a).
367. Id. § 308(d), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1858(d).
368. The Bartlett Act did not provide for civil penalties; other fisheries legislation.
however, did. See text accompanying notes 202-06 supra.
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a permit for nonpayment of a civil penalty or fine,3 69 will be as critical
to the success of the enforcement program as supplying necessary ships
and aircraft for patrols.
Lastly, mention should be made of the general rulemaking power
conferred upon the Secretary of Commerce "to carry out ... [the]
provisions of" the Act.37 0 This power, lineal descendant of one originally shared with the Treasury Department, 37 1 could be used in a variety
of ways to aid in the enforcement program, for example, in requiring
various forms of cooperation during vessel boardings,3 7 2 in giving notice of procedures for hot pursuit, or perhaps in elaborating various
37 3
of the definitions given in the Act.
B.

United States Coast Guard

For obvious reasons, the FCMA vests in the Coast Guard a major
share of responsibility for protection of United States fishery re37 4 it
sources. As the nation's basic maritime law enforcement agency,
possesses the surface and airborne equipment and trained personnel
necessary to conduct surveillance and boardings of foreign and domestic vessels subject to the fishery management authority of the
United States. Under the Bartlett Act, the Coast Guard had "the primary enforcement responsibility, '37 5 and for this reason the views of
the Commandant concerning that law were singled out for attention.
Despite an isolated suggestion that NOAA's fisheries enforcement
and surveillance program be transferred to the Coast Guard,37 6 the
FCMA makes it plain that the enforcement function is to be shared
369.

FCMA § 204(b)(12), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b)(12) (West Supp. 1977). The

Commerce Department also has discretion to impose such sanctions even in the
absence of an unpaid fine or civil penalty. Id. See pp. 550, 553 supra.
370. FCMA § 305(g), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(g) (West Supp. 1977).
371. See 16 U.S.C. § 1084 (1970), discussed in Bartlett Act Status Report, supra

note 8, at 731 n.155.
372.

See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 8813, 8817 (1977) (to be codified as 50 C.F.R. §

611.b); see also 50 C.F.R. § 295.6 (1976) (enforcement procedures for protection
of Continental Shelf fisheries resources).
373. For example, the definitions of "scientific research activity" and of operations
at sea in support of fishing as used in FCMA § 3(10)(D), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(10)(D)
(West Supp. 1977).

374.
375.

See 14 U.S.C. §§ 2, 89(a) (1970).
United States v. Ayo-Gonzalez, 536 F.2d 652, 660 n.20 (5th Cir. 1976),

cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 808 (1977).
376. Dep'ts of State, Justice, and Commerce, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations for 1977: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Appropriations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 7, at 2079 (1976) (testimony of Robert P.

Jones, Executive Director, Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n).
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between the Coast Guard and the Department of Commerce, with the
assistance of such other federal agencies and states as can be negotiated.3 7 7 The new law gives important additional recognition to the
Coast Guard's role beyond that found in the Bartlett Act. Thus, the
regulations concerning the issuance of citations to offenders are to be
issued jointly by the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of the
department in which the Coast Guard is operating.3 7 8
The Coast Guard is represented on each Regional Fishery Management Council by a non-voting member 37 9 and is empowered to determine the types of position-fixing and identification equipment that
shall be required of GIFA-nation vessels. 380 Consistent with the role
of the Coast Guard in the documentation and admeasurement of
domestic vessels, 381 the Act also calls upon the Secretary of Commerce to consult with both the Coast Guard and the Department of
State in prescribing "the forms for permit applications submitted
under [section 204(b)] and for permits issued pursuant to any such
application." 3 82 Similarly, the Secretary of State must consult the
Coast Guard and the Commerce Department in establishing application procedures and forms with respect to registration permits for
383
fishing under existing international fishery agreements.
Applications for fishing permits from foreign fishermen must be
transmitted by the State Department to the Coast Guard as well as
the appropriate Regional Fishery Management Council, 384 the Department of Commerce, 385 and responsible congressional committees. 386 No application may be granted until the Department of Commerce has consulted with the Coast Guard "with respect to enforce377. FCMA § 311(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(a) (West Supp. 1977). The Act does
not require that agreements for the use of state and other federal agencies in enforcement be negotiated jointly by the Coast Guard and the Department of Commerce. but
such an approach makes obvious good sense in view of the shared ultimate responsibility for enforcement.
378. Id. § 311(c), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(c); 42 Fed. Reg. 11,839 (1977) (to be
codified as 50 C.F.R. Pt. 620). See generally text accompanying notes 268-87 supra.
The Secretary's functions under the Act have been delegated to the Commandant of
the Coast Guard. 42 Fed. Reg. 12,176 (1977) (to be codified as 49 C.F.R. § 1.46(v)).
379. FCMA § 302(c)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(c)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1977).
380. Id. § 201(c)(2)(C), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(c)(2)(C).
381. See 46 C.F.R. Pt. 67 (1976).
382. FCMA § 204(b)(2). 16 U.S.C.A. § 1825(b)(2) (West Supp. 1977).
383. Id. § 204(c), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(c).
384. Id. § 204(b)(4)(B), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b)(4)(B).
385. Id. § 204(b)(4)(A). 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b)(4)(A).
386. Id. § 204(b)(4)(C). 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b)(4)(C).
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ment"38 7 and the Coast Guard must be informed as to the approval of
any section 204 permit application by the Commerce Department. 388
Finally, the Secretary of Commerce must consult with the Coast Guard
"with respect to enforcement at sea" when reviewing any fishery management plan or amendment to such a plan. 389
Under the FCMA, control of vessels that have been seized will continue to rest with the United States Marshals Service as agents of the
district courts, once the jurisdiction of those courts has attached by
means of the commencement of a civil forfeiture action. 39 0 In accordance with the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims, the marshal must "take into his possession for safe custody" any tangible attached or arrested property. 3 91 This power brings
other agencies into the process, because the Supplemental Rules 39 2 and
Customs Regulations 3 93 provide for withholding from clearance seized
vessels that have not been ordered released. Moreover, it is common
for the Marshals Service to appoint a "keeper" for a seized vessel, 394
although the Coast Guard ordinarily will not relieve the marshal of
overall responsibility.3 95 When involved as a keeper, the Coast Guard
acts as an arm of the court and not as a law enforcement agency.
Because local hostility may manifest itself in connection with seizures of vessels of particular countries, 3 96 such vessels and their crews
may have to be protected from the local public. Also, in the case of
vessels of socialist countries, special precautions appear to have been
deemed necessary, since the practice has grown up under the Bartlett
Act of creating a security zone around such ships during the pendency
of judicial proceedings. 3 97 The same practice has been adopted occa387.

Id. § 204(b)(6), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b)(6).

388. Id. § 204(b)(8)(B), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b)(8)(B).
389. Id. § 304(b)(2), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(b)(2).
390. Id. § 310(b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1860(b). Where only the civil penalty provision
of § 308(a) is invoked, there would be no district court jurisdiction in rem, and hence
no occasion for involvement by the marshals.
391. FED. R. Civ. P. E(4)(b).
392. Id.
393. 19 C.F.R. § 4.61(b)(23) (1976).
394. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR UNITED STATES MARSHALS,
PROCEDURES INADMIRALTY (1971), reprinted in 1972 A.M.C. 569 (1972).
395. U.S. Coast Guard Commandant Instruction No. 16214.1A, at 8 (Feb. 25,

1977).
396. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1976, at 21, col. 1 (clash between pro- and
anti-Castro demonstrators near seized Cuban trawler Golfo de Tonkin in Boston).
397. E.g., 40 Fed. Reg. 33,972 (1975) (security zone at Corpus Christi, Tex., for

Cuban vessel E-82tB), revoked, 41 Fed. Reg. 16,798 (1976); 40 Fed. Reg. 37,036
(1975) (security zone at Boston for Cuban vessel Playa de Varadero), revoked, 40
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3 98
sionally even where vessels of non-socialist nations are in custody.
The need for such extraordinary measures is open to question, and it
is to be hoped that the power will be used more sparingly as fisheries
law enforcement comes increasingly to be divorced from considerations of international politics and more completely assimilated with
general law enforcement measures. 399
Manifestly, the Coast Guard's role under the statute is broadranging and quite well-defined, although the law gives the service no
direct voice in the assessment of penalties or in the choice of sanctions. 400 The latter is not considered to be a defect, as it is plainly not
the office of the policeman, which is the Coast Guard's basic task, to
make such decisions. To the extent that the circumstances of a particular case call for one disposition or another, the criteria in section
308(a) are sufficiently broad to encompass matters which the Coast
Guard might wish to have considered, such as the need to conduct hot
pursuit. 40 1 As can be seen, the major role carved out for the Coast
Guard by the FCMA extends far beyond the planning and execution
of patrol efforts that largely characterized the Coast Guard's functions
under the Bartlett Act, and will help to ensure a coherent regulatory
program that gives due attention to the sometimes overlooked exigencies of the enforcement function.

C.

Departmentof Defense

Under the Bartlett Act, the role of the Defense Department was
substantial on paper but virtually nonexistent in fact. 40 2 Even though
that law was amended in 1970 to permit the main enforcement agencies to "utilize the equipment (including aircraft and vessels)" of all
Fed. Reg. 45,168 (1976); 40 Fed. Reg. 37,037 (1975) (security zone at New York
for Soviet vessel Zaraysk), revoked, 40 Fed. Reg. 45,169 (1975); 41 Fed. Reg. 755
(1976) (security zone at New York for Polish vessel Lepus), revoked, 41 Fed. Reg.
2109 (1976) and 42 Fed. Reg. 24.738 (1977); 41 Fed. Reg. 2086 (1976) (security
zone at Boston for Cuban vessel Golfo de Tonkin), revoked, 41 Fed. Reg. 5634 (1976).
398. See 40 Fed. Reg. 7095 (1975) (security zone at New York for Italian vessel
Antonietta Madre), revoked, 40 Fed. Reg. 10,987 (1975); 40 Fed. Reg. 30,641 (1975)
(security zone at New York for Japanese vessel Tokachi Mar't), revoked, 40 Fed. Reg.
31,652 (1975).
399. But see 42 Fed. Reg. 19,490 (1977) (security zone at Boston for Soviet
vessel Taras Shevchenko).
400.

See Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8, at 733.

401. See FCMA § 308(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1858(a) (West Supp. 1977); see generally text accompanying notes 288-319 supra.
402. Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8, at 732.
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federal agencies, 403 including in particular the "regular scheduled" use
of Defense Department equipment, 404 the provision has been essentially a dead letter in the intervening years.4 05
In the fashioning of the FCMA, however, there were occasional
suggestions that the defense establishment, particularly the Navy,
might have to be brought into the enforcement program under the
new law. Such suggestions were either motivated by a wish to conjure
up a "parade of horribles" to forestall passage of the new law, 40 6 or,
more constructively, to show that other resources could be added to
those of the Coast Guard. 4 07 Such use of the Navy would, if statu403. 16 U.S.C. § 1083(a) (1970), as amended by Act of Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-514, § 2, 84 Stat. 1297 (repealed 1976).
404. H. R. REP. No. 91-1430, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970).
405. Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8, at 732; Naval Enforcement, supra
note 308, at 362. Matters might be different in this respect if the United States did not
have as large a Coast Guard as it currently does. In other countries naval forces have
been relied upon extensively for fisheries enforcement patrols. Id. at 355-58; see e.g.
Weng Chang Ngan v. H.M. Inspector of Fisheries, No. M.29176 (N.Z. June 4,
1976) (Wild, C.J.) (arrest of Taiwanese squid boat Kin Nan by H.M.N.Z.S. Tatupo
following air and sea chase including gunfire), noted in Auckland, N.Z., Herald, Mar.
31, 1976, at 1, col. 1; id. Apr. 1, 1976, at I, col. 1; Minister for Agriculture and
Fisheries v. Shinkaruk, No. 19761383 (Cork, Ire., Dist. Ct., Oct. 13, 1976) (app.
pending), cert. refused sub nom. The State (Shinkaruk) v. District Justice Carroll,
No. 1976/502 (Ire. High Ct., Dec. 15, 1976), noted in Washington Post, Oct. 1, 1976,
at A16, col. 1; id. Oct. 19, 1976, at A24, col. 1; Irish Press (Dublin), Oct. 6, 1976,
at 3, col. I (trial of master of Soviet trawler Belomorye; vessel had been fired upon
by Irish Naval Service minesweeper L.E. Grainne); Washington Post, Oct. 1, 1976,
at A16, col. 1 (seizure of Belomorye); id. Nov. 9, 1976, at A8, col. 6 (seizure of
Cuban vessels Playa Giron, Playa Colorado and Oceano Antartico by Canadian Forces
destroyers).
406. See, e.g., Extending Jurisdiction of the United States Over Certain Ocean
Areas: Hearings on S. 1988 Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 46, 48, 67, 69-70 (1974) (testimony of Gen. George S. Brown, Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff); 121 CONG. REC. S19,149 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1975) (remarks
of Sen. Gravel) (semble); 122 CONG. REC. H2522-23 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1976)
(remarks of Rep. Bob Wilson).
407. See, e.g., 121 CONG. REC. H9930 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1975) (remarks of Rep.
Emery); 1975 House Merchant Marine Hearings, supra note 1, at 207 (testimony of
Adm. O.W. Sler, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard); id. at 395, 402 (testimony of
Allan J. Ristori, Chairman, Emergency Comm. to Save America's Marine Resources);
Fishery Jurisdiction: Hearings on Extending the Jurisdiction of the United States
Beyond the Present Twelve-Mile Fishery Zone Before the Subcomm. on Fisheriesand
Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 93-37, at 93, 118 (1974) (remarks of
Rep. Kyros); id. at 284 (testimony of Joseph Lewis). See also H. R. REP. No. 94-445,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 82 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4,
at 1051, 1136 (cost of implementation must include "expanded enforcement and surveillance capability of the [Commerce] Department (over and above the activities of
the Coast Guard and Navy)"); Letter from Adm. O.W. Siler, Commandant, U.S.
Coast Guard, to Rep. Paul Simon (May 26, 1976), reprintedin 122 CONG. REC. E3147
(daily ed. June 7, 1976) (Defense Department could be called upon by Coast Guard
in the event a foreign fishing fleet were accompanied by armed escort vessels).
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torily authorized, raise no domestic legal impediments, 408 and would
4 09
be consistent with international law and practice.
As a consequence, it was no surprise that the FCMA, as finally approved, 410 gave even more express recognition to the use of naval and
other defense forces in enforcement than did the Bartlett Act. Thus,
not content with the broad language of the 1970 Bartlett Act amendment, Congress, in section 311 (a) of the FCMA, authorized the Secretaries of Commerce and Transportation (when the Coast Guard is
serving within that department), 4 11 "to utilize the personnel, services,
equipment (including aircraft and vessels), and facilities of any other
Federal agency, including all elements of the Department of Defense,
412
. . . in the enforcement program."
To date, the administration has shown no particular inclination to
rely on the Defense Department in FCMA enforcement, even though
some "Coast Guard and Navy cooperation in law enforcement planning is already a reality. '4 13 This posture should certainly be maintained, at least until the Act has received a proper test under actual
operating conditions. If a need arises for greater resources in the en408. See Naval Enforcement, supra note 308, at 361-65. The express language of
the FCMA serves to exempt enforcement activities under the Act from the otherwise
applicable prohibition of the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1970): see
Naval Enforcement, supra note 308, at 363. For an arguable violation of the Posse
Comitatus Act in the fishery law context, see the discussion of the use of the Navy for
vessel position-fixing by triangulation as a means of enforcing the Tuna Conventions
Act in Fish and Wildlife Briefings: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and
Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 94-2, at 169 (1975) (testimony of
Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., Deputy Ass't Sec'y of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs).
For its part, the Coast Guard is not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act, but regards
that law "as a statement of Federal policy to which the Coast Guard is sensitive when
authorizing [Coast Guard] assistance to law enforcement agencies." 415 COAST GUARD
L. BULL. 27, 28 (1976).

409. Naval Enforcement, supra note 308, at 358-61; see also note 306 supra.
410. The original House- and Senate-passed versions of the Act did not incorporate a specific reference to the Defense Department. Compare FCMA § 311(a), 16
U.S.C.A. § 1861 (West Supp. 1977) and S. REP. No. 94-711. 94th Cong.. 2d Sess.
59 (1976) with S. 961, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(a) (1975). S. REP. No. 94-416,
94th Cong.. Ist Sess. 42, 61 (1975) and H.R. 200, 94th Cong.. Ist Sess. § 314(a)(1)
(1975), H.R. REP. No. 94-445, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 19, 75 (1975).
411. The Coast Guard is a specialized service in the Navy in time of war. or as
directed by the President. See 14 U.S.C. § 3 (1970); 49 U.S.C. § 1655(b) (1970).
412. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(a) (West Supp. 1977) (emphasis added). The italicized
language was suggested by the Coast Guard. Letter from John H. Ely. Gen. Counsel.
U.S. Dep't of Transportation, to Rep. Leonor K. Sullivan, Chairperson, House Comm.
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries (Feb. 23, 1976) (on file with the Washington Law
Review).
413. 415 COAST GUARD L. BULL. 10, 11 (1976): see also 42 Fed. Reg. 17.895-6
(1977) (indicating Navy involvement in the observer program).
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forcement program-for example, if major foreign fleets seek to harvest FCZ resources in the absence of a GIFA, or if such fleets are accompanied by warships, as was the British fleet off Iceland-then and
only then should further attention be given to the possibility of using
defense forces for FCMA enforcement. 4 14 Should that time arrive,
sensitive interagency issues will have to be resolved. For example,
granted that it is the congressional intent that certain naval personnel
aboard naval enforcement units would be "deputized" under section
311 (a),415 it may be more prudent to detail Coast Guard personnel or
National Marine Fisheries Service agents aboard such vessels, with
only those persons empowered to lead boarding parties and make
arrests and seizures. Seemingly, adoption of the latter course would go
far toward minimizing the harshness in foreign eyes of high seas
boardings executed entirely by naval officers.
D.

Department of Justice

The Department of Justice will have an important function under
the FCMA, but it will be less than that which it enjoyed under the
Bartlett Act. The prior law gave the Department a key function in
every case referred to it, because the two principal sanctions4 16 provided-criminal prosecutions 417 and judicial forfeitures 418-absolutely required the department's cooperation in bringing the case to
trial. At times the power was critical, as when the United States Attorney declined to prosecute. 41 9 Furthermore, in every case, the United
States Attorney essentially had the last word once the other agencies
414. See Naval Enforcement, supra note 308, at 366; see also Fidel, The Laiv
and Fishery Enforcement on the High Seas, 101 U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROC., July,
1975, at 95, 97.
415. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(a) (West Supp. 1977). Such deputization would be
authorized by § 311(b), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(b), which refers, inter alia, to officers
"authorized ... by ... the head of any Federal ... agency which has entered into an

agreement with" the Secretaries of Commerce and of the Department in which the
Coast Guard is operating. It is to be expected that naval personnel who might be so

designated under departmental orders would be commissioned, warrant, or petty officers, to maintain the parallelism with Coast Guard law enforcement powers. See 14

U.S.C. § 89(a) (1970).
416. The Bartlett Act also provided for summary forfeiture. 16 U.S.C. § 1082(c)
(1970) (repealed 1976).

417.

Id. § 1082(a).

418. Id. § 1082(b).
419. See, e.g., Shelf Enforcement, supra note 106, at 151 & n.83 (release of Cuban
vessel Playa de Varadero); MAR. FISH. REV., June 1976, at 27.
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involved (the Departments of State and Commerce, and, to a degree,
420
the Coast Guard) had recommended a given disposition.
The new law both increases and decreases the Justice Department's
role. By deleting the provision for summary (or administrative) forfeitures, 42 1 the FCMA requires that all forfeiture proceedings be conducted before a federal district judge. At the same time, the provision
for administrative hearings and civil penalties, with statutory criteria
for their imposition, 422 will certainly divert at least some of the case
load from the courts, leaving the Justice Department with the more
secondary role of collecting an assessed penalty42 3 or of defending the
424
Commerce Department in a judicial review proceeding.
E.

United States Customs Service

Another agency whose role has changed under the new law is the
Customs Service of the Department of the Treasury. The Bartlett Act
provided for enforcement by the Treasury Department, along with the
Department of Commerce (as successor to the Department of the Interior) and the department in which the Coast Guard was operating. 42 5
Indeed, the Treasury even shared rulemaking power with the Department of Commerce, 42 6 although no Treasury regulations were ever
42 7
issued under the Bartlett Act.
Under its enforcement authority, the Treasury occasionally aided in

420. See generally Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8, at 732-33 & nn. 163-65.
421. See FCMA § 310(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1860(a) (West Supp. 1977).
422. Id. § 308(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1858(a).
423. Id. § 308(c), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1858(c).
424. Id. § 305(d), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1855(d) (review of rulemaking); id. § 308(b),
16 U.S.C.A. § 1858(b) (review of civil penalties). The statute requires service of the
notice of appeal from a civil penalty only on the Secretary of Commerce. Section 308.
however, should not be construed as conferring on the Commerce Department a
power to defend a § 308(b) civil penalty review case to the exclusion of the Department of Justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1970). For a discussion of review of rulemaking, see Comment, Judicial Review of Fishery Management Regulations Under
The Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 52 WASH. L. REv. 599 (1977).
425. 16 U.S.C. § 1083(a) (1970) (repealed 1976). The powers exercised by the
Department of the Interior devolved on the Secretary of Commerce under Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970. 3 C.F.R. 1075 (1966-1970 Compilation), reprinted in
5 U.S.C. App. at 614 (1970) and in 84 Stat. 2090 (1970). The various changes in
governmental organization appear in Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8. at 731
n.155.
426. 16 U.S.C. § 1084 (1970) (repealed 1976); see also note 425 supra.
427. See Shelf Enforcement, supra note 106, at 137 & n.14.
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implementation of the former law. 428 In general, however, the customs service enforcement role under the Bartlett Act was peripheral.
The FCMA works an important change with respect to the role of the
Treasury and the Customs Service in enforcement. Because the
Treasury is not referred to in section 31 (a), customs officers are not
automatically authorized to enforce the new law. 429 Nevertheless, it
would be sensible for the two Secretaries who have basic enforcement
responsibility (Commerce and -Transportation) to enter into an interagency agreement with the Treasury to make use of Customs field personnel and equipment where appropriate. The recent unanticipated
seizures off the Texas coast counsel such a course of action, although,
as with all cooperation among specially designated agencies, it should
be made clear that responsibility for coordinating enforcement and
setting enforcement policy rests with the Coast Guard and National
430
Marine Fisheries Service.
Independent of any special designation, the Treasury does have
power under section 205(b) to "take such action as may be necessary
and appropriate to prohibit the importation into the United States of"
certain fish and fish products when the Secretary of State makes a determination that a foreign nation has failed to grant United States vessels equitable access to regulated fisheries or has taken other actions
warranting a retaliatory import prohibition under section 205(a). In
this event, the power of the Customs Service would be independently
brought into play just as it is in the enforcement of any duty law or
428. See, e.g., She/f Enforcement, supra note 106, at 147-50; Bartlett Act Status
Report, supra note 8, at 720 n.9 1; Note, Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea:
A Synopsis, 13 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 628, 636 (1976).
429. The omission appears to have been intentional, seemingly reflecting the

view that the Treasury's role under the Bartlett Act was an anachronism traceable to
the fact that the Coast Guard was a part of the Treasury at the time the Bartlett Act
was passed. See 1975 House Merchant Marine Hearings,supra note 1, at 659 (testimony of William C. Brewer, Gen. Counsel, NOAA) (semble). Since the Bartlett Act
referred separately to the Treasury and the Department of which the Coast Guard was
a part, however, see 16 U.S.C. § 1083(a) (1970) (repealed 1976), it seems more
likely that the Treasury was listed because, until 1967, the Customs Service had responsibility for vessel documentation-a critical function in light of the vessel
licensing provisions in § 1081 of the Bartlett Act. See generally Bartlett Act Status
Report, supra note 8, at 708 n.27, 731 n.155.
430. The notion that Customs agents would have to follow enforcement rules set
by other agencies is evident from the clause in the petty offense "citations" provision,
FCMA § 311(c), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(c) (West Supp. 1977), that any enforcement
officer may issue a citation "in accordance with regulations issued jointly by the Secretary [of Commerce] and the Secretary of the department in which the Coast Guard
is operating." For a converse requirement applicable to Coast Guard law enforcement
personnel, see 14 U.S.C. § 89(b)(2) (1970).
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import restriction program. Similarly, it would be appropriate for
Customs personnel to be involved in shoreside enforcement of the section 307(l)(G) prohibition on importing and exporting of "any fish
taken or retained in violation of" the FCMA.
The FCMA, however, contrary to a suggestion that the Customs
Service "should continue to be involved in initial confiscation-seizure
procedures," 43 1 merely incorporates by reference those portions of the
customs laws in a section authorizing post-judgment seizures by the
Attorney General. 432 Indeed, the Act specifically negates any suggestion that Customs may apply Customs remedies. Instead, it provides
that the "duties and powers imposed upon the Commissioner of Customs or other persons under such provisions shall, with respect to this
Act, be performed by officers or other persons designated for such
purpose by the Secretary [of Commerce] ."433 In this fashion, the
FCMA serves to clarify the rather obscure allocation of functions for
such matters as remission or mitigation of forfeitures and compromise
434
of claims under the Bartlett Act.
F. Department of State
Under the Bartlett Act, the State Department had a major voice in
many of the critical enforcement decisions. The precise nature of this
voice is classified information, 435 but some details of the Department's
responsibility are known. For example, the State Department was
among the agencies consulted in setting government negotiating positions in prosecutions under the Act. 436 The Department was also consulted on whether a seizure should be made in individual cases 437-a
43 1. NAT'L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
UNDER EXTENDED JURISDICTION: A STUDY OF PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 50 (1975).
432. FCMA § 3 10(c), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1860(c) (West Supp. 1977).
433. Id.
434. See 16 U.S.C. § 1082(c) (1970) (repealed 1976).
435. See 1975 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 164. at 160 (testimony of
Rear Adm. Robert H. Scarborough, Chief, Office of Operations, U.S. Coast Guard);
N.Y. Times. Apr. 10, 1977. § 1, at 1. col. I & 17. col. 6; Washington Post. Apr. 11.
1977, at Al. col. I &A6. col. 1.
436. See Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8, at 732-33 & n.163. Within the
Department the responsibility for fisheries matters rests with the Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. 22 U.S.C. § 2655a (Supp. V 1975).
See also 42 Fed. Reg. 24,793 (1977).
437. The Department of State is reportedly not asked for approval, but rather
whether it has any objection to the seizure. Hill, NOAA and the Coast Guard: The
Two-Million Square Mile Challenge, NOAA MAGAZINE, July 1976, at 8. 12. See, e.g.,
Honolulu Advertiser, July 13. 1976, at A3, col. I (release of Japanese fishing vessels
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role that was not received uncritically on Capitol Hill 4 3 8-and was
the source of specific instructions to the Coast Guard for enforcement
of the prohibition on foreign harvesting of Continental Shelf fishery
4 39
resources.
On the basis of early evidence, the precise role of the Department
of State in enforcement of the FCMA does not appear to have been
altered materially from its role under the Bartlett Act. Mechanisms
appear to be in place for the expression of State Department and
White House 440 views on such matters as which of the available sanctions should be invoked in a given case-consistent with the right to a
fair hearing under section 308(a)-if the Department of Commerce
decides to assess a civil penalty. Such a mechanism would be an appropriate reflection of the interaction between enforcement with respect to foreign fishing vessels and the conduct of foreign policy. 44 1
Negotiation of GIFA's under section 201(c) also involves the Department in enforcement decisionmaking, particularly in allocating among
foreign nations the total allowable catch under the provisions of section 201(e). 442 Although the question is not addressed in the statute,
it seems likely that the Department will also be influential in defining
the enforcement program with respect to foreign fishing for anadromous species beyond the fisheries conservation zone, because of the sensitiveness of such enforcement in the absence of international agreeMEI-520 and MEI-579 following contiguous fisheries zone violation at Laysan Is.).
In practical effect, the distinction between approval and lack of objection seems to be

illusory.

438. See 1975 House Merchant Marine Hearings, supra note 1, at 112-13 (testimony of Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., Deputy Ass't Sec'y of State for Oceans and Fish-

eries Affairs); id. at 209-210 (colloquy between Rep. Sullivan and Adm. O.W. Siler,
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard); Fishery Jurisdiction: Hearings on Extending the
Jurisdictionof the United States Beyond the Present Twelve-Mile Fishery Zone Before
the Subconin. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and The Environment of the
House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 93-37,

at 89 (1974) (testimony of Rear Adm. Helmer S. Pearson, Comdr., 1st Coast Guard
Dist.); 1975 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 164, at 160 (colloquy between

Francis D. Heyward, Subcomm. Counsel, and Rear Adm. Scarborough).
439. Letter from Linwood Holton, Assistant Sec'y of State for Congressional Relations, to Rep. John D. Dingell, Chairman, Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife

Conservation and the Environment, House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
(Dec. 16, 1974), reprinted in 1975 House Merchant Marine Hearings, supra note 1,
at 154-59.
440. 42 Fed. Reg. 12,176 (1977) (to be codified as 49 C.F.R. § 1.46(v)). See N.Y.

Times, Apr. 10, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 2; id., Apr. 11, 1977, § 1, at 11, col. 1.
441. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A MARINE FISHERIES PROGRAM
NATION § 1.5.4, at 31 (1976).
442. See FCMA § 201(e)(3), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(e)(3) (West Supp. 1977).

FOR THE

591

Washington Law Review

Vol. 52: 513, 1977

ment. 443 It is also probable that the Department will consult with

the Coast Guard under section 201(c)(2)(C) concerning the types
of position-fixing and identification equipment that foreign vessels will
have to carry. Finally, a crucial enforcement-related role will be played
by the State Department in the conduct of boundary negotiations with
adjacent or opposite foreign nations, 444 because such negotiations will
determine the territorial extent of the fisheries conservation zone.
G.

Regional Fishery Management Councils

Little can be said about the role of the Regional Fishery Management Councils, because the FCMA does not appear to confer direct
general enforcement functions on these bodies. The sole exception,
aside from a rather vague authorization to "prescribe such other
measures, requirements, or conditions and restrictions as are determined to be necessary and appropriate for the conservation and management of the fishery, ' '445 is found in the enumeration of discretionary provisions available to the Councils for inclusion in fishery
management plans. Under this exception, a management plan, whether
prepared by the Council or by the Secretary of Commerce, may "prohibit, limit, condition, or require the use of specified types and quantities of fishing gear, including devices which may be requiredtofacilitate
enforcement of the provisions of this Act.

'446

Hence, the powers of

the Council under section 303 are analogous to the "appropriate position fixing and identification equipment" requirement for GIFA's (and,
hence, for licensed foreign fishing vessels) found in section 201. Because the Coast Guard, which must designate such equipment, 447 is
represented on the Councils 448 and is consulted as to enforcement at

449 it is
sea before a plan is approved by the Commerce Department,
to be hoped that the two powers would be exercised as consistently
as the substance of the various management plans and fishing methods
permit.
443.
444.

See generally id. §§ 3(a), 307(2)(B), 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1802(1), 1857(2)(B).
Id. § 202(d), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1822(d). See text accompanying notes 93-99

supra.

445.
446.
447.

FCMA § 303(b)(7), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(b)(7) (West Supp. 1977).
Id. § 303(b)(4), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(b)(4) (emphasis added).
Id. § 201(c)(2)(C), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(c)(2)(C), discussed in note

supra.

448.
449.
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FCMA § 302(c)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(c)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1977).
Id. § 304(b)(2), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(b)(2).
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H.

State Agencies

Among the statements of policy announced by the Congress in the
FCMA is the goal of drawing upon "Federal, State, and academic
capabilities in carrying out research, administration, management,
and enforcement."45 0 Clearly some state role in enforcement is contemplated, but is is equally clear that the use of state enforcement
agencies to assist in carrying out the FCMA and the regional management plans presents a variety of practical as well as legal problems.
First, the new law changes the regime established under the Bartlett
Act. Under that legislation, state officers could be designated as federal law enforcement personnel45 -- a power that was never
exercised 452 -but there was no express provision for the use of state
equipment such as aircraft and vessels. 4 53 As a consequence, it could
be questioned whether a state patrol vessel or aircraft would have
been authorized to exercise the right of hot pursuit, because this right
springs not from the identity of the law enforcement officer, but from
the character of the vessel or aircraft giving the requisite signal to
stop. 454 In contrast, the FCMA authorizes the Secretarities of Commerce and of the department in which the Coast Guard is operating,
by agreement, to "utilize the personnel, services, equipment (including
aircraft and vessels), and facilities . . . of any State agency" in enforcement of the law. 455 The Secretaries could properly, and indeed
should determine that the states not be given this power in light of the
potential international complications that could arise from its exercise.
The legislative history reveals an unmistakable intention that the
powers to be exercised by enforcement officials of agreement states be
450.

Id. § 2(c)(3), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801(c)(3).

451. 16 U.S.C. § 1083(a) (1970) (repealed 1976).
452. Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8, at 731; Coast Guard Authorizations: Hearings on S. 2924 Before the Subcomm. On Merchant Marine of the Senate

Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong. 2d Sess., ser. 94-54, at 20 (1976) (testimony of
Adm. O.W. Siler, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard). See 41 Fed. Reg. 26,019, 26,020

(1976) (limitation of enforcement of Continental Shelf clause of Bartlett Act to cer-

tain Coast Guard, NMFS, and Customs personnel "or any other duly authorized

Federal enforcemeht officer").
453. See Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8,at 731 n. 159.
454. See generally N. POULANTZAS, THE RIGHT OF HOT PURSUIT IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1969); Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, art. 23(4), [1962]
2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; cf. Revised Single Negotiating Text, art. 99(5), 5 Third U.N. Conf., supra note 6, at 151, 168, U.N. Doc.
AICONF.62/WP.8IRev.lIPt.II at 47 (1976).
455. FCMA § 311(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1861(a) (West Supp. 1977).
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narrower than those of federal law enforcement personnel. Thus, the
House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee report on H.R. 200
explained:
[i] n regard to any State agency, such personnel, services, and facilities
could be used for purposes of enforcement with respect to domestic
vessels wherever such domestic vessels may be found. With respect to
foreign vessels, such personnel and services could be used only when
such vessels are found within the fisheries conservation and management zone. 456
This assertion is unexceptionable in the sense that it shows that the
coastal nation may exercise control over vessels flying its own flag
anywhere; 457 however, it also seems to indicate that an agreement
state patrol vessel could not undertake enforcement against a foreign
vessel illegally harvesting Continental Shelf fishery resources beyond
the fisheries conservation zone. The statute itself does not support this
distinction, although the limited endurance of state patrol vessels and
aircraft may counsel it as a practical matter.45 8 Moreover, psychological considerations could play a role, as perhaps suggested by Representative Leggett's observation in the hearings that "[i]t would be
pretty difficult to have a State fish and game warden to come nose to
nose with a Soviet ship." 459 The Commerce Department's response to
this was a qualified assent: "We would not anticipate that that would
460
be primarily the situation."
At the same hearings another administration witness summarized
the agreement state enforcement role by saying, "[T] here is provision
for enforcement by the States, and it would be with respect to U.S.
nationals, and enforcement offshore would be by the Coast
Guard. '4 61 A slightly different emphasis appeared in the Conference
Report, which stated that "it is the understanding of the conferees that
State officers will be employed widely in assisting in the enforcement
456.

H.R. REP. No. 94-445, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1975), reprinted in LEGIS-

LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 1051, 1128-29.

457. See Maul v. United States. 274 U.S. 501 (1927); Convention on the High
Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, art. 6(l). [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82.

458. See Bartlett Act Status Report, supra note 8, at 731 & n.159, 752 & n.285.
459. 1975 House Merchant Marine Hearings, supra note I, at 649 (remarks of
Rep. Leggett).
460. Id. (testimony of David Wallace, Associate Adm'r for Marine Resources.
NOAA).
461.
Id. at 648 (testimony of William C. Brewer, Gen. Counsel. NOAA).
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of this Act; however, in general it is expected that such State officers
will be employed primarily in areas proximate to their own States and
'462
where Federal personnel are unavailable.
The best summary of the intent of Congress came not in connection
with the FCMA, but in the hearings on a Coast Guard authorization
measure 463 that occurred while the FCMA was in conference. According to Senator Stevens, one of the managers on the part of the
Senate:
We at one time contemplated an amendment that would require the
utilization by the management councils of the enforcement agencies of
the States adjacent to the 200-mile zone with regard to domestic fishermen and, on the other hand, would have required them to utilize the
Coast Guard in any relationship to any foreign vessel.
We decided not to complicate your life in that regard by putting it
directly into law. But that is our intent and it was stated on the floor.
The direct day-to-day relationship in terms of management of resources, including enforcement, ought to come from the State fish and
game agencies. However, none of those State agencies would have any
direct relationship to foreign fishing vessels. In our opinion that
should come only through the Coast Guard and not through people
who are not trained in international aspects of law enforcement.
It may be the wrong way to put it, but we don't see any reason why
we should make a Federal case out of an isolated fisheries violation
that could be handled, in terms of local domestic fishermen, by the
local agencies involved.
On the other hand, we don't want local fisheries agencies steaming
464
up and trying to board some foreign vessel.
One may fault legislators for not clarifying this matter in the statute
itself, particularly because the FCMA was still in conference at the
time. If the congressional intent was as strong as it appears to have
been, then an appropriate amendment should have been made. As it
stands, if agreements between state agencies and the federal authorities
expressly exclude the power to enforce with respect to foreign craft, a
question could arise if an apprehension of a foreign vessel is nonethe462. S. REP. No. 94-711, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. ser. 93-94, 58 (1976) reprinted in
supra note 4, at 37, 93-94.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,

463. S. 2924, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
464. Coast Guard Authorizations: Hearing on S. 2924 Before the Subcomm. on
Merchant Marine of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 9454, at 19-20 (1976) (statement of Sen. Stevens).
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less made by a state patrol vessel. Another question could arise if a
civil penalty were sought to be imposed against a foreign vessel, without a boarding, on the basis of reports from a state patrol. On the
former point, any violation of inter-agency regulations should not vitiate the proceedings, on the ground that such limitations are not imposed
for the benefit of the foreign fisherman. 46 5 The latter problem should
similarly be dismissed, for the further reason that if no boarding has
occurred, the possibility of international confrontation is minimized.
A matter of some importance domestically is whether states should
be empowered to enforce a management plan against vessels homeported in other states. Under section 306(a) of the FCMA, "[n] o
State may directly or indirectly regulate any fishing which is engaged
in by any fishing vessel outside its boundaries, unless such vessel is
registered under the laws of such State. '46 6 It is unclear whether this
provision applies to states that are enforcing the FCMA under section
311 (a) agreements, or rather to states seeking to enforce their own
fisheries legislation. If the former are intended to be covered, then
Senator Stevens' remarks appear to have been in error to the extent
that they suggest state competence to enforce within the 200-mile
zone with respect to domestic fishing. The better view seems to be that
section 306(a) only bars states from applying their own legislation
46 7
against fishing vessels of other states beyond the three-mile limit.
Related questions of agreement state enforcement concern the propriety of enforcement by one state in the territorial waters of another,
the fact that two neighboring states may not be in the same fisheries
465. See Note, Violations by Agencies of Their Own Regulations, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 629 (1974).
466. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1856(a) (West Supp. 1977).
467. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941). The reference in § 306(a) to
vessels "registered under the laws of [a] State" must be taken with a grain of salt.
because a literal reading would bar any state control over fishing by vessels that have
federal documentation, 46 U.S.C. §§ 251, 263 (1970); 46 C.F.R. §67.03-13 (1976).
even as to the state in which such vessels are homeported. The legislative intent is
believed to have been to cover all vessels homeported in a state, whether those vessels
have federal documentation or are simply numbered under state boating laws. See 46
U.S.C. § 1452(3) (Supp. V 1975). Corrective legislation to clarify this point is desirable. The states, of course, retain the power to impose "reasonable, nondiscriminatory
conservation . .. measures," Douglas v. Seacoast Products. Inc., 97 S.Ct. 1740. 1748
(1977); see also State v. Bundrant, 456 P.2d 530 (Alas.), appeal dismissed sub nora.
Uri v. Alaska, 97 S.Ct. 40 (1976), although it is conceivable that even measures
meeting that test might be ruled invalid on the ground of inconsistency with the
FCMA. State landing laws that establish size or weight limits more restrictive than
limits fixed under the FCMA might be found to be preempted by the federal legislation and implementing regulations.
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management region, and the possible application of the Uniform Act
on Close Pursuit46 8 to marine chases between states. Because the regional plans may well differ, and authorities of an agreement state in
one region may be unfamiliar with the detailed requirements of a
neighboring region, a very strong case can be made for limiting agreement state enforcement activities to the particular region of which it is
a part. A less strong, but in the author's view, persuasive case can be
made for limiting a state's enforcement powers to the segment of the
fishery conservation zone that extends seaward from the state's territorial waters, excluding them, except for hot pursuit, from activities'int
waters of any other state--even in the same region.
A last question relates to how the agreement states will finance their
enforcement programs. Aside from any question as to constitutionality,469 or the suggestion that agreement states should share in any
penalties that might be imposed, 4 70 this problem remains to be solved.
In principle, however, the FCMA should not form the basis for a
sweeping federal assumption of responsibility for state enforcement
efforts within the territorial waters, unless and until the section
306(b)(1) power to supplant state laws in this zone is used to a significant degree.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 creates an
elaborate enforcement program calling upon federal and state agencies to cooperate in new and, to a degree, untried ways. The Act's
enforcement design is generally consistent with the terms of the Revised Single Negotiating Text of the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea, although the provisions for imprisonment of

468. See, e.g., N.Y. GRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.55 (MeKinney 1971): cf. id. § 140.10
(granting New York law enforcement officers the power to pursue into cooperating

states).
469.

While the analogy is imperfect, the notion of the police force being com-

pensated on a per-case basis is at least reminiscent of the justice of the peace who
shares in the fines he imposes. Connally v. Georgia, 97 S.Ct. 546 (1977); Ward v.
Village of Monroeville, Ohio, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510

(1927).
470. See 1975 House Merchant Marine Hearings, supra note 1, at 649 (remarks
of Rep. Leggett).

597

Washington Law Review

Vol. 52: 513, 1977

offenders are an important exception. 4 71 The Act works significant
changes in the pattern of enforcement that was developed under prior
United States fisheries legislation, including the Bartlett Act. Some
perceived weaknesses in the former regulatory scheme have been
shored up, but new ones may have been added in their place. Whether
the law turns out to be workable will depend, in large measure, not
only upon the commitment of adequate resources to the enforcement
program, but also on whether acceptable Governing International
Fishery Agreements can be negotiated with all foreign nations that
have active fisheries off the coasts of the United States. Conclusion of
the necessary boundary agreements will also be critical to successful
implementation. Failure on any of these counts could be fatal to the
new law.
Past enforcement efforts, both within the twelve-mile exclusive fishing
zone in effect from 1966 to 1977 and as to protection of Continental
Shelf fishery resources beyond that limit, demonstrate that marine fisheries protection measures can be a reality, even over a vast expanse
of ocean. Although there is every reason, then, to be optimistic that
the salutary objectives of the FCMA can be achieved, this optimism is
necessarily guarded, because important factors lie beyond the power of
a single country to control.

471. For extensive discussion of the issue of consistency between the FCMA and
Revised Text, see Jacobson & Cameron, Potential Conflicts Between a Future Law
of the Sea Treaty and The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976,
52 WASH. L. REV. 451 (1977).
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